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Abstract
I t is envisaged that the use of cheap and tiny wireless sensors will soon bring a thirdwave of evolution in computing systems. Billions of wireless senor nodes will pro-
vide a bridge between information systems and the physical world. Wireless nodes
deployed around the globe will monitor the surrounding environment as well as gather
information about the people therein. It is clear that this revolution will put security so-
lutions to a great test.
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are a challenging environment for applying secu-
rity services. They differ in many aspects from traditional xed networks, and standard
cryptographic solutions cannot be used in this application space. Despite many research
efforts, key distribution in WSNs still remains an open problem. Many of the proposed
schemes suffer from high communication overhead and storage costs, low scalability and
poor resilience against different types of attacks. The exclusive usage of simple and en-
ergy efcient symmetric cryptography primitives does not solve the security problem. On
the other hand a full public key infrastructure which uses asymmetric techniques, dig-
ital signatures and certicate authorities seems to be far too complex for a constrained
WSN environment. This thesis investigates a new approach to WSN security which ad-
dresses many of the shortcomings of existing mechanisms. It presents a detailed descrip-
tion on how to provide practical Public Key Cryptography solutions for wireless sensor
networks. The contributions to the state-of-the-art are added on all levels of development
beginning with the basic arithmetic operations and nishing with complete security pro-
tocols.
This work includes a survey of different key distribution protocols that have been
developed for WSNs, with an evaluation of their limitations. It also proposes Identity-
Based Cryptography (IBC) as an ideal technique for key distribution in sensor networks.
It presents the rst in-depth study of the application and implementation of Pairing-
Based Cryptography (PBC) to WSNs. This is followed by a presentation of the state of
the art on the software implementation of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) on typical
WSNplatforms. New optimized algorithms for performingmultiprecisionmultiplication
on a broad range of low-end CPUs are introduced as well. Three novel protocols for key
distribution are proposed in this thesis. Two of these are intended for non-interactive key
exchange in at and clustered networks respectively. A third key distribution protocol
uses Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) to secure communication within a heterogeneous
sensor network. This thesis includes also a comprehensive security evaluation that shows
that proposed schemes are resistant to various attacks that are specic to WSNs. This
work shows that by using the newest achievements in cryptography like pairings and
IBC it is possible to deliver affordable public-key cryptographic solutions and to apply a
sufcient level of security for the most demanding WSN applications.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
T oday's computing systems have evolved much since the 70's when the rst per-sonal computers were released. Advances in electronics and circuit miniaturiza-
tion has brought us to a point where a fully operational computing system can t on a
tip of a nger. Taking into consideration the size of computers and their numbers, we
can easily distinguish three waves in evolution of computing (Fig 1.1). In the beginning
computers were very rare and usually operated by few people. The advent of mobile
phones and notebook computers has resulted in millions of units sold at the turn of the
century. Nowadays, the third wave of evolution is about to happen. Billions of tiny and
cheap computing devices deployed around the world will soon gather, analyze and ex-
change information about the people and the environment they live in. Those pervasive
computing devices are not personal computers as we tend to think of them, but very
small devices, that will be eventually embedded in almost any type of object imaginable,
including cloths, cars, tools, appliances and various consumer goods.
Those tiny devices embed sensors and wireless transceivers to communicate with
each other and form distributed networks connected to the Internet. Their main task is to
build a bridge between the physical world and the digital world that is displayed on our
computer screens. In this way it is possible not only to monitor the physical world but
also actuate remotely depending on the measurement data. With advances in this eld,
new intelligent control systems will be available that are completely autonomous and can
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Figure 1.1: Three waves of computing systems evolution
act adequately without human supervision.
At the dawn of a new century we are facing new problems that will need denite
solutions in the near future. Our planet's climate is changing rapidly and we need global
and accurate measurement data to better understand what is happening around us. We
also need to reduce communication systems costs, and conserve energy and natural re-
sources. Wireless sensors technology brings us a step closer to resolving those (and many
more) issues. Sensors can even alert us about incoming natural disasters and help ght
against environmental degradation. The emergence ofWireless Sensor Networks (WSNs)
is brought about by a convergence of advanced electronic and wireless technologies.
There is no doubt that WSNs will be deployed on a large scale in many different parts of
the world. This next generation of computing brings many new challenges not only be-
cause we are dealing with very constrained devices, but also because scale really matters
here.
The whole WSN paradigm is often described with terms such as smart dust [119],
the internet of things or pervasive computing that will revolutionize the way people
live. This revolution, however, can only happen if we nd the solution to crucial prob-
lems of security and privacy in these systems. This is especially important for widespread
adoption of WSN technology in many different domains. The range of WSN applications
spans from environmental monitoring and home automation to more complex ones like
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trafc control and health care. All these applications require various security levels and
services. Simple applications like habitat monitoring (e.g [84]) need only basic security
assurances that can be fullled by using symmetric key systems.
There are also many practical applications, where sensor devices can control the op-
eration of critical equipment, monitor assembly lines and perform condition based moni-
toring of critical structures. For example, sensor devices are deployed on the Golden Gate
Bridge in San Francisco to monitor structure vibrations [72]. The importance of security
in such an application justies the use of a high security level in the network.
We can identify a whole range of commercial applications that are deployed in pub-
lic areas, where the threat of a physical attack is larger than usual. These applications
include water quality monitoring, tunnel lighting control, street trafc and parking mon-
itoring. In many cases, commercial buildings waste vast amounts of energy by inefcient
Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) usage. Wireless sensor networks can
provide intelligent control based on precise real-time measurements to reduce the energy
consumption of those systems. Sensor networks can also provide energy monitoring and
automatic meter readings in our homes. All such systems require reliable security solu-
tions that will allow wider deployments in the real world.
There are also other important applications in the military and health-care spheres,
where security has the highest priority. Such systems should depend on public-key tech-
nology in order to full all the security requirements. There is a need for a scalable public
key cryptography solution that would set the stage for an array of new and innovative
applications in wireless sensor network arena.
Sensor networks are easier to attack and harder to protect than other types of net-
works. In many cases, sensor networks are deployed in open, unattended areas that any-
one can access. The wireless nature of communication between the sensor nodes makes it
easy to eavesdrop, intercept and inject bogus information into an unprotected network.
The security problem becomes evenmore crucial when we allowwireless senors not only
to gather data about people and the environment, but also to actuate on their own, based
on their sensor readings. It is obvious that such a revolution in computing puts security
solutions to a great test.
Wireless sensor networks are clearly a very challenging environment for applying
security services. They differ in many aspects from traditional xed, networks and stan-
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dard cryptographic solutions cannot be used in this application space. Looking at ex-
isting security mechanisms for WSNs, we can see that they are still in their early stages
and the level of security provided is not satisfactory for many applications. Despite many
research efforts, the problems of key distribution and authentication are still open and re-
quire new cryptographic solutions. These new security mechanisms have to take advan-
tage of specic sensor network features and meet the strict limitations of WSN hardware
platforms.
1.1 Wireless Sensor Network overview
Wireless sensor networks can be described as an emerging new technology with a very
promising future. However, someone may actually ask the question; why do we really
need wireless communication in this area when wired sensor systems are working ne
for years now. Wired sensors can be found in many places. Buildings are full of CCTV
cameras, intrusion sensors, smoke detectors, light sensors and many others. It may seem
that moving to the wireless domain is not necessary, as the RF spectrum is already
crowded by other communication systems. The main advantage of WSNs is that they
have much lower installation and connection cost. This is especially important in the
case of large distributed systems where the price of wiring can be really signicant. Ad-
ditionally, wireless communication allows deployment in new inaccessible areas even by
people without any prior engineering experience.
We can dene a WSN as a wireless network of spatially-distributed autonomous de-
vices that use sensors to cooperatively monitor physical or environmental conditions,
such as temperature, humidity, sound, vibration, pressure, motion or pollution, at dif-
ferent locations [102]. A typical WSN consist of a large number of tiny computing de-
vices that relay information through each other until it reaches the destination node (sink
node). The sink node is a gateway device that has a connection with the xed network
and in some cases is a higher class device with greater capabilities. An example of a typ-
ical WSN scenario is presented in Fig 1.2.
Usually each node in a sensor network can collect data, act as a router and be a source
of information at the same time. Such a diversity in functionality is not common in tradi-
tional xed networks where a dedicated device is typically used for each function. This
approach requires that each sensor node can support a multi-hop routing algorithm for
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Figure 1.2: Typical wireless sensor network scenario
nding the routes in the network.
A single WSN device (apart from some sensors) is typically equipped with a radio
transceiver, memory, battery and a Central Processing Unit (CPU) that controls the op-
eration of the whole device. Sensor nodes are often called motes [1] and come in many
different shapes and sizes. The smallest System-on-a-Chip (SoC) devices designed for re-
search purposes (Smart Dust project) were just 2:5mm £ 2:5mm [62]. The crucial factor
here is the size of the battery and the antenna. Basically the smallest fully operational de-
vices are the size of the smallest batteries manufactured so far. Typical commercial motes
are usually no smaller than two AA batteries or coin cells.
Wireless sensors are designed to support unattended operation for long periods of
time. For many applications their expected lifespan on a single pack of batteries is around
2 years. This of course varies a lot depending on the algorithm's computational complex-
ity, communication overhead and duty cycling. Energy conservation is one of the most
important issues in sensor networks that needs to be considered when designing a net-
work protocol. Some platforms try to solve this problem by using alternative, renewable
energy sources. Themost promising concepts are the ones that utilizes solar cells, thermal
power or vibration energy. Intensive research is ongoing in the area of energy harvesting
for WSNs [104].
The size of a sensor network differs a lot depending on a given application and the
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coverage area. Typical transceivers have the range of approximately 100m in open area,
but in real-life applications motes are deployed much closer to each other. The number of
nodes varies from a few to several hundreds, so the scalability issue is important in case
of every network mechanism. The largest WSN deployment so far had 800 motes that
formed a single large self organized network [121].
The cost of a single sensor node depends on many factors and ranges from hundreds
of euro to a few cents. This variety depends mainly on the complexity of the particular
devices used to build the network. Size and cost are two major constraints for sensor
devices and they limit signicantly the node's resources such as bandwidth, memory,
energy and computing power.
1.1.1 WSN hardware platforms
From a security point of view proper understanding of hardware limitations and capabil-
ities is really crucial. It is clear that the level of security achieved is directly proportional
to the processing power required. This resource, together with memory is usually very
limited on sensor devices. The processing time needed for cryptographic calculations
should be short due to the short battery lifetime. There would be no use for a system that
offers a high level of security but at the same time depletes all of mote's energy in the
matter of few days. That is why WSN nodes require a lightweight cryptosystem.
WSN devices have to meet requirements that are usually specic to a given appli-
cation, but we can still distinguish several common features. Nodes should be small,
cheap, energy-efcient, and have to be equipped with the right set of sensors and have
enough memory and computational power to perform given tasks. Wireless communi-
cation within the network should be highly reliable even in the face of interference and
link failures. The WSN design space is very large and hardware platforms are suppose
to support more than one type of application. Due to the large variety in mote design
and parameters (memory size, microcontroller type and speed), it is hard to develop a
universal security solution that would t all hardware architectures. For cryptography
implementations available memory and specic CPU features are the most important
parameters. The security solutions that target WSNs should be optimized to work with
the most constrained devices (typically low-end 8-bit platforms).
From many available architectures we can choose several devices that are the most
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Figure 1.3:Wireless sensor network hardware platforms, from the left: MICAz, Tmote Sky, Imote2, bottom:
MICA2DOT
popular platforms at the moment (Fig. 1.3). Each of these motes might be regarded as
a representative of a certain class of sensor devices. The MICA2DOT represents nodes
with the most limited resources available. It is one of the smallest commercially avail-
able motes and is powered by a 3V coin cell. MICAz is a widely recognized 8-bit sensor
platform that was used in many different WSN research projects. Tmote Sky is a slightly
more powerful device with 16-bit processing and a broad range of sensors embedded on
the main Printed Circuit Board (PCB). The last device - Imote2 represents the most pow-
erful group of 32-bit sensor platforms that have a lot more capabilities than previously
mentioned nodes.
Cryptographic primitives are based on arithmetic operations and their efciency de-
pends mainly on the hardware support of a given microprocessor. In cryptography we
have to deal with large numbers that can have more than one thousand bits. Arithmetic
on such large integers is a time consuming task, especially on 8-bit CPUs. In order to op-
timize those operations we need to take advantage of all the specic features of a given
device.
Table 1.1 brings together many important parameters of popular WSN platforms.
Typical devices have 8 or 16-bit architectures and clock speeds around 4-8MHz. The data
memory available can be as low as 4kB and program storage might be limited to only
48kB. These constraints make it really difcult to implement some of the more complex
security primitives (as required in Public Key Cryptography - PKC). Another limitation is
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Table 1.1: Comparison of typical wireless sensor platforms
MICA2DOT MICA2 Tmote Sky Imote2
Processing 8-bit 8-bit 16-bit 32-bit
CPU Atmega128L Atmega128L MSP430 PXA271
Clock speed 4MHZ 7.38MHz 8.19MHz 13MHz
Program memory 128kB 128kB 48kB 32MB
RAM 4kB 4kB 10kB 256kB
FLASH 512kB 512kB 1MB 32MB
Arithmetic support Limited Limited Limited High
Active power 8mW 24mW 10mW 26mW
Sleep power 75¹W 75¹W 6¹W 330¹W
Wake up time 180¹s 180¹s 6¹s -
Radio CC1000 CC1000 CC2420 CC2420
Frequency 433MHz 433MHz 2.4GHz 2.4GHz
Data rate 38.4kb/s 38.4kb/s 250kb/s 250kb/s
Receive power 29mW 29mW 38mW 38mW
Transmit power 42mW 42mW 35mW 35mW
Battery 3V coin cell 2x AA 2x AA 3x AAA
the fact that many CPUs do not have good arithmetic support. Only high-end platforms
like the Imote2 have hardware capable of fast arithmetic operations with clock speeds
adjustable up to 416MHz.
Looking at the power consumption gures in Table 1.1 it is evident that radio com-
munication is very expensive and usually takes more energy than CPU operation. This
observation is extremely important and makes a big impact on every network protocol
design. Since wireless transmission is a major cause of power drainage, the number of
messages in the network should be reduced to a minimum. Low duty cycling should be
incorporated as well, so all the nodes in the network can stay asleep most of the time and
wake up onlywhen it is really necessary. An ideal security solution forWSNswould have
a small bandwidth overhead and low computational complexity to allow long network
operation.
1.2 Security issues in WSNs
Security is one of the most important and challenging problems in wireless sensor net-
works [117]. Sensor networks like any other communication systems need fundamental
security services. A secure WSN should posses the following security features [97]:
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² key distribution and management;
² information condentiality and privacy;
² secure routing;
² intrusion detection;
² data integrity;
² entity authentication;
² secure data aggregation.
All of the above features need to be provided if we want to have a fully secure WSN
system. Information condentiality and data integrity can be fullled by incorporating
simple link-layer security mechanisms that encrypt packets and use message authentica-
tion codes. Intrusion detection algorithms should control the access to the network and
allow only legitimate nodes to join the WSN. Authentication is an important security
property in sensor networks as it ensures the receiver, that the message did in fact origi-
nate from the claimed sender. In many cases the condentiality of simple sensor readings
is not as important as the origin of the data.
The establishment and distribution of shared keys between the sensor nodes is one
of the most important security services needed to ensure reliable networking. The above
security requirements can be fully addressed only by building upon a solid key distribu-
tion framework. Key management is an essential cryptographic mechanism upon which
other security primitives are built. Secure routing, messages condentiality and entity
authentication are not possible without a proper key distribution mechanism that boot-
straps the security in the network.
The task of applying an appropriate level of security within a sensor network is dif-
cult. In order to develop a security solution for WSNs we need to overcome several
challenges [112]:
Limited hardware. As mentioned earlier, sensor nodes are very constrained in terms of
resources. Only a small percentage of the total memory can be used for cryptogra-
phy and the overall security mechanism should be fast and energy efcient.
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Wireless communication. This type of communication is prone to jamming, eavesdrop-
ping and injection of malicious messages into the network. An additional problem
is the limited bandwidth of the system. Extra overhead required in providing the
security should not substantially degrade the overall efciency of the system.
Scalability. The security protocol must scale well with the size of the network. Tradi-
tional security solutions are designed for two-party settings and add a signicant
overhead in large scale sensor networks.
Versatility. Sensor networks have many different hardware platforms and conguration
modes that make them suitable for a wide range of applications. A security solution
designed for a at network topology will be unlikely to be the right choice in a clus-
tered network scenario. Optimal solutions should be tailored to a specic network
type.
Physical attacks. WSN nodes do not have secure storage for cryptographic keys, which
means that an active attacker can capture one or more nodes, intercept messages
and decode them using the derived secret key. Low cost sensor devices exclude the
possibility of using tamper-proof hardware.
All the severe constraints mentioned earlier, and the demanding deployment envi-
ronments, make WSN security more challenging than for traditional xed networks.
However, several properties of sensor networks may actually help to design security
services in such environment. The fact that the networks will usually comprise of large
numbers of nodes may help to increase the security as redundant motes may be used to
detect and defy possible threats. Another advantage from a security point of view is that
in the context of a WSN, there is a clearly identied single trusted authority, and that
is the original deployer of the network. The clearly identied existence of such an entity,
which is not always the case in cryptography, makes it easier to develop a solution. The
unique features of sensor networks allow novel solutions and security protocols that are
not possible in conventional networks.
WSNs are still at the design and research stage and security solutions may ultimately
be incorporated into the very foundations of system's architecture. It is important to
avoid the same mistakes as in case of Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) where
security was not obligatory from the beginning. To achieve a secure and reliable system
10
Chapter 1: Introduction
it is necessary to integrate security into every single component, since components with-
out security can become a potential point of attack.
1.3 Thesis contribution
The area of security for wireless sensor networks is very broad with many topics and
open problems. With the widespread use of WSN deployments the need for reliable se-
curity mechanisms will grow signicantly. Existing solutions are not sufcient for many
applications and new cryptographic schemes need to be developed. Despite the intense
research efforts there are still many security issues that have not been fully addressed
yet. Cryptographic key distribution and node authentication inside the sensor network
are the main problems that lack practical solutions. The solution to these problems is
essential for proper security bootstrapping in WSNs and is the main topic of this thesis.
1.3.1 Motivation
One approach to the problem of key distribution on low-powered sensor devices is to
restrict the set of cryptographic building blocks to the simplest cryptographic primitives
(block ciphers and hash functions), and then try to build a solution from these. This ap-
proach guarantees the lowest computational complexity at the cost of the level of security
provided. A more ambitious and challenging strategy is to imagine a close-to-ideal pub-
lic key cryptography solution, and then somehow try to make it practical. Following this
strategy is a lot more difcult, but offers security levels and services comparable with the
ones used in traditional computer networks.
Most of the WSN security solutions that have been proposed so far are very restricted
and rely only on simple symmetric primitives (e.g. [69], [40], [43]). Many of them reduce
the computational cost, but are not scalable and tend to dramatically increase the com-
munication overhead. They also do not provide a good trade-off between resilience and
storage of cryptographic keys. Symmetric key solutions are prone to physical attacks and
they do not work when a small number of nodes are captured by attackers. The security
of such systems is very limited when compared to Public Key Cryptography solutions.
Symmetric key techniques proposed in the literature usually defend against a particu-
lar security threat making the sensor network vulnerable to a range of dangerous attacks.
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It is difcult to combine many such mechanisms into a unique security solution due to
different or even conicting underlying assumptions. In contrast, Public Key Cryptogra-
phy provides a unied framework and a solid base for many security services that can be
build on top of it. Public Key Cryptography offers a more exible and simple interface,
without the need for key pre-distribution, pair-wise key sharing or complicated one-way
key chain schemes. The functionality of Public Key Cryptography schemes is highly de-
sirable in WSNs to enhance the security level of demanding applications.
Despite many advantages, Public Key Cryptography has its own drawbacks. It is
much more computationally expensive and uses larger key sizes than most symmet-
ric key algorithms. Traditional Public Key Cryptography systems also need authentica-
tion of public keys which is usually performed by certicates and digital signatures. The
management of certicates is usually very expensive and requires trusted infrastructure
which can be unavailable in many sensor network scenarios.
Typical security systems used in xed networks rely on a hybrid approach. They
use more expensive public key techniques only for session key establishment, and use
fast symmetric key algorithms for message encryption and decryption. Similar solutions
should be applied in the case of sensor networks. It is necessary that the nodes run cryp-
tographic operations based on primitives such as symmetric key encryption, hash func-
tions and Public Key Cryptography algorithms. Hash functions and block ciphers are the
standard building blocks that offer basic protection of the information that is exchanged
between nodes. They provide important security services such as condentiality of the
communication channel and integrity of the messages. Additionally, Public Key Cryp-
tography allows secure key exchange, node authentication, and protects against mali-
cious insiders that try to participate in information exchange. Therefore, it is essential to
use all three types of primitives to secure wireless sensor networks. However, many re-
searchers have ruled out public key cryptography claiming that it is too heavyweight for
constrained sensor devices [69], [97], [112], [98], [127].
Wireless sensor networks can have different network organization and communica-
tion patterns. A division into clusters is the most typical network topology in sensor
networks. In such scenario each cluster has a designated node, which aggregates the
data in the cluster (cluster head). The communication pattern in this type of a network
is many to one, where all cluster members send data directly to the cluster head. How-
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ever, somewireless sensor network applications require a different network organization.
Sensor networks used for industrial automation use a mesh topology, where each node
maintains communication with every other device in the network. This type of topol-
ogy requires different communication protocols and a security solution designed for a
clustered network scenario would not work here in an optimal way. Hence, the key dis-
tribution mechanism should be tailored to a specic network organization for optimal
performance.
1.3.2 Research objectives
As WSN applications mature, the need for reliable security systems grows signicantly
and justies the use of public key cryptography techniques to secure communication in
sensor networks. However, published results have shown that traditional public key so-
lutions (e.g. RSA [120]) are not suitable for constrained devices. Therefore Public Key
Cryptography was for a long time considered as an option that is beyond the capabilities
of wireless sensor nodes. The latest research results revisited this common opinion and
showed that Public Key Cryptography primitives based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC) are feasible on sensor devices [57]. This fact was a turning point in the area ofWSN
security and has motivated work on efcient Elliptic Curve Cryptography implementa-
tions on sensor nodes.
There are many Elliptic Curve Cryptography implementations onWSN nodes but not
much attention is focused on complete Public Key Cryptography solutions for sensor net-
works. So far only a few public key schemes have been proposed and none of them seems
to be a practical solution for the key distribution problem. Despite the fact that Elliptic
Curve Cryptography primitives are computationally feasible on sensor nodes, protocols
based on them are not. They require exchange and storage of large keys, which is expen-
sive, especially for the most constrained sensor devices. Practical Elliptic Curve Cryptog-
raphy schemes also need authentication of public keys, which is usually performed by
certicates and digital signatures. Sensor networks cannot afford a complicated Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI) and need new security schemes that can provide authentication
without using expensive certicates.
Elliptic Curve Cryptography brings us a step closer to applying Public Key Cryp-
tography in WSNs, but we need simple public key infrastructure solutions that would
13
Chapter 1: Introduction
enable fully functional security protocols in sensor networks. Bilinear pairings and Iden-
tity Based Cryptography (IBC) are new, promising security techniques that can full this
goal. We need to show that not only Public Key Cryptography primitives are feasible
but also that complete Public Key Cryptography protocols are practical in WSNs. The
use of the latest achievements in cryptography can bring this vision to reality. The main
objectives of this research are fourfold:
² to develop new PKC-based mechanisms that will solve many of the shortcomings
of existing key distribution protocols in sensor networks;
² to provide efcient software implementations of different Public Key Cryptography
primitives for sensor nodes;
² to investigate the application of Pairing Based Cryptography (PBC) in wireless sen-
sor networks;
² to design efcient key distributionmechanisms for large scale sensor networks with
various topologies.
The process of applying security in communication systems is a complex task that
requires important design decisions. We need to decide if the cryptographic primitives
will be implemented in hardware or in software. The rst approach is the best solution
performance-wise, but requires a dedicated hardware accelerator that would lift the total
cost of a node and complicate its design. This of course goes against the low-cost/small
size philosophy which is a priority for WSN devices. Software implementations are a few
orders of magnitude slower and not as efcient in terms of resources utilization, but they
are more exible and cost-effective solutions with rapid development time. Software so-
lutions also allow quick implementations of new cryptographic schemes on off-the-shelf
devices and allow tests on already deployed networks. That is why this thesis investi-
gates mainly software implementations of cryptographic schemes. This approach leads
also to conclusions as to whether or not reasonable security and performance levels can
be achieved with software-only cryptographic implementations, or is hardware support
really needed?
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1.3.3 Summary of contributions
This thesis presents a detailed description on how to provide practical Public Key Cryp-
tography solutions for wireless sensor networks. The contributions to the state-of-the-art
are added on all levels of development, beginning with the basic arithmetic operations
and nishing with complete security protocols. The reader is presented with the mathe-
matical foundations of all the cryptographic constructs used in this work. Based on this,
several new key distribution protocols are proposed and are evaluated on various WSN
platforms and network topologies. The thesis consists of 5 main contributions:
² Improved methods for nite eld arithmetic on low-end CPUs are described - in
particular, new optimised algorithms for large integer multiplication and binary
polynomial multiplication.
² A software package called NanoECC is presented. This cryptographic library pro-
vides ECC-based public key cryptography operations that were specically opti-
mised for different sensor network platforms. NanoECC can be exibly congured
and integrated into sensor network applications to provide protocols such as Ellip-
tic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) and Elliptic Curve Dife-Hellman
key exchange protocol (ECDH). NanoECC shows that Public Key Cryptography
based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography is not only viable, but in fact efcient for
resource-constrained sensor nodes.
² The rst in-depth study on the application of pairing-based cryptography to wire-
less sensor networks is presented. Micro-pairings present the state-of-the-art on
the implementation of bilinear pairings on a range of sensor network devices. Ef-
cient implementations of pairings enables such cryptographic schemes like Identity
Based Encryption (IBE), and thus opens new ways for achieving security in sensor
networks.
² On a system level, the application of identity-based cryptography is investigated.
The thesis proposes two new identity-based key-exchange protocols. The rst scheme
was designed for at network topologies to solve the key distribution problem
among homogeneous sensor nodes. The second one targets hierarchical sensor net-
works where groups of nodes form distinct clusters.
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² An efcient security bootstrapping mechanism called TinyIBE is presented. This
scheme uses identity based encryption to distribute session keys in a heteroge-
neous sensor network environment. TinyIBE exploits the enhanced capabilities of
high-end cluster heads to secure communication between different classes of sensor
devices.
1.4 Thesis outline
The reminder of this thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 presents an overview on cryptographic key distribution techniques. It de-
scribes the classical approach to key distribution together with recent advances in pub-
lic key cryptography in the form of Elliptic Curve Cryptography, bilinear pairings and
identity based systems. Chapter 2 presents also a survey of key-distribution methods
in wireless sensor networks. It introduces an identity-based approach to key distribu-
tion and shows its advantages over traditional systems. Finally it denes all the building
blocks that are necessary to implement Identity-Based Cryptography protocols in sensor
networks.
Chapter 3 describes in detail nite eld arithmetic on low-end processors. It gives a brief
introduction to nite elds and presents optimized arithmetic operations over the binary
and the prime eld. In particular it presents new algorithms for multiprecision multipli-
cation and binary polynomial multiplication. It describes also extension elds and shows
how to accelerate arithmetic operations through hardware improvements on the CPU
side.
Chapter 4 presents the details of elliptic curve cryptography implementations on WSN
motes. It gives the mathematical background on elliptic curves, curve arithmetic and
point representation. Chapter 4 presents also a brief survey on existing Elliptic Curve
Cryptography implementations on sensor nodes. The last part of the chapter contains a
description of the NanoECC package. It gives all the implementation details and com-
pares the performance results with the state-of-the-art.
Chapter 5 reports on cryptographic pairing implementations on sensor nodes. The rst
part of the chapter presents a mathematical introduction to bilinear pairings and denes
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different pairing types. The second part investigates the application of pairing based
cryptography inwireless sensor networks. It discusses the security parameters and differ-
ent pairing algorithms. The last part presents Micro-pairings - an efcient Pairing-Based
Cryptography implementation for sensor nodes. The description includes all the pairings
parameters together with performance evaluation on a broad range of sensor platforms.
Chapter 6 describes identity-based security protocols for sensor networks. The rst part
of the chapter denes various WSNmodels that have many distinctions and different re-
quirements. Based on this, three new key-exchange protocols are proposed. The rst two
investigate the application of non-interactive key-exchange schemes in at and hierarchi-
cal network scenarios. The third key distribution protocol uses identity-based encryption
to secure communication within a heterogeneous sensor network. Chapter 6 includes
also a comprehensive security analysis of all the proposed solutions together with possi-
ble security threats and defensive measures.
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis with a summary of contributions, suggestions for future
research, and some nal remarks.
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Key Distribution Techniques in
Wireless Sensor Networks
A fter analyzing the constraints and limitations of sensor networks, it is clear thatthese kinds of environment need lightweight cryptography to achieving high level
of security. On small sensor devices, a practical security solution must be a trade-off be-
tween cost, performance and security level. It is often very difcult to optimize all three
design goals at the same time. In most situations developers sacrice the security level
by using cost-effective symmetric key solutions without proper mechanisms for key dis-
tribution.
For symmetric encryption to work, two nodes must obtain the same secret key which
has to be protected from access by others. How the secret keys are deployed in the net-
work, however, is a non-trivial problem that is difcult to solve using only symmetric
key techniques. The problem is especially challenging in case of wide area distributed
systems such as sensor networks. An unprotected environment requires frequent key
changes which limit the amount of data compromised if an attacker learns the key. There-
fore, the strength of the cryptographic system rests with the key distribution technique,
a term that refers to the means of delivering a key to two parties who wish to exchange
data in a secure manner.
One can imagine a small sensor network that has pair-wise secret keys pre-loaded into
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the nodes memory before the deployment phase. Each sensor node has a list of n¡1 keys,
one for each of the other n¡ 1 nodes in an n-node network. After the deployment phase
the nodes can use the secret keys to encrypt the data that is exchanged in the network. The
network deployer can also manually update the keys whenever it is required. However,
the addition of new nodes is problematic and requires new keys for every single node in
the network. Such a system might work well in case of a really small network which is
deployed in a controlled environment, but is unacceptable in the case of large distributed
networks.
Another solution to the problem might be to incorporate a Key Distribution Center
(KDC). The KDC would be responsible for distributing keys to pairs of nodes whenever
they would need to communicate with each other. Every node would have to share a
unique symmetric keywith the key distribution center for the purpose of key distribution
and authentication. This approach signicantly increases the number of packets related to
security and may cause communication bottlenecks around the nodes directly connected
to the KDC. The security of such a scheme relies on the security of the key distribution
center which needs to be well protected. This method also requires the existence of a
xed infrastructure with trusted servers, which is usually not available in many sensor
network deployments.
The above two examples show how limited symmetric key techniques are when it
comes to key distribution in wireless sensor networks. Key distribution under symmet-
ric encryption requires that two nodes already share a key (through pre-distribution) or
receive keys from a trusted key distribution center. Sensor networks need more exible
methods of key distribution in the network, similar to the techniques used in traditional
xed networks.
2.1 Classical approach to key distribution
Symmetric encryption, also referred to as conventional cryptography, was the only type
of encryption in use prior to the development of public-key methods in the 1970s. The
main drawback of symmetric key techniques is the lack of a proper key exchange mech-
anism. Public key systems are an elegant solution to this problem. They simplify the
key management and offer additional functionality that was not available in symmetric
systems. In traditional xed networks, Public Key Cryptography is a fundamental and
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widely used technology that secures the communication both in private networks and
across the Internet.
The distinguishing technique used in Public Key Cryptography is the use of pairs of
keys, where the key used to encrypt a message is not the same as the key used to decrypt
it. Each user holds a mathematically related key pair: a secret private key and a published
public key. This type of security technique is called asymmetric cryptography.
2.1.1 Asymmetric cryptography
Public Key Cryptography was introduced rst by W. Dife and M. Hellman. Fig. 2.1
presents the main idea of a public key cryptosystem.
Figure 2.1: Public-key cryptosystem
Each user has a pair of keys: a public and a private key. The private key is kept secret,
while the public key may be widely distributed, so other users can send encrypted mes-
sages to the designated recipient. The keys are related mathematically, but the private
key cannot be practically derived from the public key. A messageM encrypted with the
freely available key can only be decrypted from the ciphertext C with the corresponding
private key. Sometimes, messages are encrypted with the private key and decrypted with
the public key. This operation is used in creating digital signatures.
In the wireless sensor network scenario, the whole scheme might by simplied. The
original network deployer is a trusted entity that can deploy nodes with an embedded
private/public key pair. In this way the trusted key generation center is no longer neces-
sary. A single node can broadcast its public key to all its neighbours, who can then use it
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to encrypt messages. However, in order to authenticate the public key there is a need for
a trusted Certicate Authority which issues appropriate certicates.
Among all public key algorithms, there are three established families of practical rel-
evance. The security of these systems is based on hard mathematic problems:
RSA Is named after its inventors Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [101]. The security of this
scheme is based on the difculty of factoring large numbers. It is the most famous
asymmetric algorithm that is widely used until today for many important appli-
cations such as electronic commerce. Nonetheless, its operational requirements are
very expensive with key sizes of a minimum 1024 bits.
Discrete logarithm based systems are another group of asymmetric algorithms that are
commonly used in cryptography (i.e. ElGamal encryption [50]). The security of
these schemes is based on the difculty of calculating discrete logarithms in a -
nite eld. The key sizes in these systems are comparable to those in RSA schemes.
Elliptic Curve Cryptography is based on the algebraic structure of elliptic curves and
its strength relies on the difculty of the discrete logarithm problem in this setting
(ECDLP). Elliptic Curve Cryptography has lower requirements than the other two
systems. Therefore it is considered themost attractive family for embedded devices.
As mentioned earlier, public key schemes are a few magnitudes more demanding in
terms of resource utilization than symmetric key systems. Many researchers claim that
Public Key Cryptography software implementations for sensor nodes are not possible
due to the very limited amounts of memory and computing power [43], [69]. Hence hard-
ware support may be needed for public key operations. Unfortunately most hardware ex-
tensions for sensor nodes that aim to improve the execution of asymmetric cryptography
exist mainly as a proof-of-concept. None of the sensor node platforms currently avail-
able on the market has hardware support for Public Key Cryptography. An additional
hardware accelerator would complicate the node design and rise the overall price of the
device. Nonetheless, future WSN platforms would benet from hardware that supports
Public Key Cryptography operations. This support could be in a form of a specialized
microcontroller or as an external chip that accelerates cryptographic operations.
There is an evident demand for cost effective Public Key Cryptography hardware
solutions for sensor nodes. At the same time, software support for public key opera-
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tions needs to be improved. In many situations Public Key Cryptography must be im-
plemented purely in software because changes to the hardware are not possible. Soft-
ware solutions may be also used for quick development of higher level protocols and to
validate new security concepts. For many WSN applications, asymmetric cryptosystem
would seem to be the best approach for distributing symmetric keys. It provides a high
level of security in the network and offers better scalability and resistance against node
capture than any symmetric key solution. Despite all these advantages, the application
of public key ctyptography protocols in WSNs remains challenging. All three families of
public key cryptography algorithms need authentication of public keys for proper usage.
Practical deployments of public key solutions require the existence of a public key in-
frastructure in which certicate authorities authenticate public keys. The application of a
traditional public key infrastructure in WSNs is very difcult due to the ad hoc nature of
the network and the limited resources available.
2.1.2 Public Key Infrastructure
Public-key encryption schemes are secure only if the authenticity of the public key is
assured. This service is provided with the use of certicate schemes. In cryptography, a
public key infrastructure can be dened as an arrangement that binds public keys with
respective user identities by means of a Certicate Authority. The main task of a PKI is
to create, manage, store, distribute and revoke digital certicates. A typical public key
infrastructure consists of:
² Certicate Authority (CA) - issues and veries digital certicate;
² Registration Authority (RA) - performs initial authentication and acts as the verier
for the Certicate Authority before a digital certicate is issued to the user;
² Certicate repository - there can be one or more directories where certicates (with
their public keys) are stored together with Certicate Revocation Lists (CLRs);
² Certicate management system.
Figure 2.2 presents a basic public key infrastructure and shows the information ow
in the system. In order to participate in a public key infrastructure, user Amust rst enroll
or register with the Registration Authority. The registration authority validates the user's
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identity and forwards his public key to the Certicate Authority. The primary objective of
the Certicate Authority is to bind the identifying information and credentials supplied
by the Registration Authority with the public key of the user. The result of this process
is the generation of a public key certicate. The binding is declared when a trusted Cer-
ticate Authority digitally signs the public key certicate with its own private key. The
certicate authority issues each user with a digital certicate. When user B wants to com-
municate with user A he asks for his digital certicate. User B contacts the Certicate
Authority in order to validate the received certicate. The certicate authority checks in
the repository to see if the certicate is still valid (has not expired or been revoked). User
B veries the digital certicate by using the Certicate Authority's public key which is
securely distributed among the users. After a positive certicate verication user B trusts
user A and can send him encrypted data using A's public key. This relation is established
thanks to the trusted third party that performs entity authentication on the users behalf.
Figure 2.2: Basic Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
In the context of wireless sensor networks, it is often difcult to provide a practical
PKI. The system presented in Fig. 2.2 is quite complicated and has a signicant communi-
cation overhead. Sensor nodes have strict energy limitations and cannot spend too much
time on radio transmissions. Lack of a trusted infrastructure and sensor deployments in
remote areas make it difcult to apply the concept of a Certicate Authority. It is also not
possible for one of the nodes to play the role of a Certicate Authority as this entity must
be unconditionally trusted and well-protected from attacks. However, the concept of a
public key infrastructure in a sensor network scenario can be simplied thanks to several
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design features of WSNs. Sensor nodes can be carefully congured in a secure environ-
ment which exists before the network deployment phase. The original network deployer
is a trusted entity who can use a computer (base station) to upload all the global parame-
ters and secret keys into nodes memory. It is clear that the base station can be considered
as the Certicate Authority in the system. It can be responsible for creating digital cer-
ticates that associate the identity of a node with its public/private key pair. Moreover,
the base station can take the role of a Registration Authority, since it is in charge of as-
signing identities to all the nodes in the network. The base station can also create the
public/private key pair of a node, as it is not efcient for a node to create its own keys.
In theory the base station may also act as a certicate repository, but this solution is not
practical in sensor networks. Most sensor nodes would have to use multi-hop communi-
cation in order to reach the base station and retrieve the certicates. The energy cost of
this communication would have a signicant inuence on the overall network lifetime.
A better solution would require that every node is pre-loaded with its own certicate and
the Certicate Authority's public key. After the network deployment, nodes provide the
certicate to any neighbour that requests it and use the Certicate Authority's public key
to verify the authenticity of other certicates.
Although the basic functionality of a public key infrastructure can be applied in sen-
sor networks, the whole scheme is still not practical. The system is too complicated and
not efcient in terms of resources utilization. In sensor networks of more than 100 de-
vices, the nodes would have to store many certicates and public keys that would ll the
limited storage space. Certicate management requires also the use of digital signatures
and introduces large communication overhead in the network. Nodes are also required
to contact the base station in order to validate certicates and check whether they have
been revoked. Thereby the base station has to be always connected to the sensor net-
work, which makes it vulnerable to attacks. This requirement also limits the autonomous
operation of the network and the number of possible applications.
All the above features make traditional public key infrastructure schemes unpracti-
cal in WSNs. Sensor networks cannot afford a complicated public key infrastructure and
need new security schemes that can provide authentication without using expensive cer-
ticates. These new public key systems should be simple, exible and more efcient than
methods currently used in traditional xed networks.
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2.2 Recent advances in Public Key Cryptography
Cryptography like many other areas of computer science is constantly evolving and new
advances are made in the state-of-the-art. However, the adoption rate of new techniques
in cryptography is slow due to many technological, economical and even political rea-
sons. Emerging security techniques are often treated with great uncertainty and it takes
a long time before the technology matures and can be adopted by government bodies
and commercial organizations. This fact holds true in the case of the whole family of
public key cryptosystems that are based on the algebraic structure of elliptic curves. The
concept of elliptic curve cryptography has been known for over twenty years, but com-
mercial products have appeared only recently on the market.
Cryptosystems based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography are especially interesting for
sensor networks since they are more efcient in resource utilization than any other pub-
lic key techniques [58]. The technology had been proven secure and there is no reason
why it should not be used in the context of WSNs. Additionally recent advances in the
eld of Elliptic Curve Cryptography have shown that bilinear pairings on elliptic curves
can be used to create useful cryptosystems. Cryptography using pairings is an emerg-
ing eld related to Elliptic Curve Cryptography which has been attracting the interest of
the international cryptography community, since it enables the design of original crypto-
graphic schemes and makes well-known cryptographic protocols more efcient. Pairing-
based cryptography has also allowed many long-standing open problems to be solved in
an elegant way. Perhaps the most impressive among those applications is Identity Based
Encryption (IBE), which in turn has allowed complete Identity Based Cryptography (IBC)
schemes. WSNs can make use of these new achievements in cryptography to provide ad-
vanced security services at low cost. The following sections present a general overview
of these new Public Key Cryptography systems.
2.2.1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
The use of elliptic curves in cryptography was suggested for the rst time in 1985 in-
dependently by Neal Koblitz and Victor S. Miller. Since then the eld of Elliptic Curve
Cryptography has grown signicantly and has been studied extensively. Many research
papers has been published on the security and efcient implementation of Elliptic Curve
Cryptography. ECC has been accepted commercially and has also been adopted by stan-
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dardizing bodies such as: ANSI (American National Standards Institute), ISO (Interna-
tional Organization for Standardization), SECG (Standards for Efcient Cryptography
Group) and NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology). Elliptic Curve Cryp-
tography is a proven technology that is used in many different commercial products such
as mobile phones, smart cards, email systems and many others.
In every cryptographic scheme the fundamental security lies in the hardness of the
underlyingmathematical problem. The harder the number-theoretic problem is, themore
secure will be the system , that can be build on top of that. The difculty of these prob-
lems directly impacts the performance, since it dictates the size of the domain and key
parameters. These values are very important in a security system as the performance of
arithmetic operations relays heavily on them.
As mentioned earlier, the hardness of Elliptic Curve Cryptography is based on the El-
liptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). One of the main operations in elliptic
curve cryptography is the calculation of a scalar point multiplication Q = sP , where Q
and P are two points on a certain elliptic curve. The Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm
Problem occurs when the coordinates of P and Q are known and the scalar s needs to be
calculated. This computational problem becomes harder with the size of domain param-
eters. When the size of the underlying nite eld is larger than 160 bits the calculation of
ECDLP is considered to be computationally infeasible (with the current state-of-the-art
in cryptanalysis).
So far only algorithmswith exponential running time have been proposed to solve the
discrete logarithm problem in the elliptic curve setting. The best method so far is the Pol-
lard's ½ algorithm [100] which has computational complexity of O(
p
n). For other public
key systems, that are based on integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems, fast
algorithms are known that have a subexponential expected running time (e.g. the num-
ber eld sieve lenstra93). This feature allows Elliptic Curve Cryptography based systems
to provide the same level of security as traditional schemes but with smaller parameters.
Table 2.1 [58] compares the key sizes in symmetric, RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography
systems for achieving different security levels.
The numbers in Table 2.1 shows that much smaller key sizes can be used in the ellip-
tic curve system than with RSA at a given security level. The ve specic security levels
correspond to the ve different block ciphers and the key sizes that they use. The dif-
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Table 2.1: Key size comparison between symmetric, RSA and elliptic curve systems for achieving an equiv-
alent security level. The security level of k bits means that the best algorithm known for breaking the system
takes approximately 2k steps.
Security level (bits)
80 112 128 192 256
Block cipher SKIPJACK 3-DES AES-small AES-medium AES-large
EC parameter p 160 224 256 384 512
RSA modulus n 1024 2048 3072 8192 15360
ference in key sizes between Elliptic Curve Cryptography and RSA is especially visible
for higher security levels. At 256 bits of security Elliptic Curve Cryptography uses only
a 512-bit key which is 97% smaller than the corresponding RSA key. The advantages that
can be gained from smaller keys include not only faster computations and smaller mem-
ory requirements, but also energy savings for sensor devices, as fewer bits are required
to be transmitted by the radio. All this advantages makes Elliptic Curve Cryptography
the most attractive family of public key algorithms for wireless sensor networks.
One of the problems with Elliptic Curve Cryptography is that some of the proto-
cols and implementations are covered by patents. The availability of patent free elliptic
curve schemes and other legal issues has limited the widespread of this cryptographic
technique. Another drawback of elliptic curve cryptography is that the whole system is
a lot more complicated than the traditional RSA scheme. The mathematics behind El-
liptic Curve Cryptography are rather complex and a broad range of different parame-
ters makes the implementation more difcult. Nevertheless, small key sizes, relatively
low computational requirements and high exibility justies the choice of Elliptic Curve
Cryptography as a Public Key Cryptography technique.
2.2.2 Pairing-Based Cryptography (PBC)
Pairing-Based Cryptography is a relatively young area of cryptography that revolves
around a particular function with interesting properties. Pairings, such as the Weil pair-
ing, were rst used in the context of cryptanalysis [88] to reduce the ECDLP into a dis-
crete logarithm problem in the nite eld. The rst use of pairings in cryptography is
the work of Sakai et al.[106] and Joux [67]. Both papers proposed pairings as the base for
building complete cryptosystems. Since then many protocols have been proposed that
use pairings as the underlying crypto primitives.
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A pairing function is a mapping between two groups of elliptic curve points. It is
often denoted as e^(P;Q) where P and Q are two points on a special elliptic curve. The
whole concept of using pairings in cryptography is based on the property of bilinearity:
e^(aP; bQ) = e^(P; bQ)a = e^(aP;Q)b = e^(P;Q)ab (2.1)
In equation 2.1 aP and bQ are elliptic curve point multiplication operations where a
and b are scalars. The above property of the pairing allows the creation of novel crypto-
graphic schemes (e.g. identity based encryption, short signature schemes) that cannot be
constructed using other techniques. Pairings can be also used to implement existing se-
curity protocols in a more efcient way and with additional functionality (key agreement
schemes, threshold cryptography). In the context of wireless sensor networks, pairings
enable different identity-based cryptography schemes that can simplify key distribution
in the network.
2.2.3 Identity-Based Cryptography (IBC)
The term identity-based cryptography refers to cryptosystems that use user's identities as
public keys. The rst concept of Identity-Based Cryptography was formulated by Adi
Shamir in 1985. He described in his paper [111] the theoretical basis of the system, but
did not propose a practical design solution.
The rst identity-based cryptosystem based on pairings was proposed in the year
2000 by Sakai, Ohgishi and Kasahara [106]. They proposed a key-sharing scheme that
used identities as public keys. The idea of the key agreement scheme is quite simple
and relies on the bilinearity property of the pairing. Let H1 be a hashing1 and mapping
function that maps unique identity information into an elliptic curve point. Private Key
Generator (PKG) has a master key s and issues private keys to users of the form sPA,
where PA = H1(IDA) and IDA is the identity of user A. After this step users A and B
can calculate a shared secret that only they (and the PKG) can compute, namely:
e^(sPA; PB) = e^(PA; PB)s = e^(PA; sPB) (2.2)
Thanks to bilinearity of the pairing, both users can calculate the same value inde-
1Hashing denes a conversion of a large amount of data into a small value, using amathematical function.
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pendently of each other and use this shared secret to encrypt their communication. The
above key sharing scheme does not require any communication between the parties. User
A needs only his private key and the public key of user B (which can be derived based
on public identity IDB) to calculate the pairing.
Soon after the discovery by Sakai, Ohgishi and Kasahara, another application of bi-
linear pairings was presented. In 2001 D. Boneh and M. Franklin described an identity-
based encryption schemewhichwas based on theWeil pairing. This scheme fully realized
Shamir's vision from 1985 to encrypt messages using only the identity of the recipient.
Boneh and Franklin's Identity-Based Encryption scheme remains today as one of themost
famous protocols in Identity-Based Cryptography.
2.2.3.1 Identity-Based Encryption (IBE)
Identity-Based Encryption is a public-key cryptosystem that was developed in order to
solve some of the problems of traditional public key algorithms. Thewhole schemeworks
as follows. Instead of generating a random pair of keys and publishing the public key, the
user chooses his identity ID as his public key. The sender uses this information to encrypt
data and transmits the ciphertext C through the channel. The user authenticates himself
to the key generation center and receives his private key. The recipient's private key is
calculated from his ID and must be send to him in a secure way. This operation enables
the receiver to decode the messageM. The whole IBE scheme is illustrated in Fig. 2.3.
Figure 2.3: Identity-based cryptosystem
Identity-based encryption uses a unique identity as a public key rather than relaying
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on the certicates and revocation lists that are used in traditional asymmetric cryptosys-
tems. In identity-based systems, certicates are no longer needed to bind public keys to
users identities. Thanks to this feature, the whole cryptographic system is simplied and
easier to manage. The whole identity-based encryption scheme can be divided into four
basic stages:
(1) Setup During this step all the system parameters are set and the master-key is gen-
erated. The parameters include the description of the message space M and the ci-
phertext space C. All the system parameters will be publicly known but the master-
key has to be kept secret and is known only to the PKG.
(2) Extract This operation takes as input the system parameters, the master-key and the
user identity ID. The master-key is used to generate the private key corresponding
to an arbitrary string ID 2 f0; 1g.
(3) Encrypt In this step plaintextm 2M is encoded using a public key ID. The output is
the corresponding ciphertext.
(4) Decrypt Takes as input a private key and ciphertext c 2 C and decodes the message
giving the corresponding plaintext.
The Setup and Extract steps are performed by the private key generation center and
they cannot be carried out by the users. Each request for private key has to be checked,
so a proof of identity is needed before releasing the key. Both Encrypt and Decrypt algo-
rithms are run by the users to encode and decode messages that are exchanged between
them.
The security of the Identity-Based Encryption system depends mainly on the secrecy
of the information stored at the key generation center, so a great effort has to be made
to make it as secure as possible. Another important aspect of this scheme is the accu-
racy of identity checks that are performed before issuing private keys. Only valid users
should receive secret keys that are necessary in the decryption step. The main advantage
of identity-based encryption over traditional public key systems is that there is no need to
store so many public keys. Public keys can be simply generated when necessary based on
users identities. This process minimizes the communication overhead involved in public
key authentication.
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Identity-Based Encryption is a promising security technique that can be used in many
different applications. So far it has been successfully adopted to secure les and secure
e-mail systems. Recent developments have focused on implementing Identity-based En-
cryption on smart cards. Despite its many advantages Identity-Based Encryption have
not been widely deployed in security systems. Besides the usual time it takes for new
technologies to be adopted in security systems, there are certain drawbacks that hold
back the widespread of this technology.
The main problem with Identity-Based Encryption and other identity-based systems
is the need for a trusted key generation center. This entity is in charge of generating
and escrowing user's private keys. It has the power to impersonate anybody else in the
system. For that reason the private key generation center must be an entity that is uncon-
ditionally trusted by all network users. In most systems such an entity simply does not
exist. However in the case of sensor networks the original network deployer is obviously
a trusted entity that can play the role of a public key generator. Hence, security systems
that are based on Identity-Based Cryptography present a promising solution to the key
distribution problem in wireless sensor networks.
2.3 Key distribution in Wireless Sensor Networks
Many sensor network applications require protection against such problems as eaves-
dropping or injection and modication of packets. Cryptography is the standard defense
against such attacks. The security requirements in WSNs depend mainly on the applica-
tion type, but basic requirements that are common in all networks can be described as
follows:
1) Data privacy, integrity and freshness;
2) Access control;
3) Non-repudiation and entity authentication;
4) Availability.
The rst set of goals can be fullled by incorporating a link layer security mecha-
nism that uses encryption and message authentication codes. Access control should al-
low only legitimate nodes to join the network. Guaranteeing availability involves min-
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imizing the impact of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. Non-repudiation is an important
security property in sensor networks as it ensures the receiver that the message did in
fact originate from the claimed sender. In many cases the condentiality of simple sen-
sor readings is not as important as the origin of the data. Symmetric key algorithms are
used for message integrity checks, entity authentication, and encryption, while asym-
metric cryptography additionally provide non-repudiation and access control. The above
security requirements can be fully addressed only by building upon a solid key distribu-
tion framework. Key management is the essential cryptographic mechanism upon which
other security primitives are built.
Despite much research effort, key distribution and management in wireless sensor
networks still remains an open problem. After network deployment sensor nodes have
to somehow agree upon a shared secret that will be used to encrypt the data. This issue
can be addressed by using different security techniques. In general there are four basic
classes of key distribution schemes that were considered for sensor networks:
² symmetric key solutions,
² random key pre-distribution,
² public-key algorithms,
² trusted server mechanisms.
Symmetric key solutions usually assume that a single key is used to encrypt and de-
crypt the communication in the network. This key is preloaded into the memory of every
sensor node. The second type of key agreement protocols uses central servers to dis-
tribute keys within the network. This method is limited to only a few applications where
a trusted infrastructure is available. Public key techniques use asymmetric cryptography
which is more heavyweight than symmetric cryptography and requires authentication of
public keys. The last approach to key establishment is via pre-distribution, where nodes
are loaded with random keying material before their deployment.
2.3.1 Symmetric key solutions
Most of the security solutions for WSNs use basic symmetric key algorithms due to their
simplicity and efciency in resource utilisation. In typical real-life WSN deployments,
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a network-wide key is used to encrypt all communication (e.g. in the residential mode
in ZigBee WSNs [128]). Even though the system is simple and easy to implement its
security is very limited and can be easily broken when the single key is revealed. The
security can be enhanced by issuing one particular key for every pair of nodes, but this
approach signicantly extends the number of keys in the network to 12n(n ¡ 1), where
n is the number of nodes. In large sensor network deployments each node would have
to store many secret keys, which would quickly ll its limited memory space. Such a
solution is not practical in WSNs and provides an insufcient level of security for many
applications, especially those that deal with critical data. Symmetric key solution are very
limited when it comes to key distribution, but they offer basic cryptographic primitives
that can be used by higher level security protocols.
2.3.1.1 TinySec
TinySec [69] is a link layer security architecture for wireless sensor networks. It is a
lightweight security package that developers can easily integrate into existing sensor
network applications. The authors envisage that this architecture can cover the basic se-
curity needs for most applications. The two main goals of this mechanism are ease of use
and minimal impact on network performance. TinySec provides access control, message
integrity, data condentiality and replay protection. The whole architecture does not ad-
dress such problems like energy depletion attacks, physical tampering or node capture
attacks. One of the important design goals of TinySec is that it is transparent to applica-
tions running on TinyOS2. Additionally it facilitates the customization of the provided
security level.
TinySec supports two different security options. The rst one, authenticated encryp-
tion (TinySec-AE) is a full security mode that offers encryption of the data payload and
packet authentication with a Message Authentication Code (MAC). The second one,
called TinySec-Auth, offers only authentication of the messages. The message authenti-
cation code is computed over the encrypted data and the packet header. Fig. 2.4 presents
the packet format of TinySec-AE.
The packet format is based on the standard TinyOS packet [77]. It differs from the
original structure by the addition of 6 bytes to the packet. The standard 2-byte Cyclic Re-
2TinyOS is a popular operating system used in wireless sensor networks.
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Figure 2.4: TinySec-AE packet format (bytes) [69]
dundancy Check (CRC) eld is replaced by a 4-byte message authentication code. Cyclic
redundancy check provides no security against malicious modication or forgery of the
packet. Message authentication code also detects transmission errors, so the Bit Error
Rate (BER) is not affected. TinySec uses a special 8-byte Initialization Vector (IV) with
destination and source addresses, packet length, Active Message (AM) type and counter.
Active message types in TinyOs are similar to port numbers in TCP/IP. Initialization vec-
tors are used to achieve semantic security in a way that encrypting the same plaintext
two times should give different ciphertexts.
TinySec is based only on symmetric key algorithms and uses the cipher block chain-
ing mode for encryption and message authentication code generation. The default block
cipher is Skipjack, but the whole architecture is cipher independent and other algorithms
like RC5 or AES can be used instead. The timing for Skipjack reported in [69] on 8-bit
MICA2 platform is 0:38ms (encryption of one 64-bit block). The whole TinySec imple-
mentation takes 3000 lines of nesC [51]3 code and requires 728 bytes of RAM and 7146
bytes of ROM on a MICA2 mote.
Experimental results on a 36 node network [69] showed that TinySec is an efcient
link layer security protocol. Introduction of security services added less than 10% to the
overhead in terms of packet latency and energy consumption. The network encountered
only a 6% decrease in throughput. Much of the overhead can be fully explained by the in-
creased packet length of TinySec. The results achieved in [69] demonstrate that a simple
link layer cryptography mechanism can be efciently implemented without any hard-
ware support. Software implementation offers acceptable energy costs without major
performance degradation.
The key distribution problem is not addressed in the TinySec architecture. Any par-
ticular key establishment protocol can be used in conjunction with the link layer mecha-
3nesC is a programming language similar to C that is used in TinyOs.
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nism. It is expected that higher level security protocols will use TinySec as a basic security
primitive. TinySec may reduce the effort of implementing such protocols by providing
the right set of interfaces.
2.3.2 Random key pre-distribution
Key pre-distribution schemes are very popular in sensor networks due to their simplicity
and low computational complexity. In a key pre-distribution scheme, a random set of
keys from a certain pool is loaded into each sensor node before the deployment phase.
During network operation, sensors perform a discovery process to identify shared keys
between each other. Because of the random choice of keys, a shared key may not exist
between some pairs of nodes. Those keys can be established with the use of neighbouring
nodes that already share the keys on the path between the pair of nodes. In random key
pre-distibution schemes any two nodes in the network share a common keywith a certain
probability.
The rst probabilistic key sharing scheme for sensor networks was proposed by Es-
chenauer and Gligor in [43]. The Eschenauer-Gligor (E-G) scheme uses random graph
theory to model connectivity in a sensor network. The whole protocol can be divided
into three stages:
1) Key pre-distribution stage During this step, a large key pool of P keys and their iden-
tiers is generated by a trusted key distribution server. From this key pool, m keys
are randomly drawn and distributed ofine into each node, together with key iden-
tiers. The set ofm keys is called the node's key ring.
2) Shared key discovery stage Once the nodes are initialized with keys, they are de-
ployed in the eld. After deployment, each node tries to discover the neighbours
with which it shares common keys. There are manyways to determine whether two
nodes share common keys or not. The simplest way is to make the nodes broadcast,
in clear text, the list of identiers of the keys on their key ring. If a node nds out
that it shares a common keywith a particular node, it can use it for secure communi-
cation. This approach does not reveal any important information for the adversary,
but leaves room for a trafc analysis attack.
3) Path key establishment stage A link exists between two nodes only if they share a
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key, but the path key establishment stage facilitates provision of the link between
two nodes when they do not share a common key. If two nodes A and B do not
share a key they can use their neighbours to establish secure communication. Node
A sends an encrypted message to its neighbour C using a shared secret key. This
message is a request for secure connection with node B. If node C has a common
key with nodeB, it can generate a pairwise key for nodesA andB. After the shared
key discovery stage is nished there will be a number of keys left in each sensor's
key ring that are unused and that can be utilized by each sensor node for path key
establishment.
The probability that two nodes share at least one key in their key rings of size m
chosen from a given pool of P keys can be dened as:
p0 = 1¡ Pr[two nodes do not share any key] (2.3)
The above equation takes into account that the size of the key pool (P ) is not a sensor-
design constraint. The key pool is generated ofine and hence its size is usually much
larger thanm, which is limited by the node's memory size. In the case where each key of
a key ring is drawn out of a pool of P keys without replacement, the number of possible
key rings is equal to:
P1 =
P !
m!(P ¡m)! (2.4)
The total number of possible key rings that do not share a key with a particular key ring
can be calculated as the number of key rings drawn out of the remaining P ¡m unused
keys in the pool, namely:
P2 =
(P ¡m)!
m!(P ¡ 2m)! (2.5)
Therefore, the probability that no key is shared between the two rings is the ratio of the
number of rings without a match to the total number of rings:
P2
P1
=
m!(P ¡m)!(P ¡m)!
P !m!(P ¡ 2m)! (2.6)
Hence the probability that two nodes share at least one key can be calculated as:
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p0 = 1¡ P2
P1
= 1¡ ((P ¡m)!)
2
P !(P ¡ 2m)! (2.7)
The value of P is usually very large compared tom and hence the Sterling's approxima-
tion for n! can be used to simplify the equation 2.7 into:
p0 = 1¡ (1¡
m
P )
2(P¡m+ 1
2
)
(1¡ 2mP )(P¡2m+
1
2
)
(2.8)
Figure 2.5 shows the probability of sharing at least one key between two nodes in the
Eschenauer and Gligor scheme, based on formula 2.8. The plot is drawn for different
values of the key pool size P . For example for a pool size of 1000 keys, only 26 keys need
to be distributed to any two nodes to have the probability p0 = 0:5 that they will share
a key after deployment. If the pool is increased 5 times (P = 5000), the key ring has to
be increased to 59 in order to achieve the same key sharing probability. For lower values
of p0 the Eschenauer-Gligor scheme scales well but higher values of p0 require large key
rings for each node. This is especially visible in the case of large key pool sizes of 10000
and more, which are necessary to provide higher levels of security in the system.
Figure 2.5: Probability of sharing at least one key in the EG scheme.
Since the development of the Eschenauer-Gligor scheme, randomkey pre-distribution
for sensor networks has been extensively investigated in the literature. Pietro et al [31]
questioned the validity of the random graph model in WSNs, and proposed another geo-
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metric randommodel for sensor networks. Chan, Perrig, and Song in [25] introduced two
variations of the Eschenauer-Gligor scheme: q-composite random key pre-distribution
and multipath key reinforcement. The rst scheme requires that two nodes have at least
q common keys to set up a secure link. The nodes use all common keys instead of only
one to establish the encryption key. The multipath reinforcement scheme is similar to the
Eschenauer-Gligor protocol, but uses multiple indirect paths to establish a secure link.
This approach increases the level of security in the system at the cost of increased com-
munication overhead.
All of the above schemes are based on random key distribution where neighbour-
ing nodes share a common key with certain probability. This feature, however, is also
one of the main aws of the system. Probabilistic key sharing does not give a guarantee
that a perfect connection between communicating parties can be established. The appli-
cation of such protocols in large scale sensor networks is problematic because of large key
rings and complex re-keying procedures. The communication overhead of random key
pre-distribution schemes has not yet been fully analyzed. Most papers describe how the
key discovery and path key establishment stages work, but do not consider the cost of
communication between the nodes. Especially, nding a secure path in a random graph
is a NP-complete problem which is usually ignored by the authors. Despite its draw-
backs, probabilistic key sharing is still considered as a plausible key distribution method
in WSNs. However, security schemes that use random key pre-distribution offer lower
security than systems based on public key cryptography. This fact makes it less likely
that such methods will be widely used in practical applications.
2.3.3 Public Key Cryptography feasibility
For many WSN applications, asymmetric cryptosystem would seem to be the best ap-
proach for distributing symmetric keys in the network. However, Public Key Cryptogra-
phy is computationally far more demanding in both hardware and software than sym-
metric key algorithms. The performance gap is especially large on small devices like 8-bit
sensor nodes. For example, an optimized public key solution based on RSA performs 100
to 1000 times slower than a standard symmetric cipher such as the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES). This of course has a huge impact on energy consumption, which is two
to three orders of magnitude higher for asymmetric techniques [42]. Many researchers
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claim that due to these drawbacks Public Key Cryptography is beyond the capabilities of
today's sensor nodes [69], [97], [112], [98], [127].
Despite the disadvantages, Public Key Cryptography schemes offer security services
that are highly desirable in WSNs. This fact motivates further research in this direction.
The main goal is to develop a secure and efcient key distribution mechanism that is
practical in WSNs and allows simple key establishment in large scale sensor networks.
The main efforts to apply public-key cryptography in WSNs is focused on implement-
ing RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography. The following sections describe some of the
attempts to implement these Public Key Cryptography primitives in sensor networks.
2.3.3.1 TinyPK
In [120] the authors describe the design of a public key protocol that provides authenti-
cation and key agreement between a sensor network and a third party. The same func-
tionality is provided also for every pair of nodes within the sensor network. The pro-
posed TinyPk scheme is based on the widely recognized RSA cryptosystem and the
Dife-Hellman key agreement technique. This protocol exploits the fact that RSA pub-
lic operations (encryption and signature verication) are very fast compared to private
key operations (decryption and signing).
To make the whole protocol practical for low end devices, the nodes are only required
to perform the public key operations. RSA key size is set to 1024 bits as lower values
for the keys are no longer considered secure with the current state-of-the-art in large
number factorization. Each sensor node has to cube a 1024-bit integer and take its residue
modulo a large prime which is a relatively fast operation. TinyPK uses e = 3 as the public
exponent but this low exponent variant of RSA does not lower the security of the whole
scheme. All the computationally expensive operations are performed by external servers.
In this way the heavy burden of RSA private key operations is moved to devices that
possess much higher computational capabilities than sensor nodes.
The main goal of the protocol is to allow secure communication between an external
party and a sensor network. In many cases it is impractical and against the security pol-
icy to directly provide the session key to the external entity. Introduction of new session
keys to all parties is a redundant and expensive operation. An authentication service is
needed before a secure information exchange might be possible. TinyPK assumes the ex-
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istence of a Certicate Authority in the system, which has a trusted pair of private/public
keys. Any third party that wishes to interact with the motes also requires its own key pair
and must have its public key signed with the Certicate Authority's private key. This es-
tablishes the external party's identity. Each mote in the network needs to have a copy
of Certicate Authority's public key, before it is deployed in the eld. The following de-
scribes successive steps of the TinyPK protocol:
1) The external party sends to the node the rst part of the message containing its own
public key signed by the CA's private key.
2) The external party sends the second part of the message that is signed with his
private key. Themessage consists of a time stamp and a checksum. This information
is not encrypted.
3) The sensor node receives the rst part of the message and uses his preloaded CA's
public key to verify the signature and extract the third party's public key.
4) The sensor node uses the external party's public key to verify the second part of the
message. It validates the time stamp and the checksum. After passing the validation
the third party has successfully authenticated to the sensor network.
5) The mote encrypts the session key together with the received time stamp using the
third party's public key and sends back the message.
6) The external party decrypts the message with its private key, checks if the time
stamp is the same as the one it sent. If validation is positive the external party stores
the session key for future transmissions with the sensor network.
TinyPK also provides a secure key exchange service between two sensor nodes. This
goal is achieved through the use of the Dife-Hellman key exchange protocol [32]. This
algorithm provides a shared secret-between two parties that can be then used to create
a cryptographic key for symmetric encryption. TinyPK uses this mechanism to generate
a secret-suitable for creating and replacing TinySec keys (see Section 2.3.1.1). This tech-
nique also helps to establish secure communication between two separate sensor net-
works that do not share a common key.
Thewhole key exchange scheme is presented in Fig. 2.6. Before the deployment phase,
nodes are preloaded with a large prime n and a generator g. Both parameters are publicly
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available. Each mote generates a private random number r and calculates grmod n. The
calculated values are exchanged. After receiving the message both parties share a secret
because of the property in Fig. 2.6.
Figure 2.6: Dife-Hellman key exchange protocol in sensor networks
The evaluation of TinyPK demonstrates that standard public key technology is not
well-suited to constrained devices. The RSA 1024-bit public key operation takes 14.5s
on the constrained MICA mote, which may be a reasonable value under the condition
that such operations are performed very infrequently. However, the authors in [120] re-
port that the implementation of RSA private operations is too slow to be used on sensor
devices. The Dife-Hellman key exchange performance is also not satisfactory. Modular
exponentiation is very expensive on 8-bit processors and takes around 60s for a 1024-bit
prime with a 176-bit exponent. The code for modular exponentiation required 12.4KB in
ROM and 1.2KB RAM on the MICA2 platform.
One of themain drawbacks of TinyPK is the need to exchangemanymessages that are
only related to the key establishment process. Communication in WSNs is very expen-
sive in terms of energy consumption and the key distribution mechanism should mini-
mize the number of exchanged messages. In TinyPK each sensor node has to store many
public keys in addition to its private key. Each of those keys is 1024 bits in size and has to
be authenticated before it can be used. The need for a trusted Certicate Authority in the
system limits the range of possible applications. Additionally standard Dife-Hellman
key exchange scheme is not authenticated and allows dangerous man-in-the middle at-
tacks. TinyPK shows that portions of the RSA cryptosystem can be successfully applied
in WSNs, however, a complete system requires trusted infrastructure and hardware ac-
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celeration for cryptographic operations.
2.3.3.2 Public Key Cryptography on 8-bit processors
Software implementations of Public Key Cryptography primitives on sensor deviceswere
usually considered as not possible due to high memory usage and computational com-
plexity. The authors in [57] revisited this common opinion by implementing elliptic curve
and RSA primitives on two 8-bit microcontrollers: the CC1010 and the Atmega128. The
latter is one of the most popular processors used in sensor networks.
RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography operations can be signicantly accelerated
with dedicated cryptographic coprocessors such as those used in smart cards. Unfortu-
nately coprocessors require additional hardware which adds to the size and complexity
of the devices. In many cases it is also easier to provide software implementations of basic
Public Key Cryptography primitives.
Results presented in [57] show that modular multiplication and squaring of large in-
tegers are the performance-critical operations for RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography.
The point multiplication routine on an elliptic curve is a fundamental operation of El-
liptic Curve Cryptography systems. Multiprecision multiplication and squaring of large
integers takes 77% of the execution time of the whole point multiplication routine on
the Atmega128 processor. Therefore high performance implementations need to focus
specically on optimizing these operations in assembly language. Large integers multi-
plication not only involves arithmetic operations, but also a signicant amount of data
transport to and from memory. To optimize these operations the authors proposed a hy-
brid multiplication method that combines the advantages of row-wise and column-wise
multiplication (see Section 3.3.2.1). This multiplication algorithm reduces the number of
memory accesses and uses all available registers on the Atmega128 platform to achieve a
25% performance increase for elliptic curve point multiplication.
The authors in [57] describe the implementation of standardized RSA and Elliptic
Curve Cryptography operations over NIST/SECG Fp elliptic curves. Several techniques
like the Chinese Reminder Theorem (CRT), Montgomery multiplication and Optimized
Squaring are used to accelerate RSA operations. Some optimizations are also performed
for point multiplication on elliptic curves over Fp. The authors use non-adjacent forms,
projective coordinates and other curve-specic optimizations to improve the performance
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of Elliptic Curve Cryptography. Implemented algorithms are evaluated with respect to
performance, code size, and memory usage. All the results for RSA and Elliptic Curve
Cryptography operations on Atmega128 processor are summarized in Table 2.2 [57].
Table 2.2: Timings for different RSA and ECC operations on Atmega128.
Algorithm Atmega128 @ 8MHz
Time ROM RAM
ECC secp160r1 0.81s 3682B 282B
ECC secp192r1 1.24s 3979B 336B
ECC secp224r1 2.19s 4812B 422B
Modular exponentiation 512 5.37s 1071B 328B
RSA-1024 public-key e = 216 + 1 0.43s 1073B 542B
RSA-1024 private-key w. CRT 10.99s 6292B 930B
RSA-2048 public-key e = 216 + 1 1.94s 2854B 1332B
RSA-2048 private-key w. CRT 83.26s 7736B 1853B
Timings show that point multiplication on the standard secp160r1 curve [24] is faster
than the RSA-1024 private-key operation and has comparable performance to the RSA-
1024 public-key operation. The biggest difference in performance however is visible for
higher security levels. Point multiplication on a secp224r1 curve takes only 2.19s com-
pared to 83.26s for the RSA-2048 private key operation, which offers the same level of se-
curity. Memory requirements for a full RSA implementation with the Chinese Reminder
Theorem are also signicantly higher. Results in Table 2.2 prove for the rst time that pub-
lic key primitives can be implemented in an efcient way even on very constrained 8-bit
architectures. This means that Public Key Cryptography is viable on embedded platforms
without the use of hardware acceleration. Compared to RSA, Elliptic Curve Cryptogra-
phy offers faster computation, memory, energy and bandwidth savings. Therefore it is a
better suited solution for constrained sensor devices.
2.3.4 Identity based cryptography for sensor networks
Elliptic Curve Cryptography uses smaller parameters than other Public Key Cryptogra-
phy techniques (e.g. RSA) making the cryptosystem more suitable for sensor networks.
However, the problem of public key authentication is not solved by using Elliptic Curve
Cryptography and the system still requires a practical public key infrastructure. One of
possible solutions to this problem is to apply security schemes that are used in identity
based cryptography.
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As mentioned earlier, Identity-Based Cryptography is a public key technique that
is based on identities of users. With Identity-Based Cryptography the wireless sensor
node's identity can be used as the public key and hence there is no need for a certicate
to bind awireless sensor node's identity to its public key. Such a system provides practical
public key encryption without the use of a complex public key infrastructure. In many
ways an identity based scheme is a perfect solution for sensor networks. There is no
need to maintain a public key directory, as the public keys can be derived from node's
identities that are widely known in the network. Identity-Based Cryptography provides
scalable security mechanism in which the number of keys is kept to a minimum. Nodes
generate a public key for a given node only when they want to communicate with it for
the rst time. After agreeing upon a shared session key, nodes can use cheap symmetric
key mechanisms (like TinySec) to encrypt the messages and to communicate in a secure
manner.
Identity-Based Cryptography allows every node to send secure messages to all other
nodes from the beginning of the network operation. No prior interaction between the
nodes is needed. Exchange of the information does not require any service or assistance
from a third party. However, identity-based systems assume the existence of a trusted
key generation center, which issues private keys corresponding to user's identities. This
authority can use its master key to decrypt user's messages. It can also impersonate any-
one in the network. This feature introduces the key escrow problem, where the security
of the whole system depends on the public key generator security. In many cases, a single
unconditionally trusted entity in the network simply does not exist.
Fortunately, in sensor networks the original network deployer can be considered as a
trusted entity that can act as the public key generator. It can generate a unique secret key
based on each node's identity and pre-load this information to node's memory before
the deployment phase. At this stage a secure channel clearly exists which allows careful
conguration of the network. The application of identity based cryptography to wireless
sensor networks is presented in Figure 2.7.
Security schemes that are based on Identity-Based Cryptography allow easy addition
of new nodes to the network. There is no need to replace or add new keys to existing de-
vices. New sensor nodes only have to be programmed with the domain parameters and
a private key by the public key generator before deployment. The communication over-
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Figure 2.7: Application of IBC in WSNs
head in establishing session keys is minimal in Identity-Based Cryptography schemes.
This makes the Identity-Based Cryptography approach much more suitable for low en-
ergy WSNs than traditional public key infrastructure schemes. The elimination of digital
certicates lowers the energy consumption and makes the system more practical, espe-
cially inWSNs that are deployed in remote areas. In the case of sensor networks, Identity-
Based Cryptography offers better security than other methods that are not based on Pub-
lic Key Cryptography. The whole system also increases the resistance against the node
capture attack. Subverting one of the nodes does not reveal anything about the commu-
nication between other pairs of nodes. It allows only to decrypt the messages received
from other nodes. Network access control is also provided as only the public key genera-
tor issues identities and pre-loads sensors with valid private keys. An active attacker can
encrypt messages to given identities but cannot decrypt any message without a proper
private key.
Identity-Based Cryptography has clear advantages over traditional public key sys-
tems, but also has some inherent problems. One of them is key revocation. In tradi-
tional Public Key Cryptography systems, compromised keys are replaced with a new pri-
vate/public key pair. In Identity-Based Cryptography systems, key revocation requires
that users have to change their identity information that corresponds to given private
keys. This might be especially problematic in cases where identities are chosen as nodes
unique physical addresses (e.g. transceivers serial numbers). One solution to the problem
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might be to use network addresses (e.g. IPv6 addresses) to identify nodes in the network.
An alternative solution would be to combine date with the identity information to gen-
erate new private keys when necessary. The problem of key revocation highlights the
importance of proper management of nodes identities in Identity-Based Cryptography
systems.
Despite some minor problems Identity-Based Cryptography has many advantages
when compared with other security schemes. Table 2.3 summarizes the main benets
that arise from using Identity-Based Cryptography to secure wireless sensor networks.
Table 2.3: Identity based cryptography vs other security schemes for WSNs.
Symmetric key Random key PKC IBC
cryptography pre-distribution
Computational Low Low High High
complexity
Communication Low High High Low
overhead
Key distribution Problematic Simple Complex Simple
Number of keys O(n2) O(n) O(n) n
Key directory At each node At each node At each node No
or key center
Digital No No Yes No
certicates
Forward No No No Yes
encryption
Non-repudiation No No Yes Yes
Identity based cryptography seems to t perfectly as a solution for the key distribu-
tion problem in WSNs. It provides advanced and exible primitives that can be used to
create novel key agreement schemes which can establish symmetric keys without any
communication between the nodes. There is no need for random key pre-distribution,
pair-wise key sharing or complicated one-way key chain schemes. The application of
identity based cryptography in sensor networks is a promising new approach to WSN
security that can provide practical Public Key Cryptography solutions in this challeng-
ing environment.
On the other hand the computational complexity of Identity-Based Cryptography is
signicant and it is unclear if such systems are even viable on constrained sensor de-
vices. It is also uncertain if Identity-Based Cryptography can provide a sufcient level
of security. There is a clear correlation between the level of security achieved and the
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processing power required. It is important to demonstrate that efcient Identity-Based
Cryptography implementations are indeed possible with security parameters set beyond
the current cryptanalysis records. However, before implementation details can be dis-
cussed, there is a need to identify all the building blocks that are necessary to implement
a complete Identity-Based Cryptography scheme in sensor networks.
2.3.5 IBC protocol building blocks
The implementation of Identity-Based Cryptography protocols is more complicated than
in case of traditional public key schemes (eg. RSA). It requires many modules that per-
form various operations. Figure 2.8 illustrates the framework that is required to imple-
ment complete Identity-Based Cryptography protocols.
Figure 2.8: IBC protocol building blocks
Efcient implementation of pairing based cryptosystems in sensor networks is chal-
lenging and requires optimization of the following modules:
1) Finite eld arithmetic. Elliptic curves used in cryptography are dened over nite
elds. Therefore efcient arithmetic operations in the underlaying eld are crucial
to the overall performance of the system. Much effort must be devoted to speeding
up basic arithmetic routines, as they are frequent in higher level operations. For best
performance, platform-dependent hand-coded assembly routines should be used.
2) Big number and modular arithmetic. In cryptography, arithmetic operations are per-
formed on numbers which are hundreds of bits long. Such numbers are not sup-
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ported natively in many computing languages and must be implemented exter-
nally. Appropriate handling of big numbers and modular arithmetic is the key to
efcient cryptographic operations.
3) Elliptic curve arithmetic. Cryptographicmechanisms based on elliptic curves depend
on arithmetic involving the points of the curve. Elliptic curve operations rely on the
arithmetic in the nite eld, but the performance of point addition and doubling is
also important. The efciency of curve arithmetic depends on the type of the curve,
the size of the underlying eld, the point representation system and the implemen-
tation of the algorithms.
4) ECC primitives. One of the main cryptographic primitives in Elliptic Curve Cryptog-
raphy is the scalar point multiplication. This operation is the base for many Elliptic
Curve Cryptography schemes such as Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm,
Elliptic Curve Dife-Hellman and Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme.
The performance of point multiplication is crucial in Elliptic Curve Cryptography
as it dominates the execution time of the above schemes. Point multiplication is
an important primitive not only in standard Elliptic Curve Cryptography but also
in Identity-Based Cryptography. Efcient implementation of point multiplication
is difcult due to the variety of existing algorithms and different types of elliptic
curves.
5) Cryptographic pairings. The calculation of cryptographic pairings is the most com-
putationally intensive operation in Identity-Based Cryptography schemes. Pairing-
Based Cryptography is a new area of research in cryptographywhich have not been
extensively studied yet. Software implementations of pairings were considered as
too heavyweight for embedded devices and the application of Pairing-Based Cryp-
tography to sensor networks has not been investigated so far.
Each of the above building blocks cannot be viewed in isolation and has to be opti-
mized with other modules in mind. For example nite eld operations have to be op-
timized for various eld sizes in order to support different curves and security levels.
An optimization that may not usually help, could be benecial when the behaviour of
the whole system is taken into account. In some cases one optimization could adversely
affect another.
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As can be seen in Figure 2.8, identity-based systems require also other building blocks
such as hash functions and random number generators. Secure hash functions are im-
portant in every cryptographic scheme, but they are not as computationally expensive as
other operations in Identity-Based Cryptography and hence will not be discussed in de-
tail in this work. The security and efciency of random number generators is important
in sensor networks but this topic is also beyond the scope of this thesis. The following
chapters present a detailed description on how to implement complete identity-based
security protocols in sensor networks. The implementations are discussed on all levels
of development beginning with basic operations in the nite eld, and nishing on new
pairing based cryptography protocols for WSNs.
2.4 Summary
Cryptographic key distribution is a fundamental security service in every computer sys-
tem. Other security services like authentication, data condentiality and integrity can
be built only upon a solid key management framework. The problem of symmetric key
distribution is challenging especially in large distributed systems like wireless sensor
networks, where the available resources are very limited.
Traditional xed networks usually solve the key distribution problem with the use
of Public Key Cryptography. This chapter presents the classical approach to key distri-
bution. It presents the idea behind Public Key Cryptography and shows how a basic
public key infrastructure works. It also describes the problems of using a traditional
Public Key Infrastructure in a sensor network environment. Section 2.2 presented also
a brief overview of recent advances in Public Key Cryptography such as Elliptic Curve
Cryptography and cryptographic pairings. From these techniques pairings are especially
interesting as they enable identity based cryptography which can be used in sensor net-
works to provide a practical Public Key Infrastructure and a simple way for symmetric
key distribution.
The development of feasible key distribution mechanisms for WSNs is an active area
of research. Despite much effort, key distribution and management still remains as an
open problem and a main topic in WSN security. This chapter presents a survey of differ-
ent key distribution techniques that were proposed in the literature. Most of these secu-
rity solutions use basic symmetric key algorithms due to their simplicity and efciency in
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resources utilization. Symmetric key mechanisms (like TinySec) provide link layer secu-
rity but they do not solve the key distribution problem and assume that the nodes already
share network-wide or pair-wise keys. Random key pre-deployment schemes have low
computational complexity but high communication overhead and they do not scale well
with the size of the network. Probabilistic key sharing like other schemes based on sym-
metric key cryptography do not provide a good trade-off between resilience and storage
of cryptographic keys. Other methods that are based on key distribution centers are also
ill-suited to WSNs as they are inefcient in resources utilization and require a trusted
infrastructure.
Symmetric key mechanisms offer a security level that is not acceptable in many WSN
applications especially more mature ones that deal with critical data. Some researchers
[57], including this author, believe that a proper level of security for those applications
can only be achieved with the additional use of Public Key Cryptography methods. First
efforts to apply Public Key Cryptography in sensor networks showed that RSA is not
feasible on sensor devices as it requires large keys and its private key operations are
very expensive in terms of computation. Further work in this area showed that Elliptic
Curve Cryptography is a more suitable Public Key Cryptography method in a resource
constrained environment because of smaller key sizes and faster execution time.
Practical use of Public Key Cryptography methods in WSNs requires not only com-
putational feasibility but also efcient ways for public key authentication. The use of a
traditional PKI with certicates and digital signatures is not possible in sensor networks,
therefore new cryptographic mechanisms have to be developed. This chapter proposes
the use of identity-based cryptography methods for distributing keys in the network.
This approach has many advantages over existing solutions. It can provide simple key
distribution without the use of expensive certicates. It can also introduce signicant sav-
ings on radio transmissions and storage of cryptographic keys. Despite the advantages,
the application of Identity-Based Cryptography in WSNs have not been fully investigate
so far. It is uncertain if Elliptic Curve Cryptography and pairings can by efciently im-
plemented on sensor nodes without the use of hardware accelerators. There are also no
pairing-based protocols that were designed specically for sensor networks. These prob-
lems will be addressed in the following chapters of this thesis.
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Finite Field Arithmetic for Low-end
Processors
F inite eld arithmetic is one of the main building blocks of every Identity-BasedCryptography protocol. Finite elds are very important constructs, because they
have special properties that can be exploited for the purpose of cryptography. They serve
as elementary blocks in ECC because elliptic curves used in cryptography are always
dened over nite elds. There are three main types of nite elds that are suitable for
implementation of elliptic curve systems: prime elds, binary elds and optimal exten-
sion elds.
The efcient implementation of nite eld arithmetic is an important prerequisite in
elliptic curve systems because curve operations are performed using arithmetic opera-
tions in the underlying eld. Operations on eld elements such as addition, subtraction,
multiplication, squaring and inversion operate on numbers which are usually hundreds
of bits long. These arithmetic operations are repeated many times in higher level algo-
rithms. Hence their efciency has a signicant inuence on the overall performance of
the system. The efciency of the nite eld operations depends on several factors:
² the hardware capabilities of a given platform;
² the type and size of the nite eld;
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² the way of representing the eld elements;
² the algorithms used for eld arithmetic.
Of all arithmetic operationsmultiprecisionmultiplication of eld elements is themost
time-critical routine in typical nite elds. There are operations that are more complex
in terms of computation (e.g. inversion) but they are used infrequently in practice and
hence are not time-critical. The efciency of eld multiplication is especially crucial on
low-end processors such as the 8-bit Atmega128 CPU, which is used in current sensor
node devices. The best implementation results on such a constrained hardware can only
be achieved with the use of hand crafted assembly language code. These routines should
be specically optimized for a given hardware platform for maximum performance.
3.1 Introduction to nite elds
Fields are abstractions of familiar number systems and their basic properties. The set of
real numbers R form a eld, but the set of integers is not a eld since every element
does not have a multiplicative inverse. A eld consist of a set F together with two binary
operations, addition (+) and multiplication (¢), that satisfy the usual arithmetic properties
[58]:
1) (F;+) is an abelian (commutative) group with (additive) identity denoted by 0;
2) (F n f0g; ¢) is an abelian group with (multiplicative) identity denoted by 1;
3) Distributive law: (a+ b) ¢ c = a ¢ c+ b ¢ c for all a; b; c 2 F.
3.1.1 Prime elds
A eld F is regarded as a nite eld when its order is nite. The order of a nite eld is
the number of elements in the eld. There exists a nite or Galois Field (GF) of order q if
and only if q is a prime power. Such a eld is denoted as GF (q) or Fq with q = pm where
p is a prime number called the characteristic of F, and m is a positive integer. If m = 1,
then F is called a prime eld. In case wherem ¸ 2, then F is called an extension eld. The
prime eld is denoted as Fp and consists of integers modulo p (f0; 1; 2; : : : ; p ¡ 1g) with
addition and multiplication performed modulo p. The following presents an example of
arithmetic operations in F17:
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1) Addition: 9 + 12 = 4 (21mod 17 = 4);
2) Subtraction: 9¡ 12 = 14 (¡3mod 17 = 14);
3) Multiplication: 9 ¢ 12 = 6 (108mod 17 = 6);
4) Inversion: 9¡1 = 2 (9 ¢ 2mod 17 = 1).
3.1.2 Binary elds
In the literature [58] nite elds of order 2m are called binary elds or characteristic-two
nite elds and are denoted as F2m . Such elds can be constructed using polynomial or
normal basis representation. All the software implementations described in this thesis
use the polynomial basis as the multiplication operation is much more expensive when a
normal basis1 is used. When using a polynomial basis the elements of F2m are the binary
polynomials (polynomials whose coefcients are in the eld F2 = f0; 1g) of degree at
mostm¡ 1:
F2m = am¡1zm¡1 + am¡2zm¡2 + ¢ ¢ ¢+ a2z2 + a1z + a0 : ai 2 f0; 1g (3.1)
Addition of the elements in F2m is performed like a normal addition of polynomi-
als, with coefcient arithmetic performed modulo 2 (XOR function). Multiplication of
eld elements is done in a special way as a reduction step is needed. For this purpose
an irreducible2 binary polynomial f(z) of degree m is chosen. Such a polynomial ex-
ists for any m and can be found in an efcient way. Irreducibility of this polynomial
means that f(z) cannot be factored as a product of binary polynomials each of degree less
than m. Multiplication of F2m elements is performed modulo the reduction polynomial
f(z). The following presents an example of arithmetic operations in F23 . The irreducible
polynomial for F23 is given by f(z) = z3 + z + 1 and the eld consists of 8 elements
f0; 1; z; z + 1; z2; z2 + 1; z2 + z; z2 + z + 1g.
1) Addition: (z2 + z + 1) + (z2 + 1) = z;
2) Subtraction gives the same result as addition since a = ¡a for all a 2 F2m ;
3) Multiplication: (z2+z+1)¢(z2+1) = z2+z (z4+z3+z+1)mod (z3+z+1) = z2+z;
1A normal basis of Fqn over Fq is a basis of a form N = f®; ®q; : : : ; ®qn¡1g
2Irreducible means that an object cannot be expressed as the product of two or more non-trivial factors
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4) Inversion: (z2 + z + 1)¡1 = z2 (z2 + z + 1) ¢ z2 mod (z3 + z + 1) = 1.
3.1.3 Extension elds
In addition to prime and binary elds elliptic curve cryptosystems can be also evaluated
over extension elds. An extension eld can be derived from the polynomial basis repre-
sentation of binary elds. If p is prime, k ¸ 2 and Fp[z] denotes the set of all the polyno-
mials in the variable z with coefcients from Fp, then the elements of the extension eld
Fpk can be represented by polynomials in Fp[z] each of degree at most k ¡ 1:
Fpk = ak¡1zk¡1 + ak¡2zk¡2 + ¢ ¢ ¢+ a2z2 + a1z + a0 : ai 2 Fp (3.2)
The arithmetic in the extension eld is derived from the usual arithmetic in polyno-
mial rings. The addition of two polynomials is done by the addition of their coefcients
modulo p. Extension eld multiplication is computed by a complete multiplication of
two polynomials and the subsequent reduction modulo the irreducible polynomial f(z)
of degree k. For efciency reasons, some effort can be made to choose f(z) to have a min-
imal number of terms and small coefcients. For example, for the eld Fp2 , where p is a
prime and p = 3mod 4, f(z) can be chosen as z2 + 1, and elements can be represented as
a1z + a0, with a1; a0 2 Fp.
Extension elds that are used to build Elliptic Curve Cryptography systems are of-
ten in the form of Optimal Extension Fields (OEFs) [6]. The general idea with optimal
extension elds Fpk is to select p, k, and the reduction polynomial f(z) to more closely
match the underlying hardware characteristics. OEFs are usually dened as extension
elds where the value of p is chosen as a small pseudo-mersenne prime3 which ts in a
single computer word. Such an approach simplies the handling of carries in arithmetic
operations. Despite this advantage, OEFs are not as widely standardized as prime and bi-
nary elds (e.g. IEEE P1363 standard [64]) and hence will not be discussed in this thesis.
However the arithmetic operations in the extension eld will be presented in this chapter
as they are important in Pairing-Based Cryptography. The preference for small word-
sized modulus p in OEFs makes these extension elds rather specialized. A much wider
range of possible extension elds need to be considered in the context of cryptographic
pairings.
3This prime has a form of p ¼ 2d, for example, p = 2160 ¡ 231 ¡ 1
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3.2 Embedded processors
Devices that are used in sensor networks embed different processors depending on the
requirements for computing power and memory. The architectures range from low-cost
8-bit to more advanced 32-bit platforms (see Table 1.1 in Chapter 1.1.1). Most of the sensor
nodes, however, have CPUs with very limited capabilities and low energy usage. There-
fore the security protocols designed for WSNs should be rst optimized to work with the
low-end 8-bit platforms.
All the cryptographic operations presented in this thesis were tested on three differ-
ent processors commonly used in sensor networks. The most popular CPU is the 8-bit
ATmega128 [5] provided by the Atmel corporation. This chip is embedded in such plat-
forms asMICA2DOT,MICA2 andMICAz. The second processor is the Texas Instruments
MSP430F1611 CPU [115] which is used in Tmote Sky nodes. The last hardware platform
is the PXA271 XScale microprocessor [66] which is based on an ARM core. This CPU
is being used in recent Imote2 nodes, which have more computing power and much im-
proved capabilities than the previously mentioned platforms. The above three processors
can be treated as the typical representatives of the 8, 16 and 32-bit classes of sensor net-
work devices.
3.2.1 ATmega128 8-bit processor
The ATmega128 belongs to the Atmel AVR family of processors which is based on a
modern highly structured RISC design. It offers 133 instructions, most of which are ex-
ecuted in a single CPU cycle. It can achieve a maximum throughput of 16 MIPS at 16
MHz. However, the models used in sensor networks are usually clocked at 7.3828 MHz.
The ATmega128 has a Harvard architecture with separate memory spaces for code and
data. One of the most interesting features of this hardware platform is the large set of 32
general purpose 8-bit registers. This feature gives the developer a lot of exibility when
writing source code. The physical memory is split up in three parts: program memory
with 128 KB in system-programmable ash memory, 4 KB of RAM and 4KB of congu-
ration EEPROM. There are many development tools available for the Atmel AVR family.
Atmel offers the free AVR Studio development environment. It contains a cycle-accurate
simulator of the ATmega128 processor which is a great help when developing the assem-
bly language code.
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3.2.2 The 16-bit MSP430 microcontroller
The 16-bit MSP430F1611 produced by Texas Instruments differs in many ways from the
Atmel chip. The MSP430 has a more traditional architecture that uses mainly memory-
to-memory operations rather than the more classic RISC load-store approach of the AT-
mega128. Its instruction set is limited to 27 instructions, but the variety of 7 different
addressing modes offers a lot of exibility in data manipulation. This orthogonal archi-
tecture allows every instruction to be used with every addressing mode. An interesting
feature of this CPU is the existence of an external hardware multiplier which performs
fast multiplication of 8 and 16-bit integers. The MSP430 provides twelve general pur-
pose registers. The remaining four registers r0-r3 are used for Program Counter, Stack
Pointer, Status Register and Constant Generator respectively. Registers r4-r15 are gen-
eral purpose and available for use at all times. This CPU offers also 10KB of RAM, but
only 48KB of ROM which might be a problem in the case of large programs. A very nice
feature of the MSP430 is its ultra low power consumption which is especially important
on tiny devices in distributed environments where the available energy is very limited.
3.2.3 The 32-bit ARM processor
The 32-bit Marvell PXA271 processor is built around the ARM core and differs com-
pletely from the two previously described platforms. It is a much more advanced and
powerful CPU with superior capabilities. Also the memory resources on this processor
are a few orders of magnitude higher than on the other two devices (32 MB of ROM
and 256 KB of RAM). This range of CPUs is commonly used in smartphones (e.g. the
iPhone) and PDA class devices and opens new possibilities when used in the WSN envi-
ronment. The ARM processor has a standard RISC load-store architecture, with several
innovative features, including effectively free shifting of operands at no extra cost (us-
ing a built-in barrel shifter) and conditional execution of instructions. It has 16 registers,
although three of these are reserved for special purposes, r13 as a stack pointer, r14
holds a function return address, and r15 is the program counter. If needed, the content
of r14 can be pushed onto the stack and an extra register is then available until the end
of the called function. The PXA271 offers full 32-bit processing and its clock rate can be
changed dynamically by adjusting the input voltage. This interesting feature permits a
tradeoff between energy consumption and processing power during the CPU operation.
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3.3 Efcient prime eld arithmetic on constrained CPUs
The prime eld arithmetic must provide multiplication, squaring, addition, subtraction
and reduction operations. Field inversion is also required for some operations but in
many cases it can be replaced with a larger number of cheaper operations. For example
usingMontgomery'smethod [91] themodular reduction can be carried out without using
division, and hence it is the modular multiplication and squaring which are signicant.
Multiprecision multiplication is the time-critical requirement in the great majority of
number-theoretic based methods for public key cryptography. It is required for the RSA
algorithm, for methods based on elliptic curves, and also for new mechanisms that are
based on cryptographic pairings. Elliptic curve systems are usually dened over nite
elds Fp of large characteristic where p has at least 160 bits (for security reasons). Since
the modulus is of a xed size in bits, the code for addition, multiplication, squaring and
modular reduction can be written in assembly language. The loops can be completely
unrolled to achieve maximum performance at the cost of some additional storage.
The implementation of prime eld arithmetic requires that each eld element is repre-
sented using multiple machine words. In the case of Fp where p is a large prime, the eld
element a can be implemented as a series ofW -bit unsigned integers 0 · ai < 2W , where
W is the wordsize on the target machine (e.g. W = 8, 16, 32) and a =
Pt¡1
i=0 ai2
Wi . The
number of required words t to hold a eld element can be calculated from t = d log2 pW e.
The binary representation of a eld element a can be stored in an array A = (A[t ¡
1]; : : : ; A[2]; A[1]; A[0])where the rightmost bit of A[0] is the Least Signicant Bit (LSB).
3.3.1 Modular addition and subtraction
Multiprecision integer addition and subtraction is a straightforward operation on stan-
dard general purpose processors. It requires t additions (or subtractions) of wordsize in-
tegers. One thing that needs to be remembered is the propagation of carry bits throughout
the calculations. On processors that have the add-with-carry (and subtract-with-carry)
instruction, there is no need for an explicit check for carry. Listing 3.1 presents the as-
sembly language code that performs addition of two wordsize integers on three different
processors used in sensor networks.
In the case of the ATmega128, registers Y and Z store the addresses of two eld ele-
ments a and b, whereas X holds the address of the result c. The MSP430 uses the registers
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Figure 3.1: Multiprecision addition of two wordsize integers on (i) ATmega128, (ii) MSP430 and (iii)
ARM processors
r11, r12 and r15 respectively with address increment of 2 bytes. The three registers in
case of the ARM processor are r6, r7, r8with 32-bit addressing. Multi-word subtraction
is similar to addition, the difference is in line 03 where a subtract with carry instruction
needs to be inserted. In the context of subtraction the carry bit is often called a borrow.
Arithmetic in the eld Fp requires modular additions c = (a + b) mod p and sub-
tractions c = (a¡ b)mod p. These operations require an additional step which performs
reduction modulo p. In case of modular subtraction, after calculating twordsize subtrac-
tions the borrow bit is tested. If the borrow is equal to 1 then the modulus p is added to
the result c. Similarly in modular addition the carry bit decides if a reduction is needed.
When the carry bit is equal to 1 then the modulus p needs to be subtracted from c. The
reduction is also needed if carry is equal to 0 and c ¸ p.
Table 3.1: Timings in instruction cycles for modular addition and subtraction of 160-bit integers on stan-
dard WSN processors.
Hardware platform Atmega128 MSP430 PXA271
Modular addition (assembly) 404 386 155
Modular addition (C) 596 533 200
Modular subtraction (assembly) 392 377 149
Modular subtraction (C) 584 526 194
Table 3.1 presents the timings for modular addition and subtraction operations on
160-bit integers in Fp. All the timings are given in clock cycles of a given hardware plat-
form. They represent an average value over 100 operations because the reduction step
is not always executed. The numbers in Table 3.1 prove that assembly implementation
of modular addition and subtraction gives on average 25% better performance than the
standard C implementation.
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3.3.2 Multiprecision integer multiplication
There are two main methods to implement multiprecision integer multiplication in soft-
ware. The rst group uses the Karatsuba-Ofman techniques that divide the operands into
smaller integers and thus reduce the number of multiplications. Unfortunately this ap-
proach has a large overhead in additional operations and is not efcient in nite elds
of practical interest. The second group of techniques is more practical and uses different
variations of basic schoolbook multiplication.
When doing a multiplication using the schoolbook algorithm the multiplication is
divided into several partial products that are accumulated to get the nal result. The
partial products can be calculated in any order before they are added together. They can
be arranged in rows from right-to-left or in columns by bit length. Figure 3.2 shows a
4£ 4multiplication using both methods.
Figure 3.2: (i) Column-wise and (ii) Row-wise multiplication
The column-wise technique (also known as the product scanning method) is not so
straightforward to program as the columns are of different lengths, although this is not
a concern if the code is unrolled. The alternative row-wise method (also known as the
operand scanning method) is much easier to implement as a short looped program. The
word-by-wordmultiplication can be carried out using a simple pair of nested for loops.
The row-wise algorithm requires more memory writes, but less memory reads of the
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operands. Therefore the column-wise algorithm should be preferred as memory writes
only occur at the foot of each column. A disadvantage of both methods is that they reload
the same operands many times to calculate different partial products. This is obviously
not an optimal approach especially if a processor have enough registers available to store
some of these values for later use.
Recently in [57] it has been suggested that a hybrid method which combines features
of both techniques might be preferable, particularly in a setting where the processor has
many available general purpose registers. This method was rst described in the context
of the ATmega-128L 8-bit processor, which has 32 registers. In the same setting, Uhsadel
et al. [116] have recently obtained improved results. The following sections presents a
description of an optimized method of hybrid multiplication which simplies the whole
approach. The improved technique can be applied to a wide range of embedded proces-
sors and is superior to the earlier proposals.
3.3.2.1 Improved hybrid multiplication
The most efcient implementations of multiprecision multiplication use the method of
Comba [28], which is based on the column-wise technique (see Fig. 3.2 (i)). Each W -bit
pair of digits is multiplied together to create one 2W bit partial product. This partial
product is accumulated in a triple register. The third register (called a carry-catcher)
is required to catch the carries that can arise as the full column is added up. After the
column addition, the least signicant register of the triple register is written to memory
as a part of the result, and the other two registers shifted down, representing the carry to
the next column. The maximum number that can arise in the third and most signicant
register is bounded by the number of digits in the multi-precision multiplication. This is
likely to be much smaller than 2W ¡ 1, which is the maximum number that can be stored
in a register, and so sometimes a smaller register can be used here.
The hybrid method [57] keeps the advantages of the column-wise method, while ex-
ploiting any extra registers to avoid unnecessary reloads of data. The idea is straightfor-
ward  perform the multiplication as if the word length of the computer were actually
d ¢W , and perform the d£ dmultiplication that arises in the calculation of the larger par-
tial product using the row-wise algorithm. Figure 3.3 (i) illustrates the hybrid method for
the case d = 2. Four wordsize integers are loaded into registers. As each large 2 £ 2 par-
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tial product is calculated (represented by the large outer boxes), it must be accumulated
into registers. The diagram illustrates the accumulation of a particular partial product,
and curved arrows indicate the carries. A naive implementation would require ve reg-
isters in this case to store the sum. However, in the worst case this might require up to
ve add-with-carry instructions, as in integer addition, a carry-out is always a possibility
that must be catered for.
The original hybrid method [57], and the improved variant described in [116], use a
rather complex method to deal with this carry propagation problem, based on the fact
that the product of two words, plus two words, cannot overow a double-word-sized
register since:
(2W ¡ 1)(2W ¡ 1) + (2W ¡ 1) + (2W ¡ 1) = 22W ¡ 1 < 22W (3.3)
A new idea to improve the hybrid method is to simply employ even more registers to
suppress the carry propagation. As well as using 2d column registers to hold the sum of
each now wider column, an extra 2d¡1 registers are deployed as carry catchers. These
registers are initialized to zero at the top of the column and catch any carries that may
arise without the possibility of further carry propagation. When the column is nished,
these carry catchers are simply added with carry to the main set of column registers.
The case for d = 2 is shown in Figure 3.3 (ii). The most signicant carry-catcher register
performs exactly the same role as the fth register in the naive implementation.
The d £ d row-wise multiplication requires d + 1 registers, d registers to hold the en-
tire row, each element of which is then multiplied by another register (which stores the
current multiplier) to create d partial products. There are 2d column registers and 2d ¡ 1
carry-catchers, for a total of 5d registers. For d = 1 this is the original Comba method,
which requires ve registers, just about possible if the number of general purpose regis-
ters is r = 8. The choice d = 2 requiring ten registers is a good t for a processor with
a total of r = 16 registers, and d = 4 will take 20 registers for the case r = 32. The im-
proved hybrid method can exploit even more registers if they are available on the target
platform.
The above gures are approximate and may require modication for a particular ar-
chitecture. Not all of the r registers on a given type of CPU might be available to the
developer. At least three registers will be required to store the memory addresses of the
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Figure 3.3: The processing of a two word partial product using (i) A naive implementation of the hybrid
method and (ii) The improved hybrid implementation
operands and of the result. It is also sometimes helpful if a register xed with the con-
stant value of zero is available. The processor must support simple indexedmemory load
and store instructions, an integer multiply instruction which outputs the result in a pair
of registers, and a simple add-with-carry instruction.
The implementation of the improved hybrid method is always processor specic, as
CPUs differ in small but signicant ways that can not be described in a one-size-ts-all
way. Indeed the previous work is described only in the specic context of a particular
processor [28], [57], [116]. However, in order to prove the generality of the improved hy-
bridmultiplication, this approach was applied to three different embedded processors. In
this context the new method achieved better performance (around 8-20%) than previous
techniques.
3.3.2.2 The ATmega128 microcontroller
The ATmega128 processor has 32 registers, denoted r0 to r31. There are three memory
addressing registers, denoted X, Y and Z, which actually refer to the 16-bit register pairs
r26:r27, r28:r29 and r30:r31. The calculation of a typical single partial product on
this processor using the standard Comba method is illustrated in listing 3.4 (i). The Y and
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Z registers are pointing at 8-bit digits of the multiplicand and the multiplier respectively.
The X register is pointing at the address which will eventually contain the sum of this
column. Using standard indexed addressing and the LDD instruction, the multiplicand
andmultiplier are loaded into the r0 and r1 registers. The MUL instruction always places
the 16-bit result in the register pair r0:r1. The triple register in this case is r6:r7:r8
and the register r5 is kept as a constant zero. Then an ADD and two ADC instructions are
used to add the new product into the triple register, taking care of the carries.
Figure 3.4: The processing of (i) A single partial product (Comba method) and (ii) four partial products
(improved hybrid method) on ATmega128
Listing 3.4 (ii) shows the improved hybrid method with d = 2. In this case 4 partial
products are calculated together in each step, requiring more registers. In this case the
column registers are r6:r7:r8:r9, and r10:r11:r12 are used as the carry-catchers.
This time r25 is used to hold the constant zero.
The count of basic operations reveals the advantage of the improved hybrid method.
To calculate 4 partial products using the simple Combamethodwould require 4 times the
operations in 3.4 (i), that is 8 loads, 4 multiplies, 4 additions and 8 additions-with-carry.
However for the same work carried out, the improved hybrid method requires 4 loads,
63
Chapter 3: Finite Field Arithmetic for Low-end Processors
Table 3.2: Comparison of instruction counts for ATmega128
New method Uhsadel et al. Gura et al. Classic Comba
Instruction CPI Instr Cycles Instr Cycles Instr Cycles Instr Cycles
add/adc 1 1263 1263 986 986 1360 1360 1200 1200
mul 2 400 800 400 800 400 800 400 800
ld 2 200 400 238 476 167 334 800 1600
st 2 40 80 40 80 40 80 40 80
mov 1 70 70 355 355 355 355 81 81
other 38 184 197 44 44
Totals 2651 2881 3106 3805
4 multiplies, 4 additions and 8 additions-with-carry, from gure 3.4 (ii). The saving of 4
load instructions is particularly signicant as the load instruction takes 2 clock cycles (the
same as the multiply instruction).
The ATmega128 processor has enough unused registers to extend the improved hy-
brid idea to d = 4 with further savings. Using this method, the number of clock cycles
for a full 160£ 160 bit multiplication can be reduced to 2651 clock cycles. This compares
favourably with the 2881 clock cycles recently reported in [116], and the 3106 clock cy-
cles reported in [57] (approximately 15% faster). This is despite the fact that the above
implementations use d = 5 rather than the d = 4. The improved method cannot use
d = 5 on ATmega128 due to the extra requirement for carry-catcher registers. Table 3.2
summarizes the results for multiprecision multiplication on the ATmega128.
3.3.2.3 The MSP430 CPU
In order to achieve the best performance for multiprecision multiplication on the 16-bit
MSP430, it is important to use the hardware multiplier. This device is a peripheral and is
not implemented in every member of the large MSP430 family of microprocessors. It is
accessed via memory mapped I/O registers. The MSP430F1611 model which is used in
sensor devices includes this hardware multiplier.
Listing 3.5 (i) shows the calculation of a typical partial product on this architecture
using the standard Comba method. Registers r13 and r14 store the memory addresses
of the rst 16-bit digits of the multiplicand and the multiplier. Indexed addressing mode
is used to nd the address of a particular 16-bit digit. In this case the third digit of the
multiplicand and the second digit of multiplier are loaded into the hardware multiplier
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registers using the memory-to-memory MOV instruction. Writing the rst operand to the
MPY register selects unsigned multiply mode but does not start any operation. Loading
the second operand to OP2 initiates the multiply operation. The lower and the higher 16-
bit parts of the 32-bit result are stored in RESLO and RESHI registers respectively and can
be read by the next instruction. One ADD, one ADDC and one ADC (add carry to destination
in the MSP430 instruction set) instructions are used to add the new product to the triple
register which consists of r9:r10:r11.
Figure 3.5: The processing of (i) A single partial product (Comba method) and (ii) four partial products
(improved hybrid method) on the MSP430
Due to the limited number of available registers on the MSP430 the improved hybrid
method can be implemented only with d = 2 (listing 3.5 (ii)). Eleven registers are required
to calculate the 4 partial products in every step of this algorithm. This time r4:r5:r6:r7
are the column registers, and r13:r14:r15 are the carry-catchers. Registers r10:r11
are used as pointers to particular digits in the multiplicand andmultiplier. In the MSP430
instruction set, the number of clock cycles per instruction depends both on the instruc-
tion mnemonic and the type of operands being used. Because memory-to-memory MOV
instructions require the most cycles, two extra registers r8 and r9 are used as temporary
storage to save on the overall cycle count (memory-to-register operations are much less
expensive).
At a rst glance it might appear that the cost of both methods (hybrid and standard)
is exactly the same on the MSP430. Calculation of 4 partial products using the simple
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Table 3.3: Comparison of instruction counts for the MSP430
New method Classic Comba
Instruction CPI Instructions Cycles Instructions Cycles
add &label,reg 3 100 300 100 300
addc &label,reg 3 100 300 100 300
adc reg 1 109 109 100 100
mov x(reg),&label 6 45 270 180 1080
mov reg,x(reg) 4 20 80 20 80
mov reg,reg 1 27 27 38 38
mov reg,&label 4 100 400
mov x(reg),reg 3 45 135
other 125 167
Totals 1746 2065
Combamethod requires 8 MOV, 4 ADD, 4 ADDC and 4 ADC instructions. The hybrid method
uses also 20 instructions with exactly the samemnemonics. However on closer inspection
its clear that the advantage of the hybrid method lies in the total number of clock cycles.
The 8 MOV instructions in the simple algorithm takes 48 clock cycles in total. The hybrid
method can take advantage of register to memory operations and saves 14 cycles using
only 34 cycles for the same work carried out. The benet in clock cycles of the improved
hybrid method is very similar on both the MSP430 and the ATmega128-L in the case
where d = 2.
The improved hybrid method on the MSP430 is limited to d = 2 as it already uses
all 12 available registers. Using this algorithm, 160 £ 160 bit multiplication takes 1746
clock cycles, which is an improvement when compared to the 2065 cycles for the stan-
dard Comba method (Table 3.3). Assuming that the MSP430 processor is clocked at the
standard frequency of 8MHz, the result of the multiplication of two 160-bit numbers is
calculated at 0.22ms. This result compares favourably with the 0.95ms reported for the
same operation on a MSP430 in [118]. In [56] Guajardo et al. tested multiprecision mul-
tiplication of 128-bit integers on the TI MSP430x33x family of processors, which differs
slightly in design from the MSP430F1611. The common features are the same instruction
set and the presence of the hardware multiplier. Once again the improved hybrid method
proved to be more efcient using only 1154 clock cycles against the 1425 reported in [56].
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3.3.2.4 The ARM processor
Figure 3.6 (i) shows the calculation of a typical partial product on a 32-bit ARM processor
using the standard Comba method. Registers r5 and r6 store the memory addresses of
the rst 32-bit digits of the multiplicand and the multiplier. Indexed addressing mode
is used to nd the address of a particular 32-bit digit. The UMULL instruction calculates
the 64-bit product in registers r8 and r9. These are then added-with-carry to the triple
register r2:r3:r4.
Figure 3.6: The processing of (i) A single partial product (Comba method) and (ii) four partial products
(improved hybrid method) on an ARM processor
A naive attempt to implement the improved hybrid method on the ARM with d = 2
will fail, due to a lack of registers. For themultiplication algorithm 3 registers are required
to hold the addresses of the operands, 4 more are required as column registers, 3 as carry-
catchers, and 2 more for the row elements, plus another for the multiplier. Furthermore
the multiplication instruction requires 2 registers to hold the 64-bit product of a pair of
32-bit registers, for a total of 15 registers.
This problem can be solved by exploiting the novel features of the instruction set. The
basic idea is to use just one carry-catcher register instead of three. As the carry-catcher
registers are used to catch and accumulate the sum of individual carry bits, they do not
require the 32-bit precision of a full register. In fact for any reasonable application with
big number operands of a useful size, a byte would be sufcient. This observation is
used to compress the carry-catcher requirement into a single register, without incurring
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any extra cost. The solution is presented in gure 3.6 (ii).
The ADDCS instruction (ADD if Carry Set) can be used to add a carry bit to a specic
byte in the shared carry-catcher register r11. Here r2:r3:r4:r10 are the column reg-
isters. The hybrid approach saves one load instruction on every single partial product
calculation. The foot-of-column processing is a little complex, as the individual carry-
catcher components must be masked and shifted before being added to the column reg-
isters. However, a register argument can be shifted at no extra cost using the ARM's
barrel shifter, so the overall cost is small. The method was implemented and tested in the
context of a 192£192 bit multiplication using the ARMRealView simulator [4]. The mod-
ied hybrid method required only 487 clock cycles, when compared with the 580 cycles
of the basic Comba method.
3.3.3 Squaring and modular reduction
In order to save code space, the squaring of multiprecision integers can be calculated
by the same algorithm that performs multiprecision multiplication. However, a dedi-
cated routine would signicantly improve the performance of the squaring operation.
Optimized squaring of large integers can take advantage of the fact that partial prod-
ucts aiaj , i 6= j occur twice during calculations. These partial products need only be
calculated once, and then accumulated twice, with savings in instruction cycles. Figure
3.7 shows how the new hybrid method (d = 2) can be used to improve the squaring of
multiprecision integers. The diagonal partial products are calculated only once and ac-
cumulated twice in registers r0:r2:r3:r4. Using this method the number of required
single precision multiplications can be reduced by roughly half. This gives squaring an
approximately 21-27% decrease in execution time when compared with a standard mul-
tiplication routine (see Table 3.4).
After the multiprecision multiplication (or squaring) in Fp, the resulting value has the
size of 2m bits (m = dlog2pe) and must be reduced modulo p. In case where modulus
p is not of a special form, the reduction operation can be an expensive part of modular
multiplication. Generic methods like Barret or Montgomery reduction replace expensive
divisions in classical reduction methods with cheaper operations. Nonetheless, they are
still expensive and require roughly t2 + t single-precision multiplications, where t =
dm=W e [58].
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Figure 3.7:Multiprecision integer squaring using the improved hybrid method
Since the performance of Elliptic Curve Cryptography schemes depends heavily on
the speed of eld multiplication, it is benecial to select moduli that permit fast reduc-
tion. Direct reduction techniques for moduli of special form give signicant savings in
execution time, especially on embedded processors with small word size. All NIST and
most SECG recommended primes are chosen as pseudo-Mersenne primes to facilitate
optimized reduction. These primes can be represented as p = 2m ¡ ! where ! is the sum
of a few powers of two and ! ¿ 2m. Pseudo-Mersenne primes are sparse and the pow-
ers of 2 in ! are chosen to be divisible by the specic processor word sizeW . Reduction
of a 2m-bit multiplication result c can be computed based on the congruence 2m ´ !.
The following example presents the reduction modulo p = 2160 ¡ 2112 + 264 + 1 which is
optimized for a 16-bit processor.
The result of a multiprecision multiplication of two integers can be represented using
the base 216 with ci 2 [216 ¡ 1]:
c = c192304 + c182288 + c172272 + ¢ ¢ ¢+ c2232 + c1216 + c0 (3.4)
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The higher powers of 2 in 3.4 can be reduced using the congruences:
2160 ´ 2112 ¡ 264 ¡ 1 (modp)
2176 ´ 2128 ¡ 280 ¡ 216 (modp)
2192 ´ 2144 ¡ 296 ¡ 232 (modp)
2208 ´ ¡264 ¡ 248 ¡ 1 (modp)
2224 ´ ¡280 ¡ 264 ¡ 216 (modp)
2240 ´ ¡296 ¡ 280 ¡ 232 (modp)
2256 ´ ¡2112 ¡ 296 ¡ 248 (modp)
2272 ´ ¡2128 ¡ 2112 ¡ 264 (modp)
2288 ´ ¡2144 ¡ 2128 ¡ 280 (modp)
2304 ´ ¡2144 ¡ 2112 ¡ 296 + 264 + 1 (modp) (3.5)
The use of congruences from 3.5 in 3.4 give:
c ´ ¡c192144 ¡c192112 ¡c19296 +c19264 +c19
¡c182144 ¡c182128 ¡c18280
¡c172128 ¡c172112 ¡c17264
¡c162112 ¡c16296 ¡c16248
¡c15296 ¡c15280 ¡c15232
¡c14280 ¡c14264 ¡c14216
¡c13264 ¡c13248 ¡c13
+c122144 ¡c12296 ¡c12232
+c112128 ¡c11280 ¡c11216
+c102112 ¡c10264 ¡c10
+c92144 +c82128 +c72112 +c6296 +c5280 +c4264 +c3248 +c2232 +c1216 +c0
(modp)
(3.6)
From the equation 3.6, c modulo p can be obtained by ve additions (subtractions)
of 160-bit integers and repeated subtractions of p until the result is less than p. Equation
3.6 leads to Algorithm 1 which can be efciently implemented on a 16-bit embedded
processor. The same method can be also used to derive the reduction algorithm for an 8-
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bit CPU. Table 3.4 presents timings for the fast reduction modulo p = 2160¡2112+264+1
on ATmega128 and MSP430.
Algorithm 1 Fast reduction modulo p = 2160 ¡ 2112 + 264 + 1
INPUT: An integer c = (c19; c18; c17; : : : ; c2; c1; c0) in base 216 with 0 · c < p2.
OUTPUT: c mod p
Form 160-bit integers:
k1 = (c9; c8; c7; c6; c5; c4; c3; c2; c1; c0);
k2 = (c12; c11; c10; 0; 0; c19; 0; 0; 0; c19);
k3 = (0; c17; c17; c12; c18; c17; 0; 0; 0; 0);
k4 = (c18; c18; c16; c16; c11; c10; c16; c12; c11; c10);
k5 = (0; 0; 0; c15; c15; c13; c13; c15; 0; c13);
k6 = (c19; 0; c19; c19; c14; c14; 0; 0; c14; 0):
return (k1 + k2 ¡ k3 ¡ k4 ¡ k5 ¡ k6 mod p).
Table 3.4: Timings in instruction cycles for 160-bit integer squaring and modular reduction
Hardware platform Atmega128 MSP430
Hybrid multiplication 2651 (d=4) 1746 (d=2)
Squaring 2193 (d=4) 1373 (d=2)
Modular reduction 1228 990
3.4 Efcient binary eld arithmetic for low-end processors
Finite elds of characteristic-two are usually the main alternative to prime elds when
implementing Elliptic Curve Cryptography systems. Binary elds are attractive espe-
cially for hardware implementations since the operations in F2m involve only shifts and
bitwise addition modulo 2. The simplicity of basic operations is also attractive for soft-
ware implementations on general-purpose processors.
Prime elds and binary elds have their own pros and cons when it comes to ef-
cient implementation on low-end processors. The most time-critical operation in F2m
binary polynomial multiplication - calculates only a few bits at a time and can be very
slow without proper optimizations. On the other hand, the arithmetic in prime elds is
typically more difcult to implement efciently, due in part to the propagation of carry
bits. Nonetheless, prime elds are usually preferred due to better hardware support on
embedded processors.
Most of the low-end CPUs support multiplication of wordsize integers in hardware.
This feature signicantly accelerates multiprecision multiplication in Fp. Arithmetic on
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binary elds is not natively supported in the Instruction Set of typical embedded pro-
cessors. None of the CPUs used in sensor networks support multiplication in the binary
eld. Therefore efcient implementation of polynomial multiplication remains as a chal-
lenging task.
The elements of a nite eld F2m can be represented by binary polynomials of degree
less than m, where m is a prime number. For security reasons Elliptic Curve Cryptog-
raphy systems are dened over nite elds where m is usually greater than 160 bits. In
software, the coefcients of a binary polynomial may be stored in an array of t W -bit
words. The s = tW ¡m highest order bits in the last word of the array remain unused
(always set to 0).
The addition of eld elements is performed bitwise, and is very fast requiring only t
word operations (XORs) which are supported by all computer architectures. Addition in
the binary eld is analogous tomultiprecision integer addition, without the carries. Other
arithmetic operations (beside multiplication) include inversion, squaring, reduction and
calculation of square roots.
3.4.1 Binary polynomial multiplication
The simplest way to perform polynomial multiplication is to use the basic schoolbook
multiplication. This method for two polynomials a(z) and b(z) of degree m ¡ 1 is il-
lustrated in Figure 3.8. The algorithm requires m ¡ 1 left shifts of a(z) and a modulo
2 addition of a(z) to the accumulator for every non-zero coefcient of b(z). This shift-
and-add method generates only one bit of the result at each step. Its implementation
in software is usually very slow due to many vector shifts. Large number of these op-
erations makes the implementation infeasible especially on small 8-bit processors where
shifts can only by performed one bit at a time. The shift-and-add method is more suitable
for hardware where a vector shift can be performed in one clock cycle. Embedded pro-
cessors require faster methods for eld multiplication. The following sections present a
description of an optimized hierarchical technique for binary polynomial multiplication.
This method combines different multiplication techniques and achieves superior results
on constrained WSN platforms.
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Figure 3.8: Binary polynomial multiplication using the basic schoolbook method
3.4.1.1 Optimized hierarchical method for polynomial multiplication
The optimized hierarchical technique for binary polynomial multiplication consists of
two stages:
² the rst step is the application of the Karatsuba-Ofman technique [74] which di-
vides large polynomials into several smaller polynomials;
² the second stage performs the actual multiplication of binary polynomials using
the comb method [82].
For embedded processors with small word sizes the hierarchical multiplication tech-
nique is attractive for large elds. In case of smaller values of m the second stage of the
technique can be applied directly in order to avoid unnecessary overhead. The execution
time of thewholemethod depends on the efciency of the combmultiplication. This algo-
rithm should be implemented in assembly language to provide maximum performance
on a given hardware platform.
The multiplication of two binary polynomials a(z) and b(z) of degree m ¡ 1 results
in a polynomial of degree at most 2m¡ 2. In the rst step, the Karatsuba-Ofman method
divides large m ¡ 1 polynomials into several polynomials with fewer coefcients. This
divide-and-conquer method can be directly adapted for binary polynomials. In the case
of a division into two parts (depth d = 2), the polynomial multiplication c(z) = a(z)b(z)
can be represented as:
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a(z) = A1(z)xn +A2(z) b(z) = B1(z)zn +B2(z) (3.7)
c(z) = A1B1z2n + ((A1 +A2)(B1 +B2) +A2B2 +A1B1)zn +A2B2 (3.8)
where n = dm2 e and A1; A2; B1; B2 are binary polynomials of degree less than n.
For d = 2 the above technique substitutes one full multiplication with three half-size
multiplications. One multiplication is saved at the cost of several extra additions which
are very fast in binary elds. The most time-consuming part of the equation 3.8 is the
computation of the sub-products A1B1; A2B2 and (A1 + A2)(B1 + B2). In the second
stage of the hierarchical multiplication these products are calculated using the optimized
comb method with a window width of w-bits (Algorithm 2 based on [82]).
Algorithm 2 Comb method with windows of width w
INPUT: Binary polynomials A(z) and B(z) of degree at most n¡ 1
OUTPUT: C(z) = A(z) ¢B(z).
1: Compute U [i] = U(z) ¢B(z) for all polynomials U(z) of degree at most w ¡ 1
2: C Ã 0
3: for k Ã (W=w)¡ 1 downto 0 do
4: for j Ã 0 to t¡ 1 do
5: C Ã C + U [i] ¢ zWj where
6: i = (awk+w¡1+Wj ; : : : ; awk+1+Wj ; awk+Wj)10
7: end for
8: If k 6= 0 then C Ã C ¢ zw
9: end for
10: return C
For software implementationAlgorithm 2 is faster than the basic shift-and-addmethod
since it requires fewer vector shifts (multiplications by z). Additionally it processes w co-
efcients of a(z) at a time by pre-computing 2w polynomials. In line number 5 the correct
address of the pre-computed polynomial is calculated based on the values of w consec-
utive bits in a. After this selection the polynomial can be added to specic words of the
accumulator. Figure 3.9 shows the order in which the bits of a are processed in Algo-
rithm 2. In the rst loop w bits of a are processed in columns from top to bottom. For the
consecutive loops the window is shifted w bits from left-to-right.
The size of thewindoww decides the amount of pre-computed data. The combmethod
withwindow size ofw-bits requires pre-computation of t¢2w computer words. On embed-
ded processors, the choice of w is very important and should provide a reasonable trade-
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Figure 3.9: The order of bits processing in the comb method with window width w
off between speed and storage. When the window is too small the performance of the al-
gorithm does not improve much. If the window is too big the improvement in execution
time is overshadowed by a large memory overhead. For nite elds of practical interest,
a window size of four bits provide optimal performance on low-end processors. The key
to efcient implementation of the comb method lies also in the proper handling of the
accumulator C. The best performance can be achieved by using the maximum number
of registers to minimize unnecessary store/load operations (as in the hybrid multiplica-
tion). The implementation is of course processor specic and is discussed in the context
of three standard WSN processors. The implementations were performed over F2271 - a
binary eld that can be used for pairing-based cryptography. On all three platforms, the
assembly language optimization of the hierarchical multiplication achieved signicant
performance improvement (60-75%) over the standard C implementation.
3.4.1.2 The ATmega128 CPU
The optimized hierarchical multiplication of binary polynomials of degree less than 271
can be performed in two steps and results in a polynomial of degree at most 540. Accord-
ing to formula 3.8, the multiplication can be rewritten as:
c(z) = A1B1z272 + ((A1 +A2)(B1 +B2) +A2B2 +A1B1)z136 +A2B2 (3.9)
The sub-products A1B1; A2B2 and (A1 + A2)(B1 + B2) can be efciently calculated
with a comb multiplication with window width w = 4 (Algorithm 2). On an 8-bit proces-
sor, the computations can be divided into two loops and the multiplication by zWj can
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be replaced by an address computation. In the rst loop, all pre-computed polynomials
U [i] ¢ z8j , 0 · j · t ¡ 1 are summed up in the polynomial C(z). The correct address i
of the polynomial can be calculated by converting the four bits (a7+8j ; a6+8j ; a5+8j ; a4+8j)
into a decimal value. After the rst loop C(z) is multiplied by z4 (shifted left by 4 bits)
and the polynomials U [i] ¢ z8j , 0 · j · t ¡ 1, are added to C(z) again. This time
i = (a3+8j ; a2+8j ; a1+8j ; a8j)10. The multiples U(z) ¢ B(z), deg(U) < 4 are pre-computed
and stored in a lookup table of 288 bytes.
Themost important problem,which impacts signicantly the performance of themul-
tiplication, is the handling of the polynomialC(z). Clearly, the temporary result (36 bytes)
cannot be kept in the CPU registers for the entire duration of the multiplication. How-
ever, it is important to notice that nearly all registers that are affected by the addition of a
particular polynomial U(z) ¢ B(z), are altered again in subsequent iterations of the loop.
Hand-crafted assembly implementation can take advantage of this fact to use the CPU
registers in an optimal way. The coefcients of C(z) can be rotated through the available
registers of the microcontroller, to minimize the number of memory accesses.
Figure 3.10 shows the content of registers R0-R17 throughout the rst loop of the
comb algorithm. Bytes U0¡U17 denote the 18 bytes of the particular pre-computed poly-
nomial U [i], which corresponds to bits (a7+8j ; a6+8j ; a5+8j ; a4+8j). The bytes in yellow are
loaded into registers and bytes in light blue are added to registers in each iteration of the
loop (j). The bytes in red mark the data which is stored in RAM after the addition.
Figure 3.10: First part of the Comb multiplication on the ATmega128 processor
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Table 3.5: Instruction counts for polynomial multiplication in F2271 on ATmega128
Algorithm Stage Load Store XOR Shift Other Total
Comb w = 4
Precomp 190 288 126 126 77 807
Loop 1 391 16 272 0 143 822
Shift by 4 bits 18 19 0 148 20 205
Loop 2 407 34 306 0 158 905
Total 1006 357 704 274 398 2739
Clock cycles 1898 714 704 274 457 4047
Karatsuba
Total 258 102 136 0 52 548
Clock cycles 496 204 136 0 91 927
Hierarchical Total 3276 1173 2248 822 1246 8765
(Karatsuba + Clock cycles 6190 2346 2248 822 1462 13068
3£ comb)
The rotation illustrated in Figure 3.10 minimizes the number of copy instructions, but
can only be implemented when the code is unrolled. Table 3.5 lists the instruction counts
for the Comb algorithm (w = 4) and the Karatsuba technique. It shows also the total
number of instructions that are necessary for the optimized hierarchical multiplication
in F2271 . The precomputation phase, the two loops as well as the multiplication of the
polynomial by z4 is separated to provide more details on the implementation.
Using the Karatsuba method the number of smaller eld multiplications is reduced to
three. This allows us to save more than 3000 clock cycles (20%) on a single multiplication
in F2271 . For smaller elds the comb technique should be used directly to minimize the
overhead. Direct application of this method is more efcient when the whole polynomial
U(z) ¢B(z) ts in the available registers of the CPU. For the ATmega128 with 32 registers
this happens when m · 184. The optimized hierarchical multiplication is recommended
for larger values of m. The hierarchical approach also saves code space by reusing the
fragments responsible for multiplication in the smaller eld.
The binary polynomial multiplication on embedded processors was implemented
also in the work of Seo, Han and Hong [110]. The authors reported that the modular
multiplication in F2163 took around 2.9ms on the ATmega128 CPU. This corresponds to
21410 clock cycles and is around 40% slower than the optimized hierarchical method (see
Table 3.5). The improvement in performance is signicant, especially given that the nite
eld used in [110] is a lot smaller than that used here.
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3.4.1.3 The MSP430 microcontroller
On a 16-bit architecture, a single step method for binary polynomial multiplication might
be considered. The comb method with window width of 8 instead of 4 would be much
faster because shifting by a byte can be performed more efciently on a 16-bit CPU. This
approach, however, is not practical on sensor network devices due to very large memory
requirements (both in RAM and ROM). Therefore, the implementation on the MSP430
should use a similar two stage technique as for the ATmega128. The optimized hierar-
chical method can signicantly decrease the memory footprint by using the divide-and-
conquer technique with consecutive calls to the same multiplication routine.
Efcient implementation of the comb method on the MSP430 is more difcult than
on the ATmega128 CPU. The main problem in the MSP430 case is that there are only 12
available registers instead of 32. In the eld F2271 one 17 word polynomial is divided into
two smaller 9 word polynomials in order to apply the Karatsuba method. An extra last
word containing all zeros for the second polynomial is added to maintain the symmetry.
The sub-products A1B1; A2B2 and (A1 + A2)(B1 + B2) can be then calculated using the
comb multiplication with window width of 4. The sub-product calculations require a
pre-computed lookup table of 320 bytes. The use of 16-bit words and 4-bit scanning in
the comb algorithm requires 4 loops. The polynomial C(z) is multiplied by z4 in between
the loop iterations.
Listing 3.11 shows one iteration of the rst loop implemented in assembly language
on the MSP430 CPU. The code is optimized to take advantage of all 12 available regis-
ters (r4-r15). Register r14 holds 16 coefcients of the polynomial A(z). The rst loop
scans the 4 most signicant bits in every word of A. In order to derive the required 4
bits the 2 bytes of A are swaped and a 0xF0 mask is applied. The result is rotated right
by 3 bits (to get an even value) and added to the address of the table that holds the pre-
computed polynomials U(z) ¢B(z). The combined value in r13 gives the correct address
of the polynomial U [i]. Then the polynomial is added to the 9 registers of the accumu-
lator r5-r12:r15. One word from the accumulator is stored in the memory and one
new word is loaded for the next loop iteration. The rotation of words in the registers in
subsequent loop iterations is performed in a similar manner as in Figure 3.10.
Table 3.6 lists the instruction counts for all the operations performed during the poly-
nomial multiplication in F2271 . The values were obtained using the IAR EmbeddedWork-
78
Chapter 3: Finite Field Arithmetic for Low-end Processors
Figure 3.11: Implementation of the comb algorithm on the MSP430 processor
bench simulator for the MSP430 (v4.10). The instruction set does not include load and
store operations, but instructions that move the data from the memory to registers and
vice versa can be treated as such. The instruction counts for each loop are given separately
as they slightly differ from each other. The application of the Karatsuba technique saves
around 20% of the total clock cycles. The implementation of the optimized hierarchical
multiplication in assembly language improves the execution time by 70% in compari-
son with the standard C implementation (optimization ag -O0). Assuming 8 MHz clock
speed on the MSP430 the complete multiplication of binary polynomials in F2271 takes
only 1.18 ms.
3.4.1.4 The ARM processor
The implementation of binary polynomials multiplication in F2271 is straightforward on a
32-bit ARM processor. The hierarchical method of multiplication is not necessary in this
case. The whole polynomial ts in 9 registers, so using Karatsuba here would only result
in additional overhead. The comb method can be applied directly, although the size of
the window should be chosen with care. A window of size 4 is not appropriate because
it requires shifts by 4 bits which are not efcient on a 32-bit architecture. The number of
loop iterations in Algorithm 2 depend also on the window size. WhenW = 32 and w = 4
the main loop has eight iterations. This number however can be reduced by using w = 8
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Table 3.6: Polynomial multiplication in F2271 on the MSP430 CPU
Algorithm Stage Load Store XOR Shift Other Total
Comb w = 4
Precomputation 21 160 70 70 22 343
Loop 1 36 10 72 27 27 172
3£ Shift by 4 bits 10 10 0 84 2 106
Loop 2 26 10 90 9 27 162
Loop 3 26 10 90 27 18 171
Loop 4 26 18 90 9 23 166
Total 165 238 412 394 123 1332
Clock cycles 384 952 824 394 317 2871
Karatsuba
Total 38 72 70 0 12 192
Clock cycles 118 398 282 0 41 839
Hierarchical Total 533 786 1306 1182 381 4188
(Karatsuba + Clock cycles 1270 3254 2754 1182 992 9452
3£ comb)
with 2-bit scanning. This modication achieves the same amount of pre-computation as
in the case of a window size of 4 (576 bytes). The 2-bit scanning decreases also the number
of necessary loop iterations from 8 to 4 and the number of polynomial shifts of C(z) from
7 to 3. These savings, however, are made at a cost of extra polynomial additions and table
lookups in each iteration of the four loops.
The ARM processor has 14 available registers. The temporary result is held in nine
registers while the remaining ve are used for storing operand addresses and choosing
the right lookup table element. All four loops can be unrolled to achieve signicant sav-
ings in execution time. Table 3.7 lists the instructions for the comb multiplication in F2271 .
The ARM instruction set does not specify shifts explicitly, but these operations can be
performed as a part of ordinary instructions (without additional cost). Also, shifting the
temporary result vector by 8 bits instead of 4 optimizes this operation for a 32-bit archi-
tecture. This can be efciently implemented without any actual shifts. One loop can be
used with 2 pointers that simply load and store appropriate bytes. The multiple load/s-
tore instructions and 32-bit processing makes the ARM processor far more efcient than
the constrained 8 and 16-bit platforms. Full polynomial multiplication in F2271 takes only
4706 clock cycles when implemented in assembly language.
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Table 3.7: Polynomial multiplication in F2271 on an ARM processor
Algorithm Stage Load Store XOR Shift Other Total
Comb w = 8
Precomputation 28 16 9 117 14 184
4£ Loop 370 9 320 0 218 917
3£ Shift by 8 bits 67 68 0 0 137 272
Total 1709 256 1289 117 1297 4668
3.4.2 Squaring and reduction of binary polynomials
One of the advantages of binary elds over prime elds is much more efcient squaring
of eld elements. Squaring of binary polynomials is a linear operation which is much
faster than multiplying two arbitrary polynomials. In the case when a(z) =
Pm¡1
i=0 aiz
i
then a(z)2 =
Pm¡1
i=0 aiz
2i. The binary representation of a(z)2 is obtained by spreading the
coefcients of a(z) and inserting zeroes in between (see Figure 3.12).
Figure 3.12: Binary polynomial squaring
The spreading of coefcients can be optimized using a lookup table for small poly-
nomials. On constrained 8-bit processors (like the ATmega128), the lookup table should
map four bits to one byte. Such a table requires only 16 bytes of RAM. Other embedded
processors with more memory and 16 or 32-bit processing can use larger lookup tables.
A typical solution uses a 512 bytes of pre-computation converting 8-bit polynomials into
their expanded 16-bit counterparts. Simple formula for squaring of binary polynomials
makes this operation around 8 to 10 times faster than multiplication. Table 3.8 compares
the results of modular multiplication and squaring in F2271 on three embedded proces-
sors.
Table 3.8:Modular multiplication and squaring in F2271 on embedded processors
Hardware platform ATmega128 MSP430 PXA271
Hierarchical multiplication (assembly) 13557 10116 4926
Squaring (assembly) 1581 1363 499
Hierarchical multiplication (C) 66271 40666 13183
Squaring (C) 4711 3667 2375
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The timings presented in Table 3.8 include the reduction step which must be applied
to limit the number of coefcients from 2m¡ 2 tom¡ 1. One of the advantages of using
methods based on F2m elds is that squarings are potentially so fast. But if the reduction
algorithm is slow, this advantage cannot be fully utilized. Reduction is performed mod-
ulo the irreducible polynomial f(z). The generic reduction methods reduce the result of
multiplication c(z) one bit at a time and can be slow, especially on constrained embedded
processors.
The reduction operation can be accelerated if f(z) is a trinomial, or a pentanomial. For
the eld F2m it is in practise always possible to choose as an irreducible polynomial either
a trinomial zm + za + 1 or a pentanomial zm + za + zb + zc + 1. In both cases the optimal
reduction algorithm is linear and fast because the reduction of c(z) modulo f(z) can be
performed one word at a time. The following example presents a fast reduction method
in F2271 which is optimized for a 16-bit embedded processor. The method is similar to the
reduction technique for the NIST parameters proposed in [44].
In the nite eld F2271 , the irreducible polynomial can be chosen as a trinomial: f(z) =
z271 + z201 + 1. The multiplication (or squaring) of polynomials in F2271 results in a poly-
nomial c(z) of degree less than 540. In the binary form, c(z) can be represented as an
array of words C = (C[33]; C[32]; : : : ; C[1]; C[0]). When reducing the word C[20] which
represents the polynomial c335z335 + ¢ ¢ ¢ + c321z321 + c320z320 the following congruences
occur:
z320 ´ z250 + z49 (modf(z))
z321 ´ z251 + z50 (modf(z))
...
...
...
...
...
z334 ´ z264 + z63 (modf(z))
z335 ´ z265 + z64 (modf(z)) (3.10)
By considering the two columns on the right side of congruences 3.10, the reduction of
C[20] can be performed by adding C[20] to bits (c64; : : : ; c50; c49) and (c265; : : : ; c251; c250)
of C. This observation leads to a fast reduction algorithm in F2271 (see Algorithm 3).
Algorithm 3 can be efciently implemented on a 16-bit embedded processor such as
the MSP430. For optimal performance the code should be written in assembly language
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Algorithm 3 Fast reduction modulo f(z) = z271 + z201 + 1
INPUT: A binary polynomial c(z) represented as 34 16-bit words C[.]
OUTPUT: c(z) mod f(z), represented as 17 16-bit words.
1: for iÃ 33 downto 17 do
2: S Ã C[i]
3: C[i¡ 17]Ã C[i¡ 17]© (S ¿ 1)
4: C[i¡ 16]Ã C[i¡ 16]© (S À 15)
5: C[i¡ 5]Ã C[i¡ 5]© (S ¿ 10)
6: C[i¡ 4]Ã C[i¡ 4]© (S À 6)
7: end for
8: S Ã C[16]À 15
9: C[0]Ã C[0]© S
10: C[12]Ã C[12]© (S ¿ 9)
11: C[16]Ã C[16] & 0x7FFF
12: return (C[16]; C[15]; :::; C[1]; C[0])
with all loops unrolled. Listing 3.13 shows the rst iteration of the loop (line 1 in Algo-
rithm 3) implemented on the MSP430 processor. Register r13 holds the address of C, r6
is equal to 0 and r7 holds a bit mask 0xFF00. During the rst loop iteration, r4 and r5
are loaded with the most signicant word of C. One bit rotation to the left through carry
is used to derive the necessary words S ¿ 1 and S À 15, which are then added to C.
The shifts S ¿ 10 and S À 6 can be efciently implemented with a byte swap, bit mask
application and 2 rotations left through the carry bit. After the addition of r4 and r5 to
C, register r6 is cleared for the next loop iteration. The whole reduction in F2271 takes 664
clock cycles on the MSP430 CPU.
Figure 3.13: A reduction of a single word in F2271 on the MSP430
Similar reduction methods to those in Algorithm 3 can be also developed for other
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hardware architectures. Each reduction algorithm should be optimized for a specic irre-
ducible polynomial and the wordsize of a given processor. On small 8-bit and 16-bit pro-
cessors, the irreducible polynomial should be chosen carefully to minimize the required
word shifts in the reduction algorithm. For example, on the ATmega128 CPU, a shift by 1
bit is always faster than a shift by 6 bits. In an ideal case, the irreducible trinomial should
havem¡ a ´ 0 mod W and pentanomialm¡ a ´ m¡ b ´ m¡ c ´ 0 mod W with all
m;a; b; c being odd. This minimizes shift operations on a processor with wordsizeW . The
above conditions, however, cannot be met on all occasions. In some cases an irreducible
polynomial which is optimal for one architecture may not be as good for another. For ex-
ample (m¡ a)may be a multiple of 16, but not of 32. On some processors a pentanomial
may also be a better choice than the trinomial. For Algorithm 3 one may consider using
the pentanomial z271 + z207 + z175 + z111 + 1 instead of the trinomial z271 + z201 + 1. This
would eliminate the shifts S ¿ 10 and S À 6 at a cost of an extra XOR instruction (a
saving of 51 clock cycles per reduction operation on the MSP430). More guidance on the
optimal irreducible polynomials in F2m for different hardware architectures can be found
in [108].
3.4.3 Square root computation
Recently there have emerged applications in which it is important to calculate the square
roots of eld elements. Efcient square rooting is especially important in case of pairing-
based cryptography over binary elds [7]. Fast calculation of square roots in F2m requires
that all exponents in the irreducible polynomial (a, b and c) are odd [45]. Such irreducible
polynomials are easy to nd, but unfortunately most of the standard polynomials (e.g.
irreducible polynomials recommended by NIST) are not of this form.
As pointed out by Fong et al. [45], if using an irreducible polynomial with all odd
exponents, for example the trinomial zm + za + 1, the eld square root can be expressed
as:
p
a(z) = Aeven + (z(m+1)=2 + z(a+1)=2) ¢Aodd (3.11)
where Aeven and Aodd are the even and odd indexed bits of a(z) concatenated into a half-
sized bit arrays. The multiplication by the term z(m+1)=2 is simple and is performed by
storing Aodd as the higher order bits of the nal result. The multiplication of Aodd by the
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rest of the terms in f(z) can be performed with some xor operations and shifts when
necessary. The amount of calculations required for this step depends on the particular
irreducible polynomial. The resulting polynomial c(z) =
p
a(z) is of a degree less than
m¡ 1, therefore the reduction step is not necessary.
In order to extract the odd and even coefcients of a(z), two lookup tables are re-
quired. Both tables evens[.] and odds[.] contain reduced polynomials that are formed
by extracting appropriate bits. For example the byte 11111000 needs to be split into
even bits 1100 and odd bits 1110, so the tables should contain evens[248]=12 and
odds[248]=14. This requires two tables with 256 bytes each. The pre-computation of
512 bytes may not be signicant for a 32-bit processors, but it certainly is signicant on
small embeddedCPUs, and should beminimized if possible. Notice that tables evens[.]
and odds[.] actually contain only numbers from 0-15 and can be compressed to 16 bytes
each. This can be achieved at the cost of some extra processing when establishing the in-
dices of the tables. Listing 3.14 presents the C code for calculating a eld square root
using f(z) = z271 + z201 + 1 on an 8-bit processor (such as ATmega128). The input is an
array A[.] of 34 bytes and the square root is an array C[.] also of 34 bytes (and initially
cleared to zero).
Figure 3.14: Square root calculation in F2271 on ATmega128
The calculation of square roots in F2m is most efcient when implemented in assem-
bly language and optimized for a certain reduction polynomial. Table 3.9 shows the clock
cycles for square root implementation on three embedded processors. The standard C im-
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plementation (Listing 3.14) is on average 83% slower than the hand-crafted assembly im-
plementation. Optimization for speed (ag -O3) reduces the difference by only 10% and
proves that the overhead generated by the C-compilers affects the runtime negatively.
The overhead is not crucial on an ARM processor where the overall cycle count is low,
but it denitely is crucial on constrained 8 and 16-bit platforms.
Table 3.9: Timings for square root calculation in F2271 on embedded processors
Hardware platform ATmega128 MSP430 PXA271
Square root (assembly) 1730 1644 546
Square root (C) 12021 11212 2496
Decrease 86% 85% 78%
3.5 Extension eld arithmetic
The arithmetic in the extension elds is not required for ordinary Elliptic Curve Cryp-
tography operations but is necessary in case of pairing-based cryptography. When using
pairing-based protocols, it is necessary to perform arithmetic in elds of the form Fqk ,
for moderate values of k, so it is important that the eld is represented in such a way
that the arithmetic can be performed as efciently as possible. The pairing evaluates as
an element over the extension eld Fqk , and can be represented as a polynomial with
coefcients in Fq, modulo an irreducible polynomial of degree k.
For the case where k = 2 and q = p = 3 mod 4, a suitable irreducible polynomial has
the form f(z) = z2 + 1. The number -1 is a quadratic non-residue modulo p, and so the
polynomial f(z) does not factor over the base eld. Elements in Fp2 can be represented as
polynomials a + zb with a; b 2 Fp. Such elements can be multiplied as normal, and then
reduced modulo z2 + 1. In fact z =
p¡1 mod p and z can be considered as the imag-
inary root of the irreducible polynomial. In this case the elements of the extension eld
can be represented as a + ib where i =
p¡1. This gives a straightforward analogy with
complex numbers and arithmetic operations in such extension elds can be performed
using efcient methods for complex arithmetic.
The addition and subtraction of elements in Fqk can be performed efciently by a
simple addition/subtraction of the subsequent coefcients. Multiplication and squaring,
however, are more expensive and can be very slow when not optimized properly. The
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naive way to do multiplication in the quadratic extension eld is:
(a+ ib)(c+ id) = ac¡ bd+ i(bc+ ad) (3.12)
This operation costs 4 base eld modular multiplications, but can be signicantly
accelerated by using the well known Karatsuba-Offman technique [107]:
(a+ ib)(c+ id) = ac¡ bd+ i[(a+ b)(c+ d)¡ ac¡ bd)] (3.13)
which only requires three modular multiplications. This method can be also used for
higher extension elds where it can be even more efcient. For example in the quartic
extension eld F24m , elements can be represented as polynomials with 4 coefcients in
F2m : az3 + bz2 + cz + d. In this setting the Karatsuba method decreases the number of
necessary multiplications to 9 from 16 at a cost of many extra additions. Additions are
much cheaper in F2m than modular multiplications and give signicant improvement in
execution time.
In the case of squaring in Fp2 , the Karatsuba method can be applied as well for a
cost of two modular squarings and one modular multiplication. However, a better idea
would be to use the well known identity from complex numbers arithmetic:
(a+ ib)(a+ ib) = (a+ b)(a¡ b) + i ¢ 2ab (3.14)
This requires just twomodularmultiplications. For binary elds, squaring ismuch cheaper
than multiplication (see Section 3.4.2). Therefore, in F2m¢k it is better to replace multipli-
cations with squarings where possible. For example a squaring in F24m can be efciently
calculated by using only 4 modular squarings and few additions in F2m .
Another important operation in extension eld arithmetic is raising an extension eld
element to the power of the modulus. This operation can be calculated very efciently
using the Frobenius endomorphism. For example in Fq2 :
(a+ ib)q = (aq + iq ¢ bq) = (a¡ ib) mod q (3.15)
Equation 3.15 can be proven in the following way. The expansion of (a+ib)q produces
many terms which are multiplies of q and hence are equal to 0 mod q. The only terms left
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are aq and iq ¢ bq. The rst value can be reduced as aq mod q = a (Fermat's little theorem)
and in the second term iq = (i2)(q¡1)=2 ¢ i = ¡i.
In some settings the value of the extension degree k might be much greater than 2
or 4, making the direct polynomial representation more complex. For higher extension
elds, a tower of extensions can be used, where one layer builds on top of the last. For
example, Fp12 can be implemented as a quadratic extension, of a cubic extension, of Fp2 .
The details on constructing tower extensions of nite elds can be found in [10]. This
thesis is focused mainly on pairings over the extension elds Fqk , where k is equal to 2 or
4. Small values of kminimize the code space for Pairing-Based Cryptography implemen-
tations on embedded processors. The overall performance of extension eld arithmetic
relies on the operations in the base eld. This fact once again highlights the importance
of efcient implementation of nite eld arithmetic in Fp and F2m .
3.6 Hardware perspective
The arithmetic operations presented in this chapter were implemented on general pur-
pose embedded processors which were not designed to perform multiprecision opera-
tions. The performance of nite eld arithmetic can be improved by introducing changes
in the hardware architecture of these devices. In many cases small changes to instruction
sets can provide better support for software implementation of arithmetic operations.
Such an approach is also a more attractive option than addition of an external coproces-
sor as it requires fewer resources, and provides a seamless programming interface. The
addition of a single instruction can signicantly improve the execution time of many rou-
tines. Multiprecision multiplication is the operation which can benet the most from the
instruction set extension.
As noted in [55] multiprecision integer multiplication can usually be accelerated by
introducing a special multiply-and-accumulate instruction. In the context of the improved
hybridmethod, onemultiplication and two additions with carry are repeatedmany times
in the algorithm. These three instructions can be combined together to form one new
instruction (called MACC from now on). On an 8-bit ATmega128 CPU this can be imple-
mented as (MACC rX,rZ), where rX is the rst operand of the multiplication and rZ is
the lower part of the accumulated result. MACC multiplies rX with a register rY, which
always contains the second operand for the multiplication (e.g r4 in Fig. 3.4). The lower
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part of the 16-bit result is added to register rZ and the higher part is added with carry
to the consecutive register r(Z+1). Notice that MACC acts like an ordinary multiply-and-
accumulate instruction when invoked twice with the same register rZ.
The application of the MACC instruction in the improved hybrid method can bring
signicant improvements in execution time. For multiplication of 160-bit integers with
d = 4 it reduces the number of necessary additions by around 800. When implemented
as a 2-cycle instruction, MACC improves the execution time of the hybrid multiplication
by more than 28%. MACC can be also used to accelerate squaring by around 18%.
In case of the MSP430 processor an ordinary multiply-and-accumulate instruction
is already implemented in the hardware multiplier unit. However, it cannot be used
in the hybrid multiplication because it always accumulates the result in the xed mul-
tiplier unit registers RESLO and RESHI. Additionally the loading of operands into the
multiplier is expensive (4-6 clock cycles), because the unit operates on peripheral regis-
ters. The multiply-and-accumulate operation would be more efcient if implemented as
a CPU instruction that operates on variable registers. In such cases the result of the mul-
tiplication would be accumulated in specic general purpose registers (similarly to the
MACC instruction proposed for ATmega128). The application of a special multiply-and-
accumulate operation would eliminate the need for separate additions and save 600 clock
cycles (34%) for 160-bit integer multiplication on the MSP430.
Instruction set extensions can particularly improve the arithmetic in the case of binary
elds. Embedded processors do not currently have a direct counterpart to the integer
multiplication instruction when it comes to multiplication in F2m . From an implementa-
tion point of view, polynomial multiplication can be seen as a simplication of integer
multiplication when the carries in the partial product accumulation are not propagated.
Multiplication in F2m accumulates partial products using XOR operations rather than or-
dinary additions, and hence can be denoted as XOR multiplication. The implementation
of such an instruction on an embedded processor would be simple as it is very similar to
the standard MUL operation.
In the case when XORmultiplication is available on the target platform, the improved
hybrid method can be reused for binary polynomial multiplication. This would allow
multiplication in F2m to achieve similar performance as multiplication in Fp. In [41] the
authors stated that the addition of an XOR multiplication to the ATmega128 instruction
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set would signicantly improve the performance of arithmetic in F2m . They reported that
the binary eld multiplication in F2163 would even outperform 160-bit integer multipli-
cation by 27%. Nevertheless, the optimized hierarchical method proposed in this thesis
provides the best performance for binary polynomial multiplication on embedded pro-
cessors which do not have any support for multiplication in F2m .
For future hardware designs it would be benecial to include XOR multiplication
in the default instruction set of the processor. Intel recently proposed an extension to
the x86 instruction set that would perform arithmetic on binary polynomials. The new
range of Westmere processors include a PCLMULQDQ instruction, which performs carry-
less multiplication of two 64-bit quadwords [53]. A similar instruction should be also
included on low-end CPUs.
3.7 Summary
The two main types of nite elds that are suitable for implementation of elliptic curve
systems are prime elds Fp and binary elds F2m . Arithmetic in nite elds is the funda-
mental building block in every Elliptic Curve Cryptography implementation. The perfor-
mance of the whole system depends in large degree on the efciency of the arithmetic op-
erations. On a constrained low-end processor, optimal performance can be only achieved
with optimized assembly language implementations of time-critical arithmetic routines.
The most important operation in the prime eld is the multiprecision integer multi-
plication. This chapter proposes a new method for calculating multiplication on low-end
processors. One major advantage of the new technique is that, due to its simplicity, it
can be relatively easily extended to other processor architectures. The improved hybrid
method takes advantage of extra registers to avoid unnecessary load operations and be-
comes more efcient with the number of registers used. The general applicability of the
idea has been demonstrated on three different 8, 16 and 32-bit architectures. In all of these
cases, signicant performance improvements have been achieved. The approach is also
scalable to larger eld sizes. The assembly language code for different eld sizes can be
automatically generated from user dened macros. This, however, has to be performed
before generating the arithmetic library code.
Most of the arithmetic implementations on embedded devices are mainly focused on
prime nite elds. The choice of the eld was dictated by the fact that basic arithmetic
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operations can be effectively optimized if a pseudo-Mersenne primes are used in Fp. Bi-
nary elds were not favoured because binary polynomial arithmetic (multiplication in
particular) is insufciently supported by current CPU's. One of the main contributions of
this chapter is the proposal of a new hierarchical method for polynomial multiplication
in F2m . This new technique is optimized for elds of large characteristic and takes full ad-
vantage of available CPU registers. Assembly implementation of the algorithm achieves
signicant improvement in execution time when compared with a standard C implemen-
tation. The method is also scalable and can be applied for different eld sizes. However,
the use of hand-crafted assembly language routines requires modication in the source
code for different values of m. In addition to multiplication methods fast squaring, re-
duction and square rooting in F2m are also presented in this chapter. The implementation
results prove that arithmetic in the binary eld can be efciently implemented on differ-
ent embedded processors and that it is an attractive alternative, when it comes to Elliptic
Curve Cryptography systems implementation.
In the context of low-end processors, the fastest binary polynomial multiplication is
around 50% slower than integer multiplication in a eld of similar size. Despite this dis-
advantage Elliptic Curve Cryptography over binary elds achieves similar (or better)
performance, than over prime elds (see Chapter 4). Multiplication in F2m would be sig-
nicantly faster if a carry-less multiplication instruction was available on constrained ar-
chitectures. Additionally multiprecision arithmetic operations on embedded CPU's can
be improved with an increase in the number of available registers.
91
CHAPTER 4
Elliptic Curve Cryptography for
Wireless Sensor Networks
U ntil recently it used to be thought that public key cryptography was impracticalon resource-constrained sensor nodes and that cryptosystems must depend only
on symmetric primitives. As mentioned earlier, symmetric key techniques are more ef-
cient than Public Key Cryptography but they do not solve the key distribution problem
and assume that the nodes already share symmetric keys. This fact has motivated work
on how to compute Public Key Cryptography efciently on sensor nodes. The problem
is challenging because constrained devices have very limited computational capabilities
and short battery lifespan. Chapter 2 shows that elliptic curve cryptography demands
considerably less resources than more conventional public key systems for a given secu-
rity level. In addition results presented demonstrate that Elliptic Curve Cryptography is
more efcient than RSA on small 8-bit processors. Faster execution time, smaller mem-
ory consumption and savings in bandwidth have made Elliptic Curve Cryptography an
attractive public key solution in a constrained environment.
One of themain Elliptic Curve Cryptography primitives is scalar point multiplication.
This operation is the base for many Elliptic Curve Cryptography mechanisms such as
ECDSA and ECDH. In the context of pairing-based systems, point multiplication is one of
the basic building blocks in many security protocols. Point multiplication is an expensive
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primitive and a fast execution time for it is also necessary for efcient identity based
cryptography.
The implementation of Elliptic Curve Cryptography on constrained devices such as
WSN nodes is not an easy task. Software implementations have to be small enough to
leave room for the operating system and for the core protocols. The computation of ba-
sic primitives needs to be fast enough to minimize energy consumption and maximize
the network lifetime. Optimal implementation of Elliptic Curve Cryptography primitives
requires several important selections. The choices include the following issues:
² size of domain parameters;
² type of elliptic curve;
² point representation system;
² algorithms for performing curve arithmetic.
For every implementation, there are many variables that inuence the choices made.
The main factors are the level of security that is required, the communication environ-
ment and the actual application platform with its capabilities and constraints. All three
of these factors must be considered simultaneously to nd the best possible solution for
a given application. Sensor network devices are extremely limited in terms of resources
and all the Elliptic Curve Cryptography implementation choices must be made with this
aspect in mind. Certainly, the optimal choices for sensor network implementation will
be quite different than for a workstation application. In many cases, a single best set of
choices is almost impossible to decide on. A more realistic scenario would assume dif-
ferent Elliptic Curve Cryptography parameters for various classes of WSN applications.
In this situation, an implementation with xed parameters has limited use and is not the
best option. A better solution would require a cryptographic library which allows devel-
opers to choose their own domain parameters, elliptic curves and optimization levels.
Such exibility makes it easier to nd a good t for a given combination of hardware
platform and application type.
This chapter presents a software package called NanoECC. This cryptographic library
provides elliptic curve-based Public Key Cryptography operations that were specically
optimized for different sensor network platforms. The library can be exibly cong-
ured and easily integrated into sensor network applications to provide protocols such as
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ECDSA and ECDH. NanoECC provides efcient implementation of Elliptic Curve Cryp-
tography primitives for a range of sensor devices and can be used as a building block
in constructing identity-based cryptography protocols for WSNs. The results presented
in this chapter prove that Elliptic Curve Cryptography implementation in software is
not only viable, but also efcient on constrained sensor nodes. The following sections
present a short mathematical introduction to elliptic curves and a brief overview in the
state-of-the-art of elliptic curve cryptography implementations on sensor devices. This is
be followed by a detailed description and evaluation of the NanoECC library.
4.1 Mathematical background
The implementation issues of Elliptic Curve Cryptography in WSNs cannot be discussed
without a proper understanding of the basic mathematical concepts of elliptic curves.
This section will present basic information on elliptic curves that are used in cryptogra-
phy. More detailed information about mathematical aspects of Elliptic Curve Cryptog-
raphy can be found in [14], [13], [58] and [27]. Most of the information in this section is
based on those references.
4.1.1 Elliptic curves
Elliptic curves used in cryptography are typically dened over two types of nite elds:
Fp (where p > 3 is a large prime number) and F2m . In general an elliptic curve E over a
eld Fq is dened by the Weierstrass equation:
E : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x3 + a2x2 + a4x+ a6 (4.1)
where a1; a2; a3; a4; a6 2 Fq and the discriminant ¢ 6= 0, where ¢ is a discriminant of E
and is dened as follows:
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¢ = ¡d22d8 ¡ 8d43 ¡ 27d62 + 9d2d4d6
d2 = a12 + 4a2
d4 = 2a4 + a1a3
d6 = a32 + 4a6
d8 = a12a6 + 4a2a6 ¡ a1a3a4 + a2a32 ¡ a42 (4.2)
This condition ensures that the elliptic curve is smooth, meaning that there are no
points at which the curve has two or more distinct tangent lines. There is also an ad-
ditional point on the curve known as the point at innity, O. The curve is sometimes
denoted as E(Fq) to emphasize that E is dened over the underlying eld Fq. It is impor-
tant to note that if E is dened over Fq, then E is also dened over any extension eld
Fqk .
Figure 4.1 [58] presents an example of two elliptic curves dened over the real number
eldR. The point at innity (O) is not included in the graph. All the points (x; y) graphed
in Figure 4.1 satisfy the following equations:
y2 = x3 ¡ x curve (i)
y2 = x3 + 14x+
5
4 curve (ii)
4.1.1.1 Supersingular and non-supersingular elliptic curves
Elliptic curves used in cryptography can be divided into two broad classes. This division
is made based on the order of the nite eld q. If E is an elliptic curve dened over Fq,
then the number of points in the curve #E(Fq) can be approximated according to the
Hasse theorem:
q + 1¡ 2pq · #E(Fq) · q + 1 + 2pq (4.3)
The value jtj · 2pq is called the trace of the Frobenius. The value 2pq is relatively
small comparing to q, so #E(Fq) ¼ q. If the trace of Frobenius t is divisible by the char-
acteristic of Fq then the elliptic curve is known as supersingular. A supersingular curve
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Figure 4.1: Elliptic curves over R
has a group order of q + 1. If the trace is not divisible by the characteristic of Fq then the
elliptic curve is known as non-supersingular.
The Weierstrass equation (equation 4.1) can be simplied considerably by applying
admissible changes of variables. If the characteristic of the eld Fq is prime and q > 5,
then the curve equation is simplied to:
y2 = x3 + ax+ b (4.4)
where a; b 2 Fq are constants such that 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0. The curve equation can also be
simplied in the case where the characteristic of the underlying eld is two. If a1 6= 0 the
equation of the curve dened over F2m is as follows:
y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b (4.5)
where a; b 2 F2m . Such a curve is said to be non-supersingular and has discriminant
¢ = b. Also (x; y) 2 F2mk £ F2mk , where m; k are integers. A supersingular curve is
dened when a1 = 0 with the discriminant ¢ = c4 and is given by the equation:
y2 + cy = x3 + ax+ b (4.6)
where a; b; c 2 F2m . Supersingular curves are especially interesting due to their direct
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application in pairing-based cryptography.
4.1.1.2 Koblitz curves
Koblitz curves belong to elliptic curves dened over F2m and are also known as anoma-
lous binary curves. Koblitz curves are given by the equation:
y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + 1 (4.7)
where a 2 f0; 1g. The main advantage of these curves is that the point multiplication
operation can be calculated more efciently than on ordinary binary curves. This makes
them especially attractive for implementation on constrained sensor devices. A detailed
description of Koblitz curves and their properties can be found in [114].
4.1.2 Curve operations
The main arithmetic operations on elliptic curves include point addition, point doubling
and scalar point multiplication. This section will describe these operations in detail.
4.1.2.1 Point addition and doubling
If E is an elliptic curve dened over the eld Fq, there exists a chord-and-tangent rule for
adding two points in E(Fq). This operation results in a third point in E(Fq). The set of
points E(Fq) and the point addition operation forms an abelian group with O as its iden-
tity. This group is themain construct that is used in building Elliptic Curve Cryptography
schemes. This addition operation can be explained using a geometrical representation. If
the curve is dened over the set of real numbers R then the addition rule can be rep-
resented as in Figure 4.2 (i) [58]. The points P = (x1; x2) and Q = (x2; y2) are added
together and the result is point R with afne coordinates (x3; y3). The whole rule works
as follows. First a straight line is drawn through P and Q. This line intersects the elliptic
curve at a third point R0. Then R is the reection of this point about the x-axis.
In case when P = Q the point has to be doubled (Figure 4.2 (ii)). This operation
requires a different technique. The rule for calculating a double of a point P can be ex-
plained as follows. First a line is drawn which is tangent to the elliptic curve at point P .
This line intersects the elliptic curve at a particular second point R0. The equation for this
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Figure 4.2: Addition and doubling rules for elliptic curve points
line in entered into the equation of the curve and is solved for x. This value, is entered
into the equation of the line to obtain the ¡y3 value. To get the coordinates of the R point
(result of doubling P ) a reection of R0 is calculated about the x-axis.
The algebraic formulas for the above two operations can be derived directly from
the geometric description. Each of the formulas differ depending on the characteristic of
the underlying eld. However, in all cases two properties must hold. There must be an
identity element and an inverse of a point. Without those properties points on the curve
do not form a group. The identity element is dened as the point at innity O such that
P +O = P . The inverse is the reection of the point in the x-axis such that P +(¡P ) = O.
Also, ¡O = O.
For the eld Fq with characteristic not equal to 2 or 3 the formulas in standard afne
coordinates are equal to:
x3 = ¸2 ¡ x1 ¡ x2 y3 = ¸(x1 ¡ x3)¡ y1 (4.8)
for point addition P + Q = R, where ¸ = y2¡y1x2¡x1 and P 6= §Q. ¸ is the gradient of the
line which joins P and Q. For point doubling, 2P = R, ¯ = 2x1
2+a
2y1
and P 6= ¡P . ¯ is the
gradient of the tangent line at point P obtained by implicit differentiation of the curve,
the equations are as follows:
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x3 = ¯2 ¡ 2x1 y3 = ¯(x1 ¡ x3)¡ y1 (4.9)
In the case of non-supersingular curves in characteristic two, the formulas are as follows:
x3 = ¸2 + ¸+ x1 + x2 + a y3 = ¸(x1 + x3) + x3 + y1 (4.10)
for point addition P +Q = R, where ¸ = y1+y2x1+x2 and P 6= §Q.
x3 = ¯2 + ¯ + a y3 = x12 + ¯x3 + x3 (4.11)
for point doubling 2P = R, where ¯ = x1 + y1x1 and P 6= ¡P . When working with
supersingular curves over F2m the formulas are dened as:
x3 = ¸2 + x1 + x2 y3 = ¸(x1 + x3) + y1 + c (4.12)
for point addition P +Q = R, where ¸ = y1+y2x1+x2 and P 6= §Q.
x3 = ¯2 y3 = ¯(x1 + x3) + y1 + c (4.13)
for point doubling 2P = R, where ¯ = x1
2+a
c and P 6= ¡P .
4.1.2.2 Point multiplication
The multiplication of an elliptic curve point P by a value k is a fundamental operation
that is underlying Elliptic Curve Cryptography. This arithmetic operation is called scalar
point multiplication and dominates the overall execution time of elliptic curve crypto-
graphic schemes. If P is a point on an elliptic curve E(Fq), then the result of the scalar
multiplication kP is a different point Q on the same curve. If the scalar is denoted as
k = (kt¡1; : : : ; k1; k0)2, where t = dlog2 qe and P is unknown, then the point multiplica-
tion kP = Q can be calculated by a right-to-left binary method.
Algorithm 4 (based on [74]) processes the bits of k one-by-one from right to left. As
seen in lines 3 and 4, point multiplication consists of a sequence of point additions and
point doublings and its cost depends on the number of ones in the binary representation
of k. Obviously large number of zeroes in k guarantees faster execution of Algorithm 4.
The expected number of ones in k is around t=2, but can be reduced by using different
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Algorithm 4 Right-to-left binary method for point multiplication
INPUT: k = (kt¡1; : : : ; k1; k0)2, P 2 E(Fq)
OUTPUT: Q = kP
1: QÃ1
2: for iÃ 0 to t¡ 1 do
3: if ki = 1 then
4: QÃ Q+ P
5: end if
6: P Ã 2P
7: end for
8: return Q
representation of k. For example, 255P , or (11111111)2P , requires 8 point additions. But
when transformed into (10000000¡ 1)2P , which is 256P ¡P , only one addition (and one
extra subtraction) is required.
There are several techniques that can be used to accelerate the calculation of point
multiplication. In some cases, point addition is more expensive than point doubling. In
this situation it is benecial to use more point doublings than point additions to compute
the scalar multiplication. To facilitate this a signed digit representation of numbers can
be used. One such representation is the Non-Adjacent Form (NAF). It is an effective way
to achieve the lowest Hamming weight1 for scalar k in point multiplication kP .
The non-adjacent form of a positive integer k can be represented as k =
Pl¡1
i=0 ki2
i
where ki 2 f0;§1g and kl¡1 6= 0. The NAF representation of k has the fewest nonzero
digits of any signed digit representation of k. The digits of NAF(k) can be calculated
by repeated division of k by 2 with remainders of 0 and §1. This procedure results in
NAF(k) where no two consecutive digits ki are equal to§1. The number of nonzero digits
is reduced on average to 1/3. For example when k = 27 (11011)2 then NAF(k) is equal to
(10¡ 10¡ 1). It is important to notice that NAF(k) can have at most one digit more than
k. The usage of NAF representation of k in Algorithm 4 reduces the number of necessary
point additions by 33%.
In the case when extra memory is available, the running time of the scalar point multi-
plication algorithm can be further decreased by using a windowmethodwhich processes
w digits of k at a time. A method that combines the window technique with a NAF rep-
resentation of the scalar is also possible to apply. This method requires generation of a
width-w NAF representation of k. For a positive integer w > 2, NAFw(k) can be repre-
1Hamming weight of a string is the number of symbols that are different from the zero-symbol of the
alphabet used.
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sented as k =
Pl¡1
i=0 ki2
i where each nonzero coefcient ki is odd, jkij < 2w¡1, kl¡1 6= 0
and at most one of any w consecutive digits is nonzero. The standard NAF(k) is equal
to NAF2(k) in the width-w representation. The digits of NAFw(k) can be obtained by re-
peated division of k by 2with remainders in [¡2w¡1; 2w¡1¡1]. For example when k = 189
(10111101)2 then NAF4(k) is equal to (300000¡3). The windowedNAFmethod for point
multiplication requires online pre-computation and can be calculated using Algorithm 5
(based on [114]).
Algorithm 5Window NAF method for point multiplication
INPUT: Window of w bits, positive integer k, point P 2 E(Fq)
OUTPUT: Q = kP
1: Calculate NAFw(k)=
Pl¡1
i=0 ki2
i
2: Compute Pi = iP for i 2 f1; 3; 5; : : : ; 2w¡1 ¡ 1g
3: QÃ1
4: for iÃ l ¡ 1 downto 0 do
5: QÃ 2Q
6: if ki 6= 0 then
7: if ki > 0 then
8: QÃ Q+ Pki
9: else
10: QÃ Q¡ P¡ki
11: end if
12: end if
13: end for
14: return Q
The windowed NAF method provides 1w+1 of nonzero digits density at the expense
of a precomputation table in RAM containing (2w¡2 ¡ 1) precomputed points (plus the
original point). Algorithm 5 reduces the number of necessary point additions by around
60% when compared with Algorithm 4. The windowed NAF method can be also modi-
ed to employ a sliding window technique. In this modication the window of width
w moves left-to-right over the digits in NAF(k), with placement so that the value in the
window is odd. The sliding window technique requires more precomputation than the
width-w NAF method, but needs fewer point operations in the main loop of the algo-
rithm. However, the difference in performance of both methods is fairly small.
The windowed NAF methods work well when performing point multiplication on
prime eld curves and ordinary binary curves. On Koblitz curves the point multiplica-
tion operation can be further accelerated, as no expensive point doublings are required.
Elliptic curve point doublings can be replaced with a Frobenius map ¿(x; y) = (x2; y2)
where ¿(1) = 1. The value of ¿(x; y) can be efciently calculated since squaring in
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F2m is relatively inexpensive. Because it is known that (¿2 + 2)P = ¹¿(P ) holds for all
points on the Koblitz curve, where ¹ = (¡1)1¡a, the Frobenius map can be regarded as a
complex number ¿ satisfying ¿ + 2 = ¹¿ .
The strategy for computing a scalar multiplication over Koblitz curves is to convert a
scalar k to a radix ¿ expansion such as k =
Pl¡1
i=0 ¹i¿
i, where ¹i 2 f0;§1g. Such a ¿ -adic
representation can be obtained by repeated divisions of k by ¿ . To decrease the number
of point additions in a scalar multiplication, the ¿ -adic representation for k should be
sparse and short. This can be achieved by applying ¿ -adic NAF (TNAF), which can be
viewed as a ¿ -adic analogue of the ordinary NAF. As before, the number of calculations
can be decreased by applying a window method for TNAF representation, which pro-
cesses w digits at a time at the expense of extra memory. Width-w TNAF requires the
same amount of precomputation as the window NAF method and the algorithm has the
same number of point additions. However, the elimination of point doublings makes the
window TNAF method signicantly faster than other point multiplication algorithms.
All the above techniques assume that the point P is unknown before the calcula-
tion of kP (random point multiplication). In the case when P is known a priori, point
multiplication can be signicantly accelerated. In instances where P is xed, for exam-
ple in elliptic curve digital signature generation, point multiplication algorithms can
exploit precomputed data that depends only on P (and not on k). For example, if the
points 2P; 22P; : : : ; 2t¡1P are precomputed, then the right-to-left binary method (Algo-
rithm 4) has expected running time of approximately t=2 additions (t is the bit length
of k). This technique eliminates completely the need for point doublings, but requires a
large amount of precomputation.
Brickell et al. in [21] optimized the above method by using windows of width w to
limit the number of precomputed points. The algorithm described in [21] can be acceler-
ated using the exponentiation methods due to Lim and Lee [78]. The resulting xed-base
comb multiplication lowers the number of necessary point additions at the cost of some
extra point doublings. The method is illustrated in Figure 4.3. The scalar k is rst padded
on the left with dw ¡ t zeroes (if necessary), where w is the width of the precomputation
window and d = dt=we. Then k is divided into w bit strings (Kw¡1; : : : ;K0) each of the
same length d. During the calculation of kP , one bit of every bit string is processed and
forms a short scalar for P multiplication. This value is precomputed off-line for every
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possible combination of w bits (2w precomputed points). At each stage of the comb mul-
tiplication, the required precomputed point is added to the accumulator and doubled.
This step is repeated d times. The whole procedure is summarized in Algorithm 6. The
comb method is one of the fastest algorithms for calculating point multiplication when
P is xed. This method is especially attractive for embedded devices as the points can be
precomputed off-line and stored in program memory to save on precious RAM.
Figure 4.3: Point multiplication using the xed-base comb method
Algorithm 6 Fixed-base comb method for point multiplication
INPUT: Window of w bits, d = dt=we, k = (kt¡1; : : : ; k1; k0)2, point P 2 E(Fq)
OUTPUT: Q = kP
1: Precompute (aw¡1; : : : ; a1; a0)P for all bit strings (aw¡1; : : : ; a1; a0) of length w.
2: Divide k into w bitstrings k = Kw¡1jj : : : jjK1jjK0 each of the same length d. Kji
denotes the ith bit ofKj .
3: QÃ1
4: for iÃ d¡ 1 downto 0 do
5: QÃ 2Q
6: QÃ Q+ (Kw¡1i ; : : : ; k1i ; k0i )P
7: end for
8: return Q
4.1.3 Point representation
The points on an elliptic curve can be represented in many different ways. The selec-
tion of the point coordinate system has a big inuence on the performance of the curve
arithmetic operations. Point multiplication algorithms described in the previous section
perform many point additions and doublings, which have different formulas depend-
ing on the chosen coordinate system and the type of the curve. Fast execution of these
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operations is not possible without efcient representation of elliptic curve points. The
following lists the main coordinate systems used in elliptic curve cryptography:
Afne coordinates are standard (x; y) coordinates commonly used in mathematics. All
the formulas presented in previous sections use this type of coordinate system.
Projective coordinates may be used in some cases to accelerate certain arithmetic oper-
ations. The point (X;Y; Z) on E corresponds to the afne point (X=Z; Y=Z) when
Z 6= 0 and to the point at innity O = (0; 1; 0). It has been shown that projective
coordinate systems are more efcient than afne systems when calculating point
multiplication.
Jacobian coordinates is another system that improves the timings for basic arithmetic
operations on a curve. The point (X;Y; Z) onE in jacobian coordinates corresponds
to the afne point (X=Z2; Y=Z3) when Z 6= 0 and to the point at innity O =
(1; 1; 0). In general for Jacobian coordinates, doublings are faster and additions
slower than for the projective coordinates.
López-Dahab coordinates are designed for curves dened over elds of characteristic
two. A point (X;Y; Z) on an elliptic curve in the LD coordinates is equal to the point
(X=Z; Y=Z2) in afne coordinates where Z 6= 0. The point at innity corresponds
to O = (1; 0; 0). López-Dahab coordinates are the optimal choice when calculating
point multiplication on binary curves [81].
Mixed coordinates use a combination of different coordinate systems dened above.
Some improvements can be made when adding an afne point to one in another
system. In general, one can add points expressed in two different systems and
give the result in a third one. The most efcient combination of coordinate systems
should be chosen for each arithmetic operation on the curve.
Other coordinate systems are also possible for representing points on an elliptic curve.
Formulas for point doubling and point addition from Section 4.1.2.1 are based on afne
coordinates. Some of them require a eld inversion and several eld multiplications. In
many cases, eld inversion reduces the efciency of elliptic curve cryptosystems dras-
tically, because the ratio of a eld inversion to the eld multiplication is rather high.
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Usually if inversion in Fq is more expensive than eight multiplications, then it is advan-
tageous to represent points using different coordinates (e.g. projective or mixed coordi-
nates). The underlying eld operation counts for point addition and doubling in various
coordinate systems are listed in Table 4.1. In all cases, using mixed coordinates for point
addition is more efcient than using the same representation for both points. For curves
dened over prime elds, Jacobian coordinates yield the fastest point doubling, while
mixed Jacobian-afne coordinates yield the fastest point addition 2. In case of binary
curves, López-Dahab coordinates outperform all other point representation systems.
When designing key distribution protocols it is important to consider the transmis-
sion of point coordinates. This issue is important in wireless sensor networks, where we
want to minimize the number of bytes transmitted in the network. For transmission pur-
poses afne coordinates are the most suitable, because they only include two values. In
addition, one can send compressed afne coordinates, which include the value of x and a
single bit of y. Based on the curve equation the receiver can calculate two possible values
of y. The single bit of y decides, which value is the correct one.
Table 4.1: Operation counts for point addition and doubling
Curve type Coordinate Addition Addition Doubling
system (mixed coord.)
y2 = x3 ¡ 3x+ b
dened over Fp
Afne I+2M+S  I+2M+S
Projective 12M+2S 9M+2S 7M+3S
Jacobian 12M+4S 8M+3S 4M+4S
y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b
binary curve
Afne I+2M+S  I+3M+S
Projective 14M+S 11M+S 7M+5S
Jacobian 14M+5S 10M+4S 5M+5S
López-Dahab 14M+6S 8M+5S 4M+5S
M - multiplication in Fq , S - squaring in Fq , I - inversion in Fq
4.2 Elliptic Curve Cryptography for WSNs
The rst implementations of Elliptic Curve Cryptography primitives in WSNs proved
that it is possible to compute point multiplication on standard 8-bit sensor nodes. The
feasibility of Elliptic Curve Cryptography on sensor networks was rst proven by Malan
et al. [85] with the introduction of the EccM library. This implementation provided el-
2Recently discovered Edwards coordinates beat these speed records using 3M+5S for point doubling and
7M+4S for point addition (see [11])
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liptic curve cryptography over F2m with 163-bit key sizes. The results presented in this
work conrmed the possibility of using Public Key Cryptography in sensor nodes, but
the running time of Elliptic Curve Cryptography primitives was far too high for practi-
cal applications. Early implementations of elliptic curve cryptography on sensor devices
([85], [15]) were not promising and it was unclear if Elliptic Curve Cryptography could
be attractive for sensor networks without the use of hardware accelerators.
The performance of Elliptic Curve Cryptography primitives in WSNs can be im-
proved by using some of the techniques presented in Section 4.1.2. Projective or mixed
coordinates can be used rather than afne coordinates, in order to avoid expensive in-
versions. More efcient point multiplication algorithms can be used to accelerate crypto-
graphic protocols that are based on elliptic curves. These and other optimizations were
implemented in the TinyECC library [80] and in the Wang and Li implementation on the
TelosB mote [118]. Both libraries used TinyOS as the underlying operating system and
provided improved results on computing Elliptic Curve Cryptography in WSNs. The
following sections will present the details on the above implementations and will dis-
cuss the security parameters required to apply Elliptic Curve Cryptography in a sensor
network environment.
4.2.1 Security parameters
Elliptic Curve Cryptography requires multiple parameters that are very important for
the overall security of the system. It is not enough to rely only on big key sizes. Other
domain parameters like the selected curve E, an appropriate nite eld Fq and the right
base point P are equally important. All these parameters should be chosen in a way that
the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem is resistant to all known attacks. There
may also be other additional constraints due to implementation reasons. One may chose
a particular type of a nite eld due to strong support for arithmetic in that eld on
a given platform. The basic set of domain parameters for Elliptic Curve Cryptography
systems includes the following [2]:
² S - seed if the elliptic curve was randomly generated;
² q - the order of the nite eld;
² FR - representation used for the eld elements;
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² a; b - two curve coefcients in Fq that dene the equation of the elliptic curve E(Fq);
² xP ; yP - two eld elements in Fq that dene a nite point P = (xP ; yP ) 2 E(Fq);
² n - the order of the point P ;
² h - the cofactor equal to #E(Fq)=n.
The number of points in the curve is a very important parameter in elliptic curve
systems. In order to avoid the Pohlig-Hellman attack [99] and the Pollard's ½ attack [100]
on the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem, it is necessary that#E(Fq) is divisible
by a sufciently large prime n. The hardest Elliptic Curve Cryptography scheme publicly
broken to date using the Pollard's ½ algorithm had a 112-bit n in Fp and a 109-bit m in
F2m . For the prime eld case, this was broken in July 2009 using a cluster of over 200
PlayStation 3 game consoles over a period of three and a half months [20]. For the binary
eld case, the record was set in April 2004 using 2600 computers over 17 months [122].
The process of breaking a 131-bit key in F2m is currently underway [123]. With the current
state-of-the-art in cryptanalysis, Elliptic Curve Cryptography systems based on standard
160-bit keys should be secure until the year 2020 [20]. Such level of security should be
sufcient for the majority of sensor network applications.
Using cryptographic keys of appropriate size is not the only security measure re-
quired in Elliptic Curve Cryptography systems. In the case when the nite eld Fq is
xed, the security can be improved by choosing proper elliptic curves. The maximum re-
sistance to the Pohlig-Hellman and Pollard's ½ attacks can be achieved by selecting such
E that #E(Fq) is prime or near-prime3.
Another threat to elliptic curve systems is the range of isomorphic attacks. Isomor-
phism attacks reduce the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem to the Discrete Log-
arithm Problem in groups for which subexponential time algorithms are known. These
attacks result in methods that are faster than Pollard's ½ algorithm, but only for a special
classes of elliptic curves. When selecting the prime eld, one should check that#E(Fq) 6=
q to avoid this attack. The Weil and Tate pairing attacks on elliptic curves can also be
harmful if the right precautions are not exercised. For this reason, n should not divide
qk ¡ 1 for all 1 · k · C. In this case, C a large enough number that makes the Discrete
3this is in case where#E(Fq) = hnwith n prime and h small (1,2,3 or 4)
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Logarithm Problem in F¤
qC
intractable (for n > 2160 the value of C should be at mini-
mum 20). Finally, to ensure resistance to the Weil descent attack, one may consider using
a binary eld F2m only ifm is prime.
One solution to defend against attacks on special classes of curves that may be dis-
covered in the future is to select the elliptic curve E at random. However, the condition
that#E(Fq) is divisible by a large prime should still hold. The probability that a random
curve is prone to one of the known isomorphism attacks is negligible. In this way all the
known attacks are also prevented. The coefcients of an elliptic curve can be selected
at random as outputs of a one-way hash function. Of course the chosen one-way func-
tion should be secure and not invertable. This provides some assurance that the elliptic
curve was not intentionally constructed with hidden weaknesses which could thereafter
be exploited.
4.2.2 Existing implementations
Implementing Elliptic Curve Cryptography on wireless sensor nodes became a popular
research topic in recent years. Many authors tried to apply Elliptic Curve Cryptography
in software on standard WSN nodes, but the efciency of these implementations is still
not satisfactory enough. The next sections presents themain Elliptic Curve Cryptography
implementations developed for sensor networks so far.
4.2.2.1 MICA2 implementation
The work described in [85] is the rst implementation known of Elliptic Curve Cryp-
tography on sensor devices. It targets the 8-bit MICA2 platform and provides Elliptic
Curve Cryptography primitives over F2m with 163-bit keys. The authors proposed Ellip-
tic Curve Cryptography as a method for secure distribution of 80-bit symmetric TinySec
keys. For this purpose they have developed the EccM library that was implemented in
the nesC language and evaluated under TinyOs.
In [85], the Elliptic Curve Dife-Hellman key exchange protocol is proposed for the
nodes to exchange secret keys in a secure manner. ECDH is an elliptic curve variant of
the classic Dife-Hellman protocol (see Figure 4.4). Initially all the nodes must be pre-
loaded with the same domain parameters (S; FR; q; a; b; P; n; h). Also, each node must
generate a key pair suitable for Elliptic Curve Cryptography, consisting of a private key
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d (a randomly selected integer in the interval [1; n ¡ 1]) and a public key Q (where Q =
dP ). In the case when node A key pair is (dA; QA) and node B key pair is (dB; QB) both
parties can agree upon a shared secret. This operation begins with an exchange of public
keys. When node A receives public key QB , it calculates the value dAQB . At the same
time node B computes dBQA and from now on shares the same secret value as node A,
because dAQB = dAdBP = dBdAP = dBQA. The shared secret key is usually set as the x
coordinate of the calculated point.
Figure 4.4: Elliptic curve Dife-Hellman key exchange protocol in WSNs
For the eld elements in F2m , the polynomial basis was chosen as binary polynomials
can be effectively represented in vector form. The authors also reported that with this
basis, the point multiplication implementation was more efcient on the MICA2 nodes.
The rst version of the EccM library was based on a random elliptic curve with an arbi-
trary chosen base point. Its performance was low as it could not generate the keys in a
reasonable amount of time (below one minute).
EccM 2.0 introduced many improvements in comparison with the previous version.
It used a y2 + xy = x3 + x2 + 1 Koblitz curve and a xed base point to achieve better
performance. The reduction polynomial f(x) = x163 + x7 + x6 + x3 + 1 was chosen to
facilitate fast reduction of binary polynomials. The time required to generate a private
and public key pair with the EccM 2.0 module, averaged over 100 trials, was equal to
34.2s. The memory requirement for this implementation was 1.1KB RAM and 34.3KB
in ROM. The authors in [85] argued that such performance is sufcient for infrequent
distribution of TinySec keys. However, from the energy budget point of view, a running
time of 34 seconds for the point multiplication operation is unacceptable for the majority
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of WSN applications.
4.2.2.2 TelosB implementation
Wang and Li in paper [118] proposed an Elliptic Curve Cryptography implementation
over the prime eld Fp for the 16-bit TelosB platform. This sensor device is very similar
to the Tmote Sky node and is also powered by the same MSP430 microprocessor.
As opposed to the previous work, the authors in [118] chose the prime eld as the
base nite eld for their implementation. They argued that multiplication and modu-
lar reduction in Fp, can be more effectively optimized than in F2m , if pseudo-Mersenne
primes are used for the elliptic curves. Their whole implementation was based on the
SECG recommended 160-bit elliptic curve secp160r1 [24].
The work presented in [118] implements a suite of large integer arithmetic operations
in the underlying nite eld Fp. These operations include addition, subtraction, shift,
multiplication, division and modular reduction. The authors also used a hybrid multi-
plication method that was proposed in [57]. To achieve better performance and enable
exible control over registers, they implemented the hybrid multiplication in assembly
language. All the points on the secp160r1 elliptic curve were represented using mixed co-
ordinates withmodied Jacobian coordinates (X;Y; Z; aZ4) andAfne coordinates (x; y).
The usage of the mixed coordinate system led to improvements in the performance of
the point addition and doubling operations. Mixed coordinates resulted also in a 6% im-
provement for point multiplication when compared with Jacobian coordinates.
The efciency of the point multiplication routine was further improved with the use
of a NAF representation of the scalar. The authors also used the sliding window method
for the point multiplication operation. Furthermore, additional memory was utilized for
storing precomputed points. Experimental results showed that the sliding window tech-
nique is more effective than the window NAF method for xed point multiplication. The
performance of the sliding windowmethod was more than 10% better than that of NAFs.
The implementation of point multiplication on the TelosB mote was considered in
two cases. The rst one was when multiplying a large integer with a xed point (base
point) and the other was with a random point. Fixed point multiplication allowed for
optimizations by precomputation. The results for xed and random point multiplication
were equal to 3.13s and 3.51s respectively. Memory utilization was at the level of 17.8KB
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of program space and 1.6KB of data storage.
In addition to the point multiplication operation, the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm was also implemented. When signing a message, one xed point multiplica-
tion is the dominant operation. The performance of the signature generation was equal
to 3.35s which is close to that of the xed point multiplication. The verication step of
the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm consisted mainly of one xed point mul-
tiplication and one random point multiplication and its timing was equal to 6.78s. The
program storage for the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm protocol was equal to
42.3KB with a large part of space occupied by the SHA-1 implementation.
Paper [118] shows that Elliptic Curve Cryptography primitives and protocols can be
executed in a reasonable amount of time on the TelosB platform. The presented results
suggest also that Elliptic Curve Cryptography over prime elds is more efcient than
over binary elds.
4.2.2.3 TinyECC
TinyECC v1.0 [80] is an elliptic curve cryptography library which provides Public Key
Cryptography operations optimized for constrained sensor network platforms. It pro-
vides three different Elliptic Curve Cryptography-based security protocols: a digital sig-
nature scheme (ECDSA), a key exchange protocol (ECDH), and a public key encryption
scheme (ECIES). TinyECC uses different optimization switches to adjust the performance
of cryptographic operations. Each of those switches can be turned on or off separately,
based on the developer's needs.
This library is intended for sensor platforms running TinyOS. The current version, 1.0,
is implemented in nesC, with additional platform-specic optimizations in inline assem-
bly language for popular sensor platforms. So far it has been tested on MICAz, TelosB,
Tmote Sky, and Imote2. TinyECC 1.0 supports SECG recommended 128-bit, 160-bit and
192-bit elliptic curve domain parameters. In particular, the following curves are used:
sec128r1, secp128r2, secp160k1, secp160r1, secp160r2, secp192k1, and secp192r1 [24].
TinyECC adopts several well known optimization techniques that accelerate Elliptic
Curve Cryptography operations on sensor platforms. These methods include [80]:
Projective coordinate system. Many small processors do not support the division in-
struction (ATmega128, MSP430) so the inverse operation is signicantly more ex-
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pensive than multiplication. It is efcient to implement elliptic curve operations in
projective coordinates instead of afne coordinates. TinyECC uses weighted pro-
jective representation (Jacobian coordinates) to speed up point addition, point dou-
bling and scalar point multiplication.
Curve-specic optimizations. For all NIST and most SECG curves, the underlying eld
primes p were chosen as pseudo-Mersenne primes to allow optimized modular re-
duction. This optimized modular reduction algorithm was implemented in order
to speed up modular multiplication and modular squaring.
Sliding window method. This algorithm was used to speed up scalar point multipli-
cation by reducing the total number of point additions. One disadvantage of this
technique is that extra memory is required as some points need to be precomputed.
Hybrid multiplication. In TinyECC, the natural number operations are based on the
RSA cryptographic toolkit RSAREF 2.0. This implementation is platform indepen-
dent, but not efcient. To facilitate this, TinyECC uses inline assembly code to speed
up critical operations such as multiplication and squaring for MICAz, TelosB/T-
mote Sky, and Imote2 motes. In particular, hybrid multiplication [57] was imple-
mented to accelerate the arithmetic in Fp.
Table 4.2: Performance analysis of ECC implementations on sensor motes
Implementation EccM2.0 Wang-Li TinyECC TinyECC TinyECC
Platform MICA2 TelosB MICA2 TelosB Imote2
CPU Atmega128 MSP430 Atmega128 MSP430 PXA271
Clock 7.38MHz 4MHz 7.38MHz 4MHz 13MHz
Curve sect163k1 secp160r1 secp160r1 secp160r1 secp160r1
Finite eld F2m Fp Fp Fp Fp
Point mul. 34.2s 3.5s 2.1s 4.2s 0.4s
ROM 34.3KB 17.8KB 16.0KB 11.4KB 12.9KB
RAM 1.1KB 1.6KB 1.8KB 1.8KB 2.1KB
A performance evaluation of point multiplication in TinyECC and a comparison with
other Elliptic Curve Cryptography implementations is presented in Table 4.2. The num-
bers for the Imote2 platform were achieved at 13MHz clock speed. As shown in Table
4.2, all implementations use the prime eld Fp apart from EccM2.0 which performs arith-
metic in the binary F2m . EccM2.0 is the slowest implementation with the largest memory
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footprint. The Wang-Li implementation performs the fastest point multiplication on the
TelosB platform, whereas TinyECC provides the best results on the MICA2 and Imote2
devices. In all cases TinyECC is more efcient when it comes to memory utilization. De-
spite the slightly lower performance on the TelosB mote, TinyECC is the most useful
library for sensor networks as it supports many different platforms and allows a great
degree of customization.
4.3 NanoECC: optimizing ECC for WSN platforms
Efcient implementation of Elliptic Curve Cryptography primitives in sensor networks
is a difcult task. Small memory size, limited CPU capabilities and scarce battery re-
sources create a difcult environment for applying elliptic curve cryptography. Program
code needs to be highly optimized to meet all of the above demands. This is the rea-
son why there is some confusion in the literature concerning timings of basic elliptic
curve operations on constrained WSN platforms. The results presented in the previous
section vary from each other in terms of execution time and memory consumption. It is
not certain which base eld gives the best performance for the crucial point multiplica-
tion operation. Most of the existing implementations focus on optimizing Elliptic Curve
Cryptography for a particular hardware platform and forget about the portability of the
code. Many available libraries use xed parameters without permitting the possibility to
change elliptic curves, domain parameters or security levels. The energy consumption of
cryptographic primitives is not also investigated in many cases.
The NanoECC library addresses all the above issues and offers efcient Elliptic Curve
Cryptography primitives that can be used to build complete security protocols. The li-
brary can be easily integrated into existing sensor network applications to provide Public
Key Cryptography-based security solutions. NanoECC is optimized for different sensor
network platforms and can be exibly congured to nd the best set of parameters for
a given application type. It is compatible with MICA2, MICA2DOT, MICAz, TelosB and
Tmote Sky motes, but can be also easily ported to other hardware platforms. The evalua-
tion results of NanoECC show that the software implementation of Elliptic Curve Cryp-
tography is not only feasible, but in fact attractive for tiny sensor nodes. The results can be
also treated as a comprehensive benchmark of Elliptic Curve Cryptography performance
in WSNs.
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4.3.1 NanoECC overview
When developing software for sensor networks, certain design choices must be made to
specify the features and functionality of the code. NanoECC follows four design princi-
ples:
1) Portability. The library is compatible with a broad range of existing sensor platforms
and can be easily ported to other 8, 16 and 32-bit constrained devices. Most of the
procedures use standard C, which favors speed and permits re-use of the code on
numerous other WSN platforms. Even though some functions use inline assembly,
the code development process is as portable as possible. Assembler routines are
generated automatically by special utility program from user dened macros. In
this simple and convenient way, appropriate assembler code can be quickly devel-
oped for new platforms and processors that are not yet supported.
2) Performance. NanoECC is optimized for speed and energy efciency. Memory usage
is a secondary concern as optimizing for code size lowers the functionality and
portability of the library. The memory footprint of the library can be reduced af-
ter achieving satisfactory performance by deleting unnecessary functions. In order
to speed up the execution of particularly time-critical arithmetic routines, the stan-
dard C code is replaced with some assembly language specic for each platform.
The high performance of NanoECC is achieved also through many different opti-
mizations for elliptic curve operations.
3) Security. High level of security in Elliptic Curve Cryptography systems can only be
achieved through careful selection of algorithms and domain parameters. NanoECC
takes into consideration all of the guidelines described in Section 4.2.1. It also sup-
ports the elliptic curve parameters recommended by NIST [22] and SECG [24].
4) Versatility. Large set of available library functions in NanoECC gives a lot of possibil-
ities in writing Elliptic Curve Cryptography based programs. The parameters can
be exibly congured and the code can be easily integrated into WSN applications
to provide the building blocks for standard Elliptic Curve Cryptography schemes
(ECDSA, ECDH) and more advanced Identity-Based Cryptography protocols. Na-
noECC is the only library for WSNs (so far) that provides Elliptic Curve Cryptog-
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raphy operations over both the prime eld Fp and the binary eld F2m . The library
can be also used with conjunction with different embedded operating systems.
The prime nite eld was the main focus of many different Elliptic Curve Cryptog-
raphy implementations for sensor networks [56], [80], [118], [15]. The choice of the eld
was dictated by the fact that basic arithmetic operations can be effectively optimized if
pseudo-Mersenne primes are used in Fp. The authors in [80] stated, that it is difcult to
obtain efcient Elliptic Curve Cryptography implementation over F2m on typical sensor
platforms. Binary elds were not favoured because polynomial arithmetic (multiplica-
tion in particular) is insufciently supported by current CPU's. Results achieved by Na-
noECC using both types of nite elds show for the rst time that in some cases in this
constrained environment, Elliptic Curve Cryptography operations over the binary poly-
nomial eld F2m outperform those in Fp. Moreover, the timings for the binary eld case
would be even faster if a binary polynomial multiplication instruction was available on
the architectures considered.
The core of NanoECC is based on MIRACL (Multiprecision Integer and Rational
Arithmetic C/C++ Library) [109], which provides all the necessary tools to perform op-
erations on elliptic curves. MIRACL supports Elliptic Curve Cryptography over both
standard nite elds, Fp and F2m . It also handles all of the operations on big integers
and large polynomials. MIRACL was originally designed for desktop class computers,
but can be also optimized to work with constrained 8 and 16-bit platforms. On a PC with
large memory space, all the memory for big integers is allocated dynamically from the
heap. In an embedded environment, the memory resources are very limited and dynamic
memory allocation is often not available. MIRACL had to be optimized to allocate all the
memory exclusively from the stack. One downside of this is that the maximum size of big
variables has to be set at compile time, when the library is being created. Nevertheless,
static memory allocation allows maximum use and re-use of memory, and avoids frag-
mentation of precious RAM. The MIRACL library was extensively optimized to provide
the best Elliptic Curve Cryptography performance on constrained WSN motes.
4.3.2 Implementation of NanoECC
NanoeECC was implemented initially on two popular WSN motes: the MICA2 [30] plat-
form developed by Crossbow Technology and the Tmote Sky [92] node developed by the
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Moteiv corporation. The library is also compatible with other sensor nodes (MICA2DOT,
MICAz, TelosB), which use the same processors (ATmega128 and MSP430F1611). Ex-
perimental results have shown that the point multiplication operation is the most time
consuming operation in Elliptic Curve Cryptography protocols. For example, more than
90% of the execution time in the Elliptic Curve Dif-Hellman key exchange protocol is
spent on performing point multiplication operations. That is why the primary focus of
NanoECC was on optimizing the performance of xed-point and random-point multi-
plication routines.
4.3.2.1 Curve arithmetic optimization
The selection of point multiplication algorithms is complicated and depends on platform
characteristics, coordinates selection, interoperability, security requirements andmemory
constraints. Another difculty in using Elliptic Curve Cryptography is that of nding
suitable elliptic curves. Curve parameters have to be carefully chosen to allow efcient
computations and provide a reasonable level of security. NIST recommends using at least
160-bit keys in Elliptic Curve Cryptography systems to achieve a security level equivalent
to that offered by standard RSA based solutions with 1024-bit keys.
In the case of the binary eld F2m , random point multiplication achieves best perfor-
mance when using Koblitz curves. The elimination of point doublings gives a signicant
speed up when performing point multiplication on this type of curve. For the example
programs, the NIST k163 Koblitz curve was selected over F2163 . Ordinary binary curves
(e.g NIST b163) can be also applied, if required. Nevertheless, Koblitz curves are recom-
mended for constrained embedded devices due to better performance. The random point
multiplication was implemented using the window TNAF method. The size of the win-
dowwas selected in an experimental way. The best trade-off between speed andmemory
was achieved using awindow size of 4 bits. This results in a precomputation of 4 points in
RAM at the beginning of every point multiplication calculation (online precomputation).
ECDH and ECDSA protocols require multiplication by a scalar of a xed base point
on the selected curve in the rst phase of each scheme. This can be carried out more
quickly using precomputation. The example programs implement a xed point multipli-
cation method using additional storage to accelerate the calculations. With this, approach
point multiplication is a tradeoff between memory space and computation time. For the
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xed point multiplication in the binary eld, the comb method (Algorithm 6) was used.
Precomputation was performed with window size w = 4 resulting in 16 elliptic curve
points stored in ROM (off-line precomputation). The precomputed points were gener-
ated automatically by a special utility program based on the curve parameters and the
generator point. This approach provides additional support for curves and domain pa-
rameters which are not standardized.
The overall performance of point multiplication depends not only on the algorithm
but also on the efciency of the curve operations such as point addition and doubling.
The selection of the point coordinate system has a big inuence on the performance of the
above mentioned operations. For binary curves, point addition and doubling operations
were implemented using López-Dahab coordinates, as they require the least number of
eld multiplications and squarings in F2m (see Table 4.1).
In case of the prime eld Fp it has been shown that projective Jacobian coordinates
(X=Z2; Y=Z3) are more efcient than Afne coordinates (x; y), when it comes to point
doubling operation. Rules for point doubling in Afne coordinates require inversion in
the underlying eld, which is usually much more expensive than multiplication. The
same operation in projective coordinates uses a greater number of cheaper multiplica-
tions and squarings in place of an expensive inversion. On embedded devices, eld mul-
tiplication is much faster than inversion (especially when implemented in assembly lan-
guage). Hence it is benecial to replace the standard Afne coordinates. For curves de-
ned over prime elds, point addition is fastest using mixed Afne-Jacobian coordinates
(Table 4.1).
When using elliptic curves dened over prime elds, signicant performance opti-
mizations can be achieved with pseudo-Mersenne primes. Reduction modulo a pseudo-
Mersenne prime can be performed by a fewmodular multiplications and additions with-
out any division operation. As a result, the time for modular reduction can be reduced
signicantly. For the example programs, a y2 = x3 ¡ 3x + 157 curve was selected with
p = 2160 ¡ 2112 +264 +1. Selecting the curve parameter a as ¡3minimizes the number of
eld multiplications and squarings for point doubling. The random point multiplication
on the above curve was performed using the window NAF method (Algorithm 5) with a
sliding window of size 4. Fixed point multiplication over Fp was implemented using the
same comb method as in the case of binary curves.
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4.3.2.2 Finite eld arithmetic optimization
Modular arithmetic routines are fundamental operations in every elliptic curve system.
The overall performance of Elliptic Curve Cryptography depends greatly on the speed
of those primitives. Optimal techniques for performing nite eld arithmetic on low-end
processor are presented in Chapter 3. This section summarizes only the methods used in
the example programs, which demonstrate the performance of NanoECC in WSNs.
In Fp, big integer multiplication and reduction modulo p of the result are the most
time-critical operations and must be performed as quickly as possible. On small proces-
sors, multiprecision multiplication of large integers not only involves arithmetic opera-
tions, but also a signicant amount of data transport to and from memory. To limit the
number of unnecessary data accesses the improved hybrid method was implemented on
the target platforms.
This newmultiplicationmethodminimizes the number of operations onmemory and
uses additional CPU registers for catching and storing the carry bits. The improved hy-
brid method takes advantage of extra registers to avoid unnecessary load operations and
becomes more efcient with the number of registers used. The method can be also used
to accelerate squaring in Fp. The implementation details of the improved hybrid method
on several embedded processors can be found in Section 3.3.2.1. For modular reduction,
fast algorithm was implemented that takes advantage of a special form of the modulus
p = 2160 ¡ 2112 + 264 + 1 (Algorithm 1). In the case when p is not of a special form the
Montgomery reduction can be applied. NanoECC is optimized for speed. Therefore the
basic arithmetic operations in Fp such as multiplication, squaring, reduction, addition
and subtraction were all implemented using the assembly language of a given hardware
platform. On the MICA2 mote, which is clocked at 7.3828MHz, 160-bit integer multipli-
cation was performed in 0.36ms. The same operation on the Tmote Sky platform took
0.21 ms at 8.192MHz.
The eld F2m is usually constructed using a polynomial basis representation. In this
case, binary polynomialsmultiplication and reductionmodulo an irreducible binary poly-
nomial are the crucial operations. For the C implementation of the polynomial multipli-
cation, the Karatsuba-Ofman techniquewas adopted. This divide-and-conquer technique
reduces the code size and the multiplication complexity by using word size polynomial
multiplication and extra additions (which are very fast in F2m). If more memory is avail-
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able, multiplication can be implemented in assembly language. NanoECC includes an
assembly implementation of the comb method for polynomial multiplication (Algorithm
2) withwindow sizew = 4. In order to speed up the reduction routines on both platforms,
a pentanomial f(z) = z163+z7+z6+z3+1was used as the irreducible polynomial. Based
on the specic form of f(z), a fast reduction algorithm was implemented (similar to Al-
gorithm 3). The squaring of binary polynomials was implemented using the technique
described in Section 3.4.2.
4.3.2.3 Integration with TinyOS
In order to check the performance of the NanoECC library on standard sensor nodes,
an example Elliptic Curve Dife Hellman program was developed for the TinyOS op-
erating system [77]. TinyOS is an open source OS written in nesC language [51]. It fea-
tures a component-based architecture which enables quick development time and reuse
of already existing modules, such as sensor drivers, distributed services, data acquisition
tools, and network protocols. Although TinyOS is open source and thus it is possible to
modify its internal components, NanoECC can be integrated without any kernel modi-
cations. The library is written almost entirely in C and can be integrated with any em-
bedded operating system (such as Contiki [38] or Mantis [12]). TinyOS was chosen as the
target OS due to its popularity and strong support from the research community.
When developing for TinyOS, it is possible to use the build-in standard components
to create fully functional network applications. TinyOS is especially useful when devel-
oping applications for different hardware platforms. The use of nesC and TinyOS permits
the same applications to run on completely different devices. Porting the code from one
device to another is a lot easier, with unied components such as timers, I/O interfaces,
LED's, etc. This approach hides most of the hardware dependencies for different plat-
forms and simplies the programming.
The example Elliptic Curve Dife Hellman application was written in the nesC lan-
guage and used the generic TinyOS network stack. Figure 4.5 shows the conguration of
the Ecdh2m application, which implements the ECDH key exchange algorithm inWSNs.
Each node in Figure 4.5 represent a different application component. The edges represent
interface wiring and triangles are labeled with the corresponding interface name. The
following describes the main components used in the ECDH program:
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Figure 4.5: An example ECDH program based on NanoECC implemented in TinyOS
Ecdh2mApp. Is the overall application conguration le. It denes the wiring between
particular components in the entire program.
Ecdh2mC. Is the core component of the program, which implements the actual ECDH
protocol over the binary nite eld. This component is connected with all the other
modules which provide the required functionality. It generates a private/public key
pair and processes the received packets (containing public keys of other nodes). It
also embeds the node's public key in the messages that are sent over the radio
interface. Finally it calculates the shared secret key between two nodes.
MainC. This component is executed rst in a TinyOS application. Its common StdCon-
trol interface is used to initialise and start the connected TinyOS components.
SenMsgC. Provides multiple abstractions of message senders. It handles the sending of
the messages dened by the Ecdh2mC component (which contain the node's public
key).
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ReceiveMsgC. Provides the interface for receiving packets. It forwards the decrypted
packet to the Ecdh2mC component.
TimerC. This component creates multiple instances of timers which can be used by ap-
plication components. The timers are used to set the time of different events in the
system.
LedsC. Controls the mote's leds, which are used for visual notication of particular
events such as sending the message over the radio or calculating the shared key.
This component is not necessary for proper functioning of the program.
GeneralIOC. Provides the interface to control different input/output operations. In this
implementation it is used to set the voltage on a particular pin of the device (port27).
This pin is used to pass the trigger signals to the measuring equipment. This com-
ponent was used during application testing.
NanoECClib. Contains all the cryptographic modules required for the ECDH protocol.
It is build out of several components. The rst one mrcore.c includes library
initialization code. The next two mrarth0.c and mrarth1.c perform large inte-
gers arithmetic. The module mrbits.c generates random big numbers, and nally
mrec2m.c and mrgf2m.c provide arithmetic operations over F2m .
4.3.3 NanoECC performance evaluation
The example ECDH programs were compiled under the TinyOs operating system and
run on the MICA2 and Tmote Sky motes, so all measurements were taken on actual
devices. The three most important parameters for sensor nodes were measured: com-
putation time, memory usage and energy consumption. The devices had to be slightly
modied to facilitate data acquisition. A precise one ohm resistor was soldered between
the mote and its battery pack to measure the exact amount of current drained during
program execution. Input/Output ports on MICA2 and Tmote Sky were used to pass
trigger signals to the measuring equipment. The details concerning the energy measure-
ments and the experimental setup are described in Appendix A.
The above way of obtaining measurements achieves exact timings and precise power
consumption information without using the mote's timers and other features which in-
crease computation overhead. Figure 4.6 shows an example graph of Tmote Sky voltage
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Figure 4.6: Voltage levels on Tmote Sky during example ECDH program execution
levels during the ECDH program execution. The calculation of the xed point multipli-
cation and the random point multiplication takes almost the whole time required for the
ECDH protocol (92%). Therefore the performance evaluation of NanoECC is focused on
the above operations.
4.3.3.1 Point multiplication results
The cost of point multiplication in terms of basic operations on the curve and in the nite
eld is presented in Table 4.3. All the values were taken as an average over 100 point
multiplications, because operation counts differ slightly depending on the value of k in
kP . The number of operations was exactly the same in the case of both sensor nodes. The
gures for point additions and doublings depend on the chosen point multiplication al-
gorithm. The numbers for eld operations depend on the chosen coordinate system and
the number of point additions/doublings. As seen in Table 4.3, xed point multiplica-
tion requires a similar number of operations over both F2m and Fp. This is due to the
fact that for both elds the same comb multiplication method was used. The advantage
of the binary eld is evident in case of the random point multiplication. The use of a
Koblitz curve and the window TNAF multiplication method eliminates point doublings
and at the same time signicantly reduces the number of necessary eld multiplications.
Random point multiplication over Fp requires more eld operations as the window NAF
method performs a point doubling in every iteration of the loop (see Algorithm 5).
The results for the point multiplication operations over the binary and the prime eld
on MICA2 and Tmote Sky nodes are listed in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 respectively. Pre-
computation was used in all cases to speed up the point multiplication routines. In order
to illustrate the difference in performance, C implementations are listed separately from
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Table 4.3: Cost of point multiplication in basic operations on sensor nodes
Fixed point multiplication Random point multiplication
Field F2m ,m = 163 Fp, p-160 bits F2m ,m = 163 Fp, p-160 bits
Point additions 36 39 35 36
Point doublings 40 38 0 162
Field multiplications 450 463 250 940
Field squarings 340 270 643 742
Table 4.4: Performance evaluation of point multiplication on MICA2 mote
Fixed point multiplication Random point multiplication
Field F2m ,m = 163 Fp, p-160 bits F2m ,m = 163 Fp, p-160 bits
Language C C+asm C C+asm C C+asm C C+asm
Timing [s] 2.97 0.66 1.20 0.60 2.16 0.87 2.59 0.99
Current [mA] 7.86 7.86 7.88 7.88 7.86 7.86 7.88 7.88
Energy [mJ] 70.0 15.6 28.4 14.3 50.9 20.5 61.2 23.4
ROM [KB] 32.4 38.7 57.8 40.1 32.4 38.7 57.8 40.1
RAM [KB] 1.7 2.1 1.8 1.9 1.7 2.1 1.8 1.9
the mixed C/assembly language implementations. Point addition and point doubling
operations were not considered independently as their computation time is insignicant
comparing to point multiplication.
For both platforms the results for xed and random point multiplication over F2m
and Fp are comparable. These results question the common opinion that Elliptic Curve
Cryptography over binary elds has much lower performance on constrained devices.
Actually, when looking at the results of random point multiplication, binary elds yield
even better performance on sensor nodes due to the use of Koblitz curves. Fixed point
multiplication is faster than random point multiplication in most cases, especially when
assembly routines are used. It is important to note that using a Koblitz curve makes off-
line precomputation less efcient and in some cases it might by better to use regular
point multiplication instead. The use of a mixed C/assembly language implementation
signicantly improves the performance of all point multiplication operations without in-
creasing the code size inmost cases. Formultiplication in the prime eld, the introduction
of assembly routines also decreased the library size. Both point multiplication routines
on each platform can be calculated in under one second when using arithmetic routines
written in assembly language. The experiments showed also that 75-90% of the time re-
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Table 4.5: Performance evaluation of point multiplication on Tmote Sky mote
Fixed point multiplication Random point multiplication
Field F2m ,m = 163 Fp, p-160 bits F2m ,m = 163 Fp, p-160 bits
Language C C+asm C C+asm C C+asm C C+asm
Timing [s] 1.21 0.53 0.74 0.45 1.04 0.65 1.15 0.72
Current [mA] 3.45 3.45 3.68 3.68 3.45 3.45 3.68 3.68
Energy [mJ] 12.5 5.49 8.17 4.97 10.8 6.73 12.7 7.95
ROM [KB] 32.1 33.2 36.9 31.3 32.1 33.2 36.9 31.3
RAM [KB] 1.8 2.1 1.7 1.9 1.8 2.1 1.7 1.9
quired for the Elliptic Curve Dife Hellman protocol is spent on performing modular
multiplications and squarings. This fact highlights once again the importance of efcient
arithmetic routines in the base eld.
The values for current in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 were measured based on the voltage levels
on each device. The energy consumption was calculated as the multiplication of current,
voltage (3V using two AA batteries) and program execution time. When calculating eld
multiplication on the Tmote Sky node, the hardware multiplier on the MSP430 CPU was
used to improve the performance. This fact also inuenced the average current consump-
tion, which was slightly higher when themultiplier unit was turned on. Operations in the
binary eld did not require the hardware multiplier. On the MICA2 the average current
drawn was almost the same using both elds. The energy consumption was decreased
by 40-75% on both platforms when mixed C/assembly language implementations were
used. In all experiments the Tmote Sky node was more efcient than MICA2 mote in
terms of power consumption. In some cases it used ve times less energy for the same
work carried out.
The program size gures given in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 include only the NanoECC im-
plementation without counting additional storage for TinyOS modules. The numbers for
the RAMmemory requirement were not taken directly from the TinyOS output, because
they did not include stack usage. Simulation environments such as AVR Studio and IAR
EmbeddedWorkbench for MSP430 were used to achieve precise information about RAM
usage and stack size at any given time during ECDH programs execution. The gures for
RAM in the above tables show the maximum stack usage for particular programs. The
average RAM utilization was usually much lower.
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4.3.3.2 Performance comparison
Figure 4.7: Point multiplication timings comparison on MICA2 and Tmote Sky
The performance of NanoECC onMICA2 and Tmote Sky nodes compares favourably
with the results presented in the literature (Arazi et al [3], Blaß et al [15], EccM2.0 [85],
TinyECC [80], Wang-Li [118], Yan et al [125]). Figure 4.7 compares the execution time
of random point multiplication using different implementations. In all cases the size of
the nite eld elements was 160 or 163-bits (except from [15] where F2113 was used). On
both platforms, NanoECC performs the fastest point multiplication from all available
implementations. In [57], Gura et. al calculated the scalar multiplication on a secp160r1
curve in 0.81s on the ATmega128 processor (CPU used in the MICA2 node). However,
the implementation was performed entirely in assembly language and is not clear how
well it can be integrated into sensor network applications. The performance of many
libraries over F2m ([85], [3], [125], [15]) is relatively low when compared with NanoECC.
The main reason why NanoECC is the fastest among software implementations is that
it applies the window TNAF method for point multiplication and implements efcient
base eld arithmetic in assembly language.
Figure 4.8: Point multiplication energy comparison on MICA2 and Tmote Sky
The difference in performance between NanoECC and other Elliptic Curve Cryp-
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Figure 4.9: Point multiplication ROM size comparison on MICA2 and Tmote Sky
tography implementations is even more visible in the case of the energy consumption
(Figure 4.8). Faster execution time of random point multiplication in NanoECC achieves
signicant savings in energy usage. On the Tmote Sky node, NanoECC can compute 50
point multiplications using the same energy as one multiplication in [85]. In compari-
son with TinyECC, the implementation presented here is around 2.5 times more energy
efcient on both hardware platforms. The energy efciency of NanoECC permits the cal-
culation of many public key operations on sensor devices and extends the overall lifetime
of the network.
Figure 4.9 illustrates the code size of different Elliptic Curve Cryptography imple-
mentations on sensor nodes. On both platforms, NanoECC takes a considerable amount
of ROM. Because asymmetric systems aremuch slower than symmetric systems, themain
focus for NanoECC was on speed rather than code size. However, the size of the li-
brary on both devices can be signicantly reduced by manual removal of unnecessary
functions. TinyECC has a smaller memory footprint than NanoECC, but was written in
nesC and cannot be easily implemented on embedded devices that run operating sys-
tems other than TinyOS. NanoECC is not dependent on the operating system, hence it
can be used in various embedded systems. On the MICA2 node the standard version of
NanoECC takes a similar amount of memory to EccM2.0, which is a much slower imple-
mentation. The code size is not a big problem on the MICA2 platform, because 38.71KB
accounts for 30% of the total space. The library size may be more problematic in case of
the Tmote Sky node which has only 48KB of ROM. In this situation it would be bene-
cial to optimize more on size at a cost of slightly lower performance and loss of some
functionality.
Different Elliptic Curve Cryptography implementations on sensor nodes have vari-
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Figure 4.10: Point multiplication RAM size comparison on MICA2 and Tmote Sky
ous RAM size requirements. Figure 4.10 summarizes RAM usage of the current elliptic
curve cryptography libraries developed for WSNs. NanoECC has similar RAM require-
ments to the second fastest implementation (TinyECC). In addition, the RAM size for Na-
noECC also includes the maximum stack usage during the program execution. In other
implementations, the value for RAM corresponds only to the data and bss segments of
the memory. This numbers are usually much lower than the total RAM usage. One such
example is visible in [15], where the authors state that their implementation use only 200B
in RAM. NanoECC uses 2.1KB of RAM on both platforms. On the Tmote Sky node this
constitutes 21% of the overall memory. In the case of the MICA2 mote, RAM is limited
to only 4KB which corresponds to 52% of total space. If the sensor application requires
more RAM, then NanoECC can use a smaller window or even perform point multiplica-
tion without online precomputation. This of course has an impact on performance and
would increase energy consumption (longer execution time).
4.4 Summary
The possibility of using Public Key Cryptography on resource-constrained devices is very
promising for wireless sensor networks. Public Key Cryptography can provide secure
broadcasts with digital signature schemes and authenticated key exchange algorithms.
All these services are highly desirable in a WSN environment to improve the overall
level of security. The main obstacle in using asymmetric cryptography in WSNs is the
high resource utilization of standard public key protocols. It is certainly possible to use
dedicated hardware accelerators for Public Key Cryptography primitives on WSN plat-
forms. However none of the sensor devices currently available on the market supports
public key operations in hardware, so it makes sense to explore different software ap-
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proaches for Public Key Cryptography support.
One such alternative method is Elliptic Curve Cryptography, which requires consid-
erably less resources than standard techniques based on RSA. Despite this advantage,
the implementation of Elliptic Curve Cryptography in WSNs is still challenging and
requires many optimization. This chapter presents the implementation of basic Elliptic
Curve Cryptography primitives on different sensor platforms. It presents also a short
mathematical background on elliptic curves and curve arithmetic. Of all operations on
elliptic curves, point multiplication is the most important one in Elliptic Curve Cryp-
tography. Scalar multiplication is the basic building block not only for standard Elliptic
Curve Cryptography protocols (ECDH, ECDSA) but also for more advanced security
schemes, which use identity based cryptography. Therefore efcient implementation of
this operation is crucial to the overall performance of Public Key Cryptography schemes
in wireless sensor networks.
There are many Elliptic Curve Cryptography software implementations on sensor
nodes, but most of them have signicant limitations and low performance. Many of the
implementations were developed with xed parameters as independent applications,
that cannot be easily ported to different hardware architectures. As a result, developers
may found it difcult, and sometimes impossible, to integrate such libraries with exist-
ing WSN applications. Moreover, the point multiplication operation can be optimized in
many ways to signicantly reduce the execution time and energy consumption. The re-
sults presented in existing implementations vary a lot from each other and it is not clear
which optimizations should be used and how they should be combined to achieve the
best performance.
This chapter presented the NanoECC library, which solves the shortcomings of ex-
isting Elliptic Curve Cryptography implementations in sensor networks. This library is
specically optimized for different sensor platforms and can be exibly congured for
easy integration with existing WSN applications. The code is portable and can be inte-
grated with different embedded operating systems. The evaluation results of NanoECC
give a clear answer to the question of how long Elliptic Curve Cryptography primitives
take on standard WSN nodes. The library revisits also for the rst time the common
assumption that Elliptic Curve Cryptography over prime elds is much more efcient
than over binary elds. The fastest point multiplication results were achieved on Koblitz
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curves over the binary eld. Efcient implementation of the windowed TNAF algorithm
gives the best performance of the random point multiplication on all sensor network
platforms. Therefore binary elds are recommended for elliptic curve cryptography im-
plementations on low-end architectures.
NanoECC has the best performance among existing implementations on different
sensor devices. There are libraries which have a smaller memory footprint than Na-
noECC, but they are not as versatile and have much more limited functionality. The high
speed of the library is achieved through efcient implementation of point multiplication
algorithms and arithmetic routines optimization in assembly language. The results pre-
sented in this chapter showed that Elliptic Curve Cryptography is not only viable on
sensor devices, but is in fact attractive for different WSN platforms. Using NanoECC it
is now more practical to create Public Key Cryptography-based security solutions on re-
source constrained nodes such as MICA2 and Tmote Sky.
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Pairings for Embedded Devices
P oint multiplication is an important operation on elliptic curves and is a basic build-ing block for many Elliptic Curve Cryptography protocols. In the same way that
scalar multiplication is the base for Elliptic Curve Cryptography, pairings are the main
building block in Identity-Based Cryptography and other pairing-based cryptosystems.
Cryptography using pairings (PBC) is an emerging eld related to Elliptic Curve Cryp-
tography which has been attracting the interest of the international cryptography com-
munity, since it enables the design of original cryptographic schemes, and makes well-
known cryptographic protocols more efcient. Pairing-Based Cryptography is a fairly
new idea in cryptography, but has already gained a lot of attention.
One of the rst usees of pairings to build cryptosystem is due to Joux [67]. He pro-
posed a simple three-party one-round key agreement protocol which was based on bilin-
ear pairings. After the publication of [67] researchers started to further investigate the use
of pairings in cryptography. In 2001 Boneh and Franklin [18] proposed an identity-based
encryption scheme based on the Weil pairing. Another important application of pairings
was the discovery of a short signature scheme by Boneh, Lynn and Shacham [19]. Since
then, many research papers have been published on the design of cryptographic proto-
cols using pairings. Pairings have been accepted in the cryptographic community as an
interesting tool to design security protocols. The creation of the IEEE P1363.3 standard
[65] may serve as a proof that the technology is viable and can be used in practical ap-
130
Chapter 5: Pairings for Embedded Devices
plications. The standard denes different pairing-based cryptographic techniques and is
currently available in a draft format.
The calculation of cryptographic pairings is the most computationally intensive op-
eration in Identity-Based Cryptography schemes. Therefore efcient implementation of
bilinear pairings is the key to practical identity based systems. It can be achieved by us-
ing:
² suitable pairing friendly elliptic curves;
² fast nite eld arithmetic routines;
² efcient pairing algorithms.
The choice of appropriate parameters for pairing-based systems is even more compli-
cated than in the case of elliptic curve cryptography. There are several types of pairing-
friendly curves with various embedding degrees and different algorithms for calculating
the pairing function. It is not at all obvious which set of parameters is the best for any
given application. In many cases the code for one type of pairing cannot be re-used to
implement a bilinear mapping of a different type. The optimal pairing to use depends
not just on the security level, but also on the protocol to be implemented. For maximum
efciency, each implementation must be highly optimized according to its parameters.
This is true especially in the case of constrained embedded devices.
There has been a tremendous amount of work on the realization and efcient imple-
mentation of bilinear pairings on standard computers. Although much research has been
carried out on Pairing-Based Cryptography, very little attention has focused on imple-
menting those operations on resource-constrained devices. Apparently, software imple-
mentations of pairings were considered as too heavyweight for WSN nodes and the ap-
plication of Pairing-Based Cryptography to sensor networks have not been investigated
so far.
This chapter presents the rst in-depth study on the application of pairing-based
cryptography to wireless sensor networks. The rst two sections introduce the mathe-
matics behind bilinear pairings and explain different pairing types. After that the security
parameters of Pairing-Based Cryptography are discussed together with various pairing
algorithms. Finally Micro-pairings is presented which is an efcient implementation of
pairings on a range of sensor network platforms. Micro-pairings was designed in order
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to enable different identity-based cryptography schemes inWSNs. The evaluation results
show that certain pairings can be calculated in a short amount of time, even on the most
constrained sensor devices. Micro-pairings prove that software implementations of pair-
ings are viable in WSNs and can be used to build complete Public Key Cryptography
cryptosystems.
5.1 Mathematical background
The implementation of cryptographic pairings is more complicated than the implementa-
tion of basic Elliptic Curve Cryptography primitives. Hence it is important to introduce
the main mathematical concepts behind Pairing-Based Cryptography. The best known
implementations of bilinear pairings (e.g. Weil pairing) involve fairly complex mathe-
matics. However, most of the pairings can be dealt with abstractly, using only the group
structure and mapping properties. The abstract notation of bilinear maps is sufcient
to build complete Pairing-Based Cryptography security protocols. This section explains
only the basic issues related to pairings. More detailed information on the topic can be
found for example in [83] or [48].
5.1.1 Bilinear pairings
A pairing is a bilinear map between two groups. The Weil or Tate pairings on elliptic
curves are examples of such a map. A bilinear pairing can be dened as follows. Let r
be a positive integer. Let G1 and G2 be additively-written groups of order r with identity
element O, and let GT be a multiplicatively-written group of order r with identity 1.
A bilinear pairing is a computable, non-degenerate function
e : G1 £G2 ! GT : (5.1)
The map must satisfy the following three properties:
Bilinear: We can say that a map e : G1 £G2 ! GT is bilinear if
e(aP; bQ) = e(P; bQ)a = e(aP;Q)b = e(P;Q)ab (5.2)
for all P 2 G1, Q 2 G2 and all a; b 2 Zr.
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Non-degenerate: For a given point Q 2 G1, e^(Q;R) = 1 is the identity element in GT for
all R 2 G1 if and only if Q is an identity element in G1. From this and bilinearity,
we can nd that if P is a generator1 of G1, then e^(P; P ) is a generator of GT .
Computable: There is an efcient algorithm to compute e(P;Q) for any P 2 G1 and any
Q 2 G2.
In practice, the groupsG1 andG2 are implemented using a group of points on certain
special elliptic curves and the group GT is implemented using a multiplicative subgroup
of an extension of the underlying nite eld. For certain families of supersingular elliptic
curves we have G1 = G2.
Most of the pairing applications rely on the hardness of the following problem for
their security [48]: given P , aP , bP , and cP for some a; b; c 2 Zq, compute:
e(P; P )abc: (5.3)
This computational problem is known as the Bilinear Dife-Hellman Problem (BDHP).
The hardness of the BDHP depends on the hardness of the Dife-Hellman problems
(DHP) both on E(Fq) and in Fqk . The DHP on E(Fq) is a problem of calculating abP
when P , aP and bP are given for some values a; b 2 Zr. If the DHP in G1 can be ef-
ciently solved, then one could solve an instance of the BDHP by computing abP and then
e(abP; cP ) = e(P; P )abc. Therefore the main hard assumption in Pairing-Based Cryptog-
raphy is considered to be just as hard as the DHP in G1 and GT .
The most important parameters in Pairing-Based Cryptography are the base eld size
q, the group size r and the embedding degree k. A subgroup G of E(Fq) is said to have
an embedding degree k with respect to r if k is the smallest integer such that r j qk ¡ 1.
Embedding degree is an important parameter in pairing based cryptography, which de-
cides on the security of the whole system. This parameter is often denoted as the security
multiplier. In general k has to be small for the pairing implementation to be practical.
5.1.2 Pairing types
The properties of a particular pairing depends on the selected groups G1;G2;GT . In gen-
eral pairings can be divided into three basic groups [49]:
1element P is a generator of the group when written multiplicatively, every element of the group is a
power of P (a multiple of P when the notation is additive).
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² Type 1 pairing where G1 = G2;
² Type 2 pairing where G1 6= G2 but there is an efciently computable homomor-
phism Á : G2 ! G1;
² Type 3 pairing where G1 6= G2 and there are no efciently computable homomor-
phisms between G1 and G2.
Each pairing type has slightly different properties. It is not possible to simultaneously
have all the frequently-used properties using just one type of pairing. The distinction into
types is relevant for the design of cryptographic schemes. Some protocols are more suited
to particular types of pairings. In practice, Type 2 pairings (denoted as ·e(P;Q)) are not
very useful, because it is not possible to hash efciently onto elements in the groupG2. In
addition, P and Qmust be manipulated as points over the full extension eld Fqk . These
features makes Type 1 and 3 pairings preferred over Type 2 pairings.
From the implementation point of view, Type 1 pairings exist only on supersingular
elliptic curves (see Section 4.1.1.1). For all supersingular curves, the embedding degree
is one of the values k = f1; 2; 3; 4; 6g. If the supersingular curve is dened over a prime
eld Fq with q > 3, then k = 1 or k = 2. All supersingular elliptic curves with k = 4
are dened over characteristic two nite elds, while those with k = 6 are dened over
characteristic three nite elds. The choice of k is very restricted on supersingular curves,
and limits the number of possible pairing-friendly curves.
On supersingular curves, G1 = G2 and a distortion map ª exists which maps a point
from E(Fq) to E(Fqk). Hence, a Type 1 pairing can be dened as e^(P;Q) = e(P;ª(Q)),
where P and Q belong to the curve E(Fq). For Type 1 pairings, P and Q are linearly
dependent, but P and ª(Q) are not, hence e^(P; P ) 6= 1. Such pairing have also an addi-
tional property of symmetry, namely e^(P;Q) = e^(Q;P ). When Q = xP , then e^(P;Q) =
e^(P; xP ) = e^(P; P )x = e^(xP; P ) = e^(Q;P ). This is a useful property that can be used to
simplify security protocols.
There is an alternative to the supersingular elliptic curves, with their limited choice of
embedding degree k. Special families of non-supersingular elliptic curves E(Fp) can also
be pairing-friendly. The condition for being pairing-friendly with an embedding degree
of k, is that k is the smallest positive integer such that rj(pk¡1), and there is no reason that
non-supersingular curves cannot be found to meet this condition. Pairings evaluated on
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such curves belong to Type 3 pairings. One of the features of non-supersingular curves is
that they do not support the distortion map ª. Hence all Type 3 pairings do not have the
property of symmetry, e(P;Q) 6= e(Q;P ). In e(P;Q) point P can be dened on E(Fp) but
Q cannot be set on the same curve. The best that can be done is to put Q on a lower order
twisted curve namely E0(Fpk=w), where w is at least 2 for even k. Despite this inconve-
nience, Type 3 pairings can be still used to build complete pairing-based cryptosystems.
For most non-supersingular elliptic curves, the embedding degree k is large and k ¼
r. Hence it is not possible to nd suitable pairing-friendly curves by random selection.
Fortunately, there are techniques that allow generation of ordinary elliptic curves with
low embedding degree. All these techniques are based on the complex multiplication
method [87]. In [90] Miyaji, Nakabayashi and Takano used the complex multiplication
method to generate MNT curves of low embedding degree where k = f2; 4; 6g. In 2005,
Barreto and Naehrig (BN) [9] discovered a method for constructing elliptic curves E of
prime order ` over prime elds Fp with embedding degree k = 12. Finally, Cocks and
Pinch [48] described a method for generating elliptic curves for any embedding degree.
However, one downside of this method is that curves have p ¼ r2, which results in a
large base eld Fp. There are also many other families of ordinary elliptic curves that are
suitable for Pairing-Based Cryptography and it is not difcult to nd curves that match
particular security levels. A comprehensive taxonomy of pairing friendly elliptic curves
can be found in [47].
5.1.3 Pairing algorithms
There is only one known setting for cryptographically useful bilinear maps, namely el-
liptic curves with an efciently computable Weil or Tate pairing. It has been shown that
the Tate pairing is simpler and more efcient then the Weil pairing [48]. Therefore this
chapter is focused only on implementing the Tate pairing on embedded devices.
The Tate pairing, denoted e(P;Q), where the points P andQ are linearly independent
points on an elliptic curve E(Fqk), evaluates as an element of an extension eld Fqk . If P
is of prime order r, then the pairing evaluates as an element of order r. The Tate pairing
can be calculated using different algorithms. The most basic one is Miller's algorithm [89]
(see Algorithm 7).
Miller's algorithm consists of two parts: the main loop and the nal exponentiation.
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Algorithm 7 Computation of e(P;Q)with Miller's algorithm
INPUT: Q 2 E(Fqk), P 2 E(Fqk), where P has order r with r = (rt; : : : ; r0)2 and t =
blog2 rc ¡ 1
OUTPUT: e(P;Q)
1: T Ã P , f Ã 1
2: for iÃ t downto 0 do
3: f Ã f2 ¢ lT;T (Q)v2T (Q)
4: T Ã 2T
5: if ri = 1 then
6: f Ã f ¢ lT;P (Q)vT+P (Q)
7: T Ã T + P
8: end if
9: end for
10: f Ã f (qk¡1)=r
11: return f
During the main loop, point P is multiplied by its group order r using a classic double-
and-add line-and-tangent algorithm. The l function denotes a line through point T or
points T and P . The v function marks a vertical line through point 2T or point T +P . The
values of the line and vertical functions lT;P (Q) and vT+P (Q) respectively, are distances
calculated between the xed point Q and the lines that arise when adding P to T on the
elliptic curve in the standard way. If the point T has coordinates (xj ; yj), the point T + P
has coordinates (xj + 1; yj + 1), the point Q has the coordinates (xQ; yQ), and the line
through T and P has a slope of ¸j , hence:
lT;P (Q) = (yQ ¡ yj)¡ ¸j(xQ ¡ xj) (5.4)
vT+P (Q) = (xQ ¡ xj+1) (5.5)
Equations 5.4 and 5.5 use afne coordinates, although in most cases projective co-
ordinates achieve better performance. Algorithm 7 may fail if one of the intermediate
lines l passes directly through Q or a vertical function v evaluates as zero. Therefore P
and Q should not be chosen at random. However, this is not a concern in most pairing-
based protocols, because P and Q are usually chosen as P 2 E(Fq) and Q 2 E(Fqk).
Miller's algorithm hasO(log r) iterations, each requiring a constant number of arithmetic
operations in Fqk . In order to implement it efciently on embedded devices, several opti-
mizations need to be applied.
One of the basic optimizations to Algorithm 7 is to choose r to have a low Hamming
weight. In this way the execution of operations in lines 6 and 7 will be limited. In some
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cases (e.g. for the MNT curves) the choice of a low Hamming weight order may not be
practical, in which case the optimal strategy might be to represent r in a NAF format, and
use a standard windowed NAF method (similar to Algorithm 5). Further optimizations
can be applied in case of particular pairing types.
5.1.3.1 Type 3 pairing optimizations
In the case of non-supersingular elliptic curves of prime characteristic (q = p), the em-
bedding degree k is always chosen to be even. For even values of k, the extension eld
Fpk is built as a quadratic extension on top of an implementation of Fpd where k = 2d.
In this case the exponent in the nal exponentiation can be written as (pk ¡ 1)=r =
(pd¡1)[(pd+1)=r]. Elements in Fpk can be represented as w = a+ ibwhere a; b 2 Fpd . The
conjugate of w is equal to ¹w = a¡ ib. From the Frobenius endomorphism one can derive:
(a+ ib)p
d
= (a¡ ib) and (1=(a+ ib))pd¡1 = (a¡ ib)pd¡1 (5.6)
The above property can be used to eliminate the extension eld divisions in the main
loop of Algorithm 7 (line 3 and 6). The output of the main loop in Type 3 pairings has
to be raised to the power of pd ¡ 1. However, based on equation 5.6, after raising to the
power of pd ¡ 1, the inverse and the conjugate give the same result. Hence it is possible
to replace expensive divisions by v2T (Q) and vT+P (Q) with cheaper multiplications by
conjugates ¹v2T (Q) and ¹vT+P (Q).
Algorithm 7 can be further optimized by appropriate selection of point Q. Point Q =
(xQ; yQ) is dened on E(Fpk), where xQ = a+ ib and yQ = c+ id with a; b; c; d 2 Fpd . By
selecting b = c = 0 the functions ¹v2T (Q), ¹vT+P (Q) evaluate as elements in the eld Fpd .
These functions are eliminated by the nal exponentiation, which always includes pd¡ 1
as a factor of the exponent. This optimization is known as the denominator elimination
technique [8].
Another optimization can be applied because of the group order r, which is always
odd. In this case the last iteration of the main loop in Algorithm 7, always contains r0 = 1.
However, the last point addition results in a line value which is always eliminated by the
nal exponentiation. Hence this last step can be omitted. The nal exponentiation itself
can be also simplied. In many cases the exponent pd + 1 can be further factored. For
example p3 + 1 = (p+ 1)(p2 ¡ p+ 1), where p2 ¡ p+ 1 is the sixth cyclotomic polynomial
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©6(p). Based on the above factoring, the nal exponentiation can be broken down into
three parts: easy exponentiations to the power of pd ¡ 1 and (pd + 1)=©k(p) and more
expensive exponentiation to the power of ©k(p)=r. All the above modications lead to
Algorithm 8 (based on [107]).
Algorithm 8 Optimized algorithm for computation of e(P;Q)
INPUT: Q 2 E0(Fpd), P 2 E(Fp), where P has order r
OUTPUT: e(P;Q)
1: T Ã P , f Ã 1
2: sÃ blog2(r ¡ 1)c
3: for iÃ s¡ 1 downto 0 do
4: f Ã f2 ¢ lT;T (Q)
5: T Ã 2T
6: if si = 1 then
7: f Ã f ¢ lT;P (Q)
8: T Ã T + P
9: end if
10: end for
11: f Ã f (pd¡1)
12: f Ã f (pd+1)=©k(p)
13: f Ã f©k(p)=r
14: return f
In some Pairing-Based Cryptography protocols the rst parameter to the pairing,
point P , may be a xed public value or a xed private key. If P is xed, then all of the
T values (which are multiples of P ) can be precomputed and stored in memory to accel-
erate the calculation of e(P;Q). In this situation, it is preferable to use afne coordinates
for all the points. This approach, however, requires a lot of space for precomputed val-
ues and should be applied only on embedded devices with a large amount of available
memory.
Additional useful optimizations of Type 3 pairings can be applied when particular
pairing-friendly curves are chosen. For example, when using BN [9] or MNT [90] curves,
the parameter w is always greater than one. In these cases it is possible to use a truncated
loop variant of the Tate pairing, which is called the Ate pairing [61]. This method is very
similar to Algorithm 8, but this time points P and Q change sides. Now P is on the
twisted curve (P 2 E0(Fpd)) and Q is on the curve over the base eld (Q 2 E(Fp)). In this
setting themain loop of Algorithm 8 can be truncated by a factor ofw and a viable pairing
can still be calculated. For example, for the BN curves, the loop has half the number of
iterations than in Algorithm 8. The fact that P is over the extension eld, introduces extra
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computation when evaluating subsequent values of T . This, however, can be offset if the
point P is xed and by using the precomputation technique described earlier.
5.1.3.2 Type 1 pairing optimizations
Type 1 pairings can be evaluated only on supersingular elliptic curves. It has been shown
that supersingular curves lead to some of the most efcient pairing implementations in
terms of processing speed and bandwidth requirements [7], [8]. These features make this
type of pairing especially attractive for low power environments like wireless sensor net-
works where available resources are very constrained. One drawback of supersingular
curves is the limited choice of embedding degree k, which limits the range of security
levels that can be efciently achieved.
For the supersingular curves of low characteristic, the basic Miller algorithm can be
drastically simplied by integrating the distortion map (ª), the point multiplication, and
the Frobenius endomorphism directly into the main loop. The fastest known method to
compute pairings on supersingular curves is called the ´T pairing [7]. This pairing can be
evaluated very efciently, especially in elds of characteristic 2. For the ´T pairing, the
main loop is truncated to half the length of the related ´ pairing (which is in turn closely
related to the Tate pairing), and the nal exponentiation cost is small.
If q = 2m, then on a supersingular elliptic curve E(Fq), the Tate pairing e(P;Q) eval-
uates as an element in Fqk , where in this case k is equal to 4. The parameters P and Q
are points of order r on the curve, where for the supersingular curve r is a large prime
divisor of 2m § 2(m+1)=2 + 1. This simple group order can be used to optimize the nal
exponentiation operation. On a supersingular y2 + y = x3 + x+B curve over F2m where
B 2 f0; 1g andm = 3 mod 8, the ´T pairing can be calculated using Algorithm 9.
Algorithm 9 (based on [7]) presents an optimized scheme for the calculation of the
´T pairing. Pairs (xP ; yP ) and (xQ; yQ) are the coordinates of points P and Q represented
as binary polynomials in F2m . Values f and g are elements evaluated over the extension
eld F24m and they can be efciently represented as polynomials with four coefcients in
F2m . Elements s; t 2 F24m can be derived from the distortion map (ª) which is dened as:
ª(x; y) = (x+ s2; y + sx+ t) (5.7)
The above distortion map maps a point from E(F2m) to E(F24m).
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Algorithm 9 Computation of ´T (P;Q) on a y2 + y = x3 + x+B curve over F2m
INPUT: P;Q
OUTPUT: ´T (P;Q)
1: let P = (xP ; yP ), Q = (xQ; yQ)
2: uÃ xP + 1
3: f Ã u ¢ (xP + xQ + 1) + yP + yQ + 1 + (u+ xQ)s+ t
4: for iÃ 1 to (m+ 1)=2 do
5: uÃ xP , xP Ã pxP , yP Ã pyP
6: g Ã u ¢ (xP + xQ) + yP + yQ + xP + (u+ xQ)s+ t
7: f Ã f ¢ g
8: xQ Ã x2Q, yQ Ã y2Q
9: end for
10: return f (2
2m¡1)(2m¡2(m+1)=2+1)
5.2 Pairing-Based Cryptography for WSNs
As mentioned earlier, pairing based cryptography is an emerging trend in cryptography
that is strictly related to Elliptic Curve Cryptography. Although much research has been
carried out on pairings on standard desktop class computers, not much attention has
focused on implementing those complex operations on small and constrained devices.
Pairing-based systems have becomemore andmore popular in Public Key Cryptography
schemes but it may seem that these operations are far too complex to be calculated in
reasonable amount of time on tiny architectures like WSN nodes.
In the literature there are some papers [33], [94] that envisage WSNs as a good ap-
plication space for Pairing-Based Cryptography. However, the publications presented so
far do not specify any implementation details and the viability of Pairing-Based Cryp-
tography in WSNs remains unknown. There are only a few results available which are
related to practical deployments of pairings on sensor nodes. So far the only software
implementation of pairings was presented by Oliveira et al. in [96]. The TinyTate imple-
mentation used TinyECC as the underlying library and targeted the MICAz mote. The
following sections provide details of the above implementation and discuss the security
parameters required to implement pairings on sensor nodes.
5.2.1 Security parameters
The security levels in pairing-based cryptography depends on the value of the embed-
ding degree k. Other important parameters are the group order r and the size of the
underlying nite eld Fq. In general, for most pairing applications the parameters q, r
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and k must satisfy the following security requirements:
1) The group order r must be large enough so that solving the ECDLP in an order-r
subgroup of E(Fq) is infeasible (e.g. using Pollard's ½ algorithm);
2) The embedding degree k should be sufciently large so that solving the DLP in Fqk
is infeasible (e.g. using the index-calculus method).
With the current state-of-the-art in cryptanalysis setting, r as a 160-bit prime guaran-
tees that any attack on the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem will take at least
280 steps. In a similar manner choosing k ¢ log2 q ¼ 1024 sets a limit of minimum 280 steps
for any Discrete Logarithm Problem attack over the extension eld. Such values for k, q
and r guarantee a security level of the equivalent of 80-bits of security in a symmetric
key system. Based on the above conditions, one could use a k = 2 supersingular curve
(r 160 bits) with a 512-bit prime p and an extension eld size of 1024-bits for a security
level of 80-bits. Similar level of security can be also achieved using a k = 6 MNT curve
with a 160-bit prime p and an extension eld size of 960 bits (r also 160-bits long). Both
implementations, however, will have different performance depending on the speed of
arithmetic operations in Fq and Fqk on a given platform.
Table 5.1: Key size comparison in Pairing-Based Cryptography
Symmetric key size Group size (r) Fqk size (k ¢ log2 q) Embedding degree (k)
80 160 960-1280 2-8
128 256 3000-5000 12-18
256 512 12000-18000 24-36
Usually on embedded devices, a smaller size of Fq results in a faster pairing, as arith-
metic operations over large nite elds are very slow on constrained CPU's. On the other
hand, larger values of k require more operations in higher extension elds, which can
be expensive without proper optimizations. In any case, the selection of parameters for
Pairing-Based Cryptography is not straightforward and should be made with a particu-
lar security protocol in mind. Table 5.1 presents a comparison of different security levels
for Pairing-Based Cryptography together with the required security parameters [107].
The security level of 80 bits should be enough for the majority of sensor network applica-
tions. Therefore all the implementations presented in this chapter conform to this level.
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Looking at the values in Table 5.1, it is evident that the efciency of systems using pair-
ings scales more like RSA rather than Elliptic Curve Cryptography. Nevertheless, unique
properties of pairings makes pairing-based protocols more interesting in the context of
sensor networks than the above cryptosystems.
5.2.2 TinyTate
The authors in [96] implemented the Tate pairing on aMICAz sensor node, which embeds
the ATmega128 8-bit CPU. They used the following parameters in their implementation:
Finite eld. The Tate pairing in TinyTate was evaluated over the prime eld Fp. The
choice of the nite eld was motivated by the use of TinyECC as the underlying
library, which only supports operations over Fp. The authors claimed also that the
Discrete Logarithm Problem in prime elds is harder than the Discrete Logarithm
Problem in binary elds.
Curve selection. TinyTate used a supersingular y2 = x3 + x curve over the prime eld
Fp with p is a 256-bit prime.
Coordinate system. Projective coordinates were chosen instead of the afne system to
eliminate the expensive inversion in point addition and doubling operations.
Pairing parameters. The main security parameters were chosen as k = 2, q is a 256 bit
prime and r is a 128 bit prime. For r, a Solinas primewas chosen in order to decrease
the number of point additions in the main loop of Miller's algorithm. The choice of
k = 2 permitted the application of the denominator elimination optimization and
made arithmetic operations in Fqk easier to implement. The security level for the
pairing implementation was relaxed in order to achieve better performance.
Table 5.2 presents the performance evaluation of TinyTate. Although thememory con-
sumption gures are reasonable, the execution time of 30s is signicant for aMICAzmote
with very limited energy resources. The execution time of TinyTate is high especially
given that the parameters used by the authors are below the 80-bit level of security. The
group order r was set to 128 bits and the extension eld size was k ¢ log2 q = 512. Both
values are below the current records for breaking the Discrete Logarithm Problem [73]
and below the security levels presented in Table 5.1. All these features makes TinyTate
unsuitable for practical wireless sensor network applications.
142
Chapter 5: Pairings for Embedded Devices
Table 5.2: TinyTate implementation results
Tate pairing implementation on MICAz
Execution time ROM size RAM size
30.21s 18.384KB 1.831KB
5.3 Micro-pairings: efcient Pairing-BasedCryptography for sen-
sor nodes
The small number of pairing implementations on sensor nodes in the literature indicates
that Pairing-Based Cryptography was considered to be too heavyweight for constrained
devices. However many recent security papers in WSNs propose protocols which use
pairings to secure the communication in sensor networks [33], [94], [126]. The only way
to make such protocols practical is to provide efcient implementations of pairings on
sensor nodes.
This section presents a comprehensive study on the application of parings to sensor
nodes. It describes Micro-pairings which is an efcient implementation of different pair-
ing types on a broad range of sensor platforms. Micro-pairings was designed in order to
make existing and future Pairing-Based Cryptography protocols practical on embedded
devices. The software package targets typical sensor nodes like MICA2/MICAz, Tmote
Sky and Imote2. It can be also easily ported to other sensor nodes. The evaluation results
of Micro-pairings prove that pairings with full-size security parameters are viable on dif-
ferent hardware platforms. It also shows for the rst time that certain pairings can be
calculated quickly and efciently even on small and constrained devices such as MICA2
or Tmote Sky.
5.3.1 Micro-pairings overview
The main idea when developing Micro-pairings was to provide fast implementations
of different pairing algorithms for a broad range of sensor platforms. The key design
choices were performance, high security level and diversity in pairing types. All pairings
were implemented according to the 80-bit security level from Table 5.1. The main task
was to nd the optimal combination of pairing type, domain parameters and arithmetic
routines which gives the best pairing performance on an embedded device. Similar to
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NanoECC, Micro-pairings was optimized for speed and energy efciency rather than
memory utilization. High performance of Micro-pairings was achieved through efcient
implementation of pairing algorithms and fast arithmetic operations over Fp and F2m .
All the pairings implementation presented in this chapter are based on the MIRACL
[109] library, which provides all of the basic tools to perform operations on elliptic curves.
All memory allocation in Micro-pairings was taken directly from the stack. This means
that after the pairing calculation, almost all of the RAM memory could be re-used for
different purposes. The MIRACL library was optimized to work on three completely
different 8, 16 and 32-bit architectures. Each of those processors has specic features that
needed to be exploited in order to achieve maximum efciency.
The code for Micro-pairings was rst developed and tested on simulation environ-
ments of the different processors. For the ATmega128 processor and theMSP430 CPU, the
AVR Studio 4.13 and the IAR EmbeddedWorkbench v4.10 were used respectively. Devel-
opment for the PXA271 processor was performed using the IAR Embedded Workbench
v5.0 for the ARM platform. These user-friendly environments allowed the integration of
the main C code with different assembly routines that accelerated arithmetic operations
on a given CPU. The timings of all the programs could also be estimated with cycle accu-
rate precision using these tools. After initial code testing and simulation, Micro-pairings
was implemented on the MICA2, Tmote Sky and Imote2 nodes. The code was integrated
with the TinyOS operating system in a similar way as it was performed for the NanoECC
library. The overall results of these implementations are described in Section 5.3.4.
5.3.2 Type 1 pairings implementation
As mentioned earlier, Type 1 pairings can be evaluated on supersingular curves. These
curves can be separated into three sub-classes: curves over binary elds (q = 2m with k =
4), curves over elds of characteristic 3 (q = 3m with k = 6) and curves over elds of large
prime characteristic (q = p, p > 3with k = 2). The representation of eld elements in F3m
is not very straightforward on a binary system. The case where k = 2 requires p to have
at least 512 bits (due to security reasons). Arithmetic operations in such a big nite eld
would be very slow on a constrained 8-bit processor. Therefore, the most suitable curve
to implement Type 1 pairings on sensor nodes is the binary curve with the embedding
degree k = 4.
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In order to achieve an adequate security level, the binary eld can be chosen as F2271 .
The equation of the supersingular curve over F2271 is as follows:
y2 + y = x3 + x (5.8)
In this case the number of points on the curve is known to be 2271+2136+1 = 487805¢r
where r is a large prime, large enough to make any Pohlig-Hellman-like attack [58] on
the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem infeasible. The next thing is to consider the
security of the discrete logarithm over F(2271)4 , where it is vulnerable to an index calculus
type of attack. The current state of knowledge of the Discrete Logarithm Problem over
extension elds F2m¢k is not well studied. However, it is believed to be roughly the same
as that of the Discrete Logarithm Problem over F2m , for prime m, where m ¼ 4 ¢ 271 =
1084. In this setting the current record is form = 613 [68], so there is (for now) a relatively
wide margin of safety.
From the previous sections, it is known that the fastest pairing algorithm on super-
singular curves is the ´T pairing [7]. Supersingular curves lead to more efcient imple-
mentations in terms of bandwidth, memory usage and processing speed, hence they are
more suitable for wireless sensor networks. The ´T pairing was implemented according
to Algorithm 9. Elements in the extension eld F24m were represented as polynomials
with 4 coefcients in F2m . So, for example, element b(z) = B3z3 + B2z2 + B1z + B0 in
F24m was represented as a vector [B3; B2; B1; B0]. The elements s; t 2 F24m were equal to
[0; 1; 1; 0] and [0; 0; 1; 0] respectively. Both values were derived from the distortion mapª.
Looking at Algorithm 9, one can see that the most expensive part is the for loop which
needs to be executed (m + 1)=2 times. All the operations inside this loop have to be
optimized in terms of execution speed in order to achieve good performance of the algo-
rithm. The most time-consuming operation inside this loop is the polynomial multipli-
cation, and its implementation has a major impact on the overall execution time of the
´T pairing. In particular, multiplication of F24m values (line 7) is very time-critical, but
consists of multiplications in F2m , which again emphasizes the importance of the base
eld multiplication. Using the Karatsuba method [74] for F24m multiplication, decreases
the number of necessary operations to nine modular multiplications and some additions
which are very cheap in binary elds (just bitwise exclusive-or of the coefcients of the
polynomials). Inside the main loop there are also other important operations like squar-
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Table 5.3: Cost of the ´T pairing on y2 + y = x3 + x curve
ModMuls ModSquares Square roots
Main loop 1904 544 544
Final exp. 114 139 0
ing and calculation of the square root of the eld element. However, these functions are
not as complex as binary polynomial multiplication and when efciently implemented
can be performed much faster.
The last stage of the ´T algorithm is the nal exponentiation. This step is not very time
consuming as it can be performed for the relatively inexpensive cost of (m+ 1)=2 exten-
sion eld squarings, four extension eld multiplications, one extension eld division and
some other cheaper arithmetic operations.
5.3.2.1 Binary eld arithmetic
The total cost of the ´T pairing (m = 271) in terms of basic arithmetic operations is given
in Table 5.3. Additions are not taken into consideration because they are fast in F2m (being
just XOR operations). The key to efcient ´T implementation lies in the performance
of binary polynomial multiplication. Therefore, Micro-pairings used assembly language
routines for all the basic arithmetic operations on binary polynomials.
The binary polynomial multiplication in F2271 was implemented using the optimized
hierarchical method described in Section 3.4.1.1. The optimizations for particular hard-
ware platforms were performed according to Section 3.4.1.1 as well. Other polynomial
arithmetic operations like squaring, reduction and calculation of the square root were
also implemented in assembly language on all three target platforms. Operations like
modular reduction and calculation of the square root were strictly optimized for a spe-
cic form of the irreducible polynomial f(z) = z271+z201+1. Reductionmodulo f(z)was
implemented based on Algorithm 3, and squaring of binary polynomials was performed
as described in Section 3.4.2. Calculation of the square root in F2271 was implemented us-
ing the techniques from Section 3.4.3. Table 5.4 summarizes the performance of the main
arithmetic routines in F2271 on all three target processors. All values are in clock cycles
of a given CPU and the multiplication and squaring routines also include the reduction
operation.
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Table 5.4: Timings in clock cycles for modular arithmetic routines in F2271
Atmega128 MSP430 PXA271
Operation Mul Sqr Sqrt Mul Sqr Sqrt Mul Sqr Sqrt
Assembly 13557 1581 1730 10147 1363 1644 4926 499 546
C code 66271 4711 12021 40666 3667 11212 13183 2375 2496
Decrease 80% 66% 86% 75% 63% 85% 62% 79% 78%
All the gures in Table 5.4 were obtained on simulation environments like AVR Studio
(Atmega128) and IAR Embedded Workbench (MSP430 and PXA271). There were signi-
cant differences for the same optimization levels when different compilers were used (for
example gcc and the IAR compiler). That it is why the same settings for the compilers in
all cases were used. Optimization ag -O0 was set during all simulations, so the results
in Table 5.4 can be directly compared with other implementations no matter which com-
piler is used. Results achieved with the assembly language routines are compared with a
C-only implementation to show the savings in execution time.
As can be seen in Table 5.4, the difference between the standard C code functions and
specially optimized assembly routines is quite signicant. Handcrafted code gave a nice
improvement in execution time on all tested hardware platforms. All the operations tim-
ings were decreased by between 60% and 85%. Square root computation was around four
to seven times faster and, (of the most signicance for the ´T algorithm), polynomial mul-
tiplication improved up to ve times. Field-specic assembly code gives the maximum
speed up for the ´T pairing algorithm. The timings in clock cycles for the ´T pairing to-
gether with memory occupation on all three processors are presented in Table 5.5 and
Table 5.6.
Table 5.5: Performance of the ´T pairing on Atmega128 and MSP430
Atmega128 MSP430
Cycles ROM Stack Cycles ROM Stack
Assembly 19,660,993 47.41KB 3.17KB 14,097,304 23.66KB 4.17KB
C code 80,608,843 41.23KB 3.17KB 50,684,686 23.01KB 4.17KB
Decrease 76% -15% 0% 72% -3% 0%
With the introduction of specially optimized arithmetic routines, Micro-pairings cal-
culate the ´T pairing 65-76% quicker. In the best case (the ATmega128 CPU) the execution
is four times faster than in the case of the C-only implementation. It appears that careful
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Table 5.6: Performance of the ´T pairing on the PXA271
PXA271
Cycles ROM Stack
Assembly 6,002,134 29.55KB 4.12KB
C code 16,974,044 37.24KB 4.12KB
Decrease 65% 20% 0%
optimization of critical routines in assembly language leads to a large performance in-
crease on embedded microcontrollers. Usually on standard desktop computers, savings
of around 20-30% are possible to achieve when using assembly language.
The results presented in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 are especially signicant because in almost
all cases, the same level of memory usage was achieved. The memory requirements for
the ´T pairing on the three platforms tested are reasonable when taking into considera-
tion the complexity of the operations. Stack usage in all implementations remained at the
same level, as assembly routines did not use any additional variables. RAM utilization
may seem high, but the memory is reserved only for the duration of the pairing calcu-
lation. After that, all of that RAM memory is released and can be reused for different
purposes. Stack size values presented in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 were also the peak numbers
during program execution. Average stack utilization was usually 60% of those values.
The increase in memory overhead is considerable only on the ATmega128 platform, but
provides the best performance results. For theMSP430 processor, the 3% increase in ROM
utilization is negligible, as it leads to 72% improvement in execution time. On the PXA271
microcontoller the assembly routines resulted in a 20% decrease in program code.
5.3.3 Type 3 pairings implementation
Type 3 pairings give an attractive alternative to Type 1 pairings with their limited choice
of pairing-friendly curves. Special families of non-supersingular elliptic curvesE(Fp) can
also be pairing friendly, and the Tate pairing now evaluates as an element in Fpk , for
some reasonable value of k. Type 3 pairings have all the properties of Type 1 pairings,
except that of symmetry: e(P;Q) 6= e(P;Q). However, the lack of symmetry is not a
major downfall and Type 3 pairings can also be used in Pairing-Based Cryptography.
From amongst the many possible families of non-supersingular pairing-friendly el-
liptic curves [46], Micro-pairings implements the MNT curve [90] with k = 4:
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y2 = x3 ¡ 3x+B (5.9)
The prime p was chosen to be 160 bits in length, and the number of points on the
curve was 34 ¢ r, where r was a large prime. To be specic:
p = E3F367D542C82027F33DC5F3245769E676A5755D
B = DABC0397E45200C4DF4CF67714DB64EB866BA034
r = 6B455E0A014F1E30EAEF7300BD4BB4258290FC5
Since r is 155 bits in length, there is an adequate resistance to a Pohlig-Hellman type
of attack on the discrete logarithm problem [58], which would require around 278 steps to
succeed. However, the resistance to an index calculus attack [58] is more problematical.
Given that the embedding degree is 4, the number of bits of DLP difculty is 4¢160 = 640.
The current record is 531 bits [73], so again the safety margin is sufcient for the time
being. The level of security here can be considered similar to that for the previously used
supersingular curve, given the current state of knowledge [76].
For the implementation of Type 1 pairings the optimizedMiller's algorithmwas used
(Algorithm 8). However, one additional optimization was applied, which accelerated the
calculation of the nal exponentiation. On a k = 4 MNT curve, the exponent can be
divided into three parts. Using the Frobenius endomorphism, the rst two parts of the
nal exponentiation can be easily calculated. The only hard part is the calculation of f
to the power of (p2 + 1)=34r. The number of points on the base eld curve is equal to
r = p + 1 ¡ t, where t is the trace of Frobenius. Based on this, the nal exponent can be
calculated as (p2 + 1)=34(p+ 1¡ t) = p+ ±, where ± is equal to:
± = (p2 + 1)=(34r)¡ p = F19192168B16C1315D34
Therefore the expensive part of the nal exponentiation can be calculated as fp ¢f ±, which
requires one application of Frobenius endomorphism and a half-length exponentiation.
The nal method for computing the Tate pairing on a k = 4 MNT curve is shown in
Algorithm 10.
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Algorithm 10 Computation of e(P;Q)with Tate pairing
INPUT: Q 2 E0(Fp2), P 2 E(Fp), ±
OUTPUT: e(P;Q)
1: T Ã P , f Ã 1
2: sÃ blog2(r ¡ 1)c
3: for iÃ s¡ 1 downto 0 do
4: f Ã f2 ¢ lT;T (Q)
5: T Ã 2T
6: if si = 1 then
7: f Ã f ¢ lT;P (Q)
8: T Ã T + P
9: end if
10: end for
11: f Ã f (p2¡1)
12: f Ã f34
13: f Ã fp ¢ f ±
14: return f
The line functions lT;T (Q) and lT;P (Q) in Algorithm 10 were calculated according to
equation 5.4. In addition some, ideas, were used from [26] to recycle calculations from
the elliptic curve point doubling and point addition formulas. In effect the calculation of
lines 4 and 5, and lines 7 and 8 were combined. It is important to note that the calculation
of fp is effectively for free, using the Frobenius endomorphism2. So, for example, the cal-
culation of fp
2¡1 requires only two applications of the Frobenius, and a single inversion.
5.3.3.1 Prime eld arithmetic
The most time consuming operation in the calculation of e(P;Q) is the modular multipli-
cation (ModMul), and to a lesser extent modular addition/subtraction (ModAdd). Mod-
ular inversion (ModInv) is expensive, but rare. For maximum efciency Micro-pairings
used the Montgomery representation of numbers modulo p [91], so that modular reduc-
tion required no divisions. The code for multiplication, reduction, addition and subtrac-
tion was in the form of automatically generated loop-unrolled assembly language rou-
tines. For large integer multiplication and squaring, the improved hybrid method was
implemented (see Sections 3.3.2.1 and 3.3.3). The memory for all variables was allocated
from the stack and some effort was made to keep the code size to a minimum by remov-
ing unnecessary functions.
The Tate pairing evaluates as an element of an extension eld Fpk . So for k = 4,
special functions for multiplication, addition, exponentiation and inversion in Fp4 had to
2The Frobenius endomorphism over nite elds can be dened as ©(f) = fp
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be developed. These operations were constructed mainly on the basis of standard base
eld arithmetic primitives. More details about the implementation of these routines can
be found in Section 3.5. The overall cost of the Tate pairing in terms of the basic arithmetic
operations is given in Table 5.7.
Table 5.7: Cost of the Tate pairing on MNT k = 4 curve
ModMul ModAdd ModInv
Main loop 5730 15006 2
Final exp. 571 2642 1
Type 3 pairing implementations were tested in the same simulation environments as
Type 1 pairings. A summary of results for nite eld arithmetic over Fp, assuming 160-bit
integers can be found in Table 5.8. The number of clock cycles for modular addition was
taken as an average value because the reduction step was not always executed. Modular
multiplication of big integers was the most important operation that had a big inuence
on the overall pairing performance. This was also the most time-critical routine because it
was repeated over 6000 times throughout the pairing calculation. Modular inversion was
the most expensive arithmetic operation on all embedded platforms, but luckily it had to
be performed only three times during the pairing calculation. When looking at the results
in Table 5.8, the differences between assembly language and C-only implementations are
apparent. Modular multiplication improved up to three times and other operations like
modular addition and modular inversion were also quicker. On the Atmega128 the im-
proved hybrid multiplication with column size d = 4, gave a times three improvement,
whereas on the MSP430, the same method with d = 2 was more than twice as fast as
the standard multiplication technique. In the case of the PXA271 differences in timings
between assembly language and C routines were not as signicant as they were for other
platforms. That is mainly because the ARM architecture was designed from the begin-
ning for fast integer arithmetic operations and there is not much space for improvements
when using hand-crafted assembly code. Despite that, Micro-pairings still achieved a
42% improvement in execution time for modular multiplication on the PXA271 proces-
sor.
Tables 5.9 and 5.10 present the overall results for the calculation of the Tate pairing
on different embedded processors. The introduction of assembly language routines gave
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Table 5.8: Timings in clock cycles for modular arithmetic routines in Fp using 160-bit integers
Atmega128 MSP430 PXA271
Operation Mul Add Inv Mul Add Inv Mul Add Inv
Assembly 7547 404 364291 4734 386 229724 843 155 49223
C code 22493 596 419812 11148 533 269768 1463 200 53318
Decrease 66% 32% 13% 57% 27% 15% 42% 22% 8%
up to 62% reduction in the total execution time of the pairing. However, the timings for
the Tate pairing calculation were signicantly slower than for the ´T algorithm on all
processors. On the PXA271, an improvement of 36% was achieved, which proves that
integer arithmetic can be very efciently executed on an ARM-based machine with 32-
bit processing, even without the use of assembly language routines. The results from
Tables 5.9 and 5.10 prove that eld-specic assembly language code gives the maximum
speedup for the Tate pairing algorithm.
Memory usage is sometimes equally important as execution time and this is certainly
the case for small and constrained embedded devices like sensor nodes. Tables 5.9 and
5.10 show the memory overhead of all Tate pairing implementations. In all cases the code
size was decreased with the introduction of assembly language implementations. On the
Atmega128 processor, the optimized pairing implementation saved over 30KB in com-
parison with the standard C version. Memory usage results were also satisfactory on the
MSP430 CPU, where 10KB of program space were saved. This achievement is especially
important for theMSP430F1611 platformwhere only 48KB of ROM are available. Despite
these optimization efforts, the memory overhead for the Tate pairing was still quite sig-
nicant on these devices. Looking from the memory point of view, the ´T pairing should
be recommended over the standard Tate pairing on the most limited WSN platforms.
Table 5.9: Performance of the Tate pairing on Atmega128 and MSP430
Atmega128 MSP430
Cycles ROM Stack Cycles ROM Stack
Assembly 54,800,077 60.91KB 3.39KB 37,739,040 34.88KB 3.39KB
C code 143,888,874 94.41KB 3.39KB 77,411,534 46.15KB 3.39KB
Decrease 62% 35% 0% 51% 24% 0%
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Table 5.10: Performance of the Tate pairing on the PXA271
PXA271
Cycles ROM Stack
Assembly 8,055,473 44.40KB 3.75KB
C code 12,573,931 51.50KB 3.75KB
Decrease 36% 14% 0%
5.3.3.2 The Ate pairing
In order to compare different pairing algorithms on non-supersingular elliptic curves, the
Ate pairing [61] was implemented on the Atmega128 and MSP430 processors. The Ate
pairing is briey described in Section 5.1.3.1 and is the counterpart of the ´ pairing for
ordinary curves. This pairing has a truncated main loop (similar to the ´T pairing) where
the number of loop iterations is smaller than r. The Ate pairing can be calculated with
Algorithm 11 (based on [107]).
Algorithm 11 Computation of e(P;Q)with Ate pairing
INPUT: P 2 E0(Fpd), Q 2 E(Fp), t is the trace of Frobenius
OUTPUT: e(P;Q)
1: T Ã P , f Ã 1
2: sÃ blog2(t¡ 1)c
3: for iÃ s¡ 1 downto 0 do
4: f Ã f2 ¢ lT;T (Q)
5: T Ã 2T
6: if si = 1 then
7: f Ã f ¢ lT;P (Q)
8: T Ã T + P
9: end if
10: end for
11: f Ã f (pd¡1)
12: f Ã f (pd+1)=©k(p)
13: f Ã f©k(p)=r
14: return f
On the MSP430 platform, the method was implemented according to Algorithm 11,
but on the Atmega128 more program space was available and the multiplies of point P
were precomputed. In both cases, the parameters were set as k = 4, p a 256-bit prime and
a xed point P on the MNT curve. Table 5.11 shows the performance results of the Ate
pairing on the Atmega128 and MSP430.
As can be seen in Table 5.11, the Ate pairingwas slower than the standard Tate pairing
on both hardware platforms. This was mainly due to the fact that the Ate pairing was
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Table 5.11: Performance of the Ate pairing on Atmega128 and MSP430
Atmega128 MSP430
Cycles ROM Stack Cycles ROM Stack
132,373,604 71.9KB 2.5KB 96,829,440 47.0KB 3.0KB
calculated with larger security parameters. In particular, the nite eld was larger by
almost 100 bits. This makes a large difference in performance especially on constrained
8-bit and 16-bit processors. The Ate pairing also used more memory both in ROM and
RAM. This was due primarily to precomputation data. This fact was especially visible
for the ATmega128 CPU where precomputed values of T took 28KB of a total 71.9KB of
program memory. Precomputation was not applied in the case of the MSP430 processor
due to the 48KB memory limit. Otherwise the pairing program on this platform would
have been a bit faster.
5.3.4 Overall results
The overall results for Micro-pairings, assuming a 7.3828MHz clock rate on the MICA2,
8.192MHz on Tmote Sky and two different clock speeds for Imote2, are presented in
Tables 5.12 and 5.13. As can be seen, the pairing calculation can be performed in as little
as 2.66s on a tiny 8-bit MICA2 mote. The timings for other more powerful devices are
much faster. The ´T pairing over F2271 is the fastest pairing on all target platforms. The
difference is a lot smaller on the Imote2 platformwhere arithmetic operations over Fp can
be executed much more efciently. The program code was also noticeably smaller for the
Type 1 pairing in all cases. These features favour the usage of the ´T pairing, especially
on the two more constrained sensor nodes where available memory is very limited.
Table 5.12: Overall results for pairing implementation over F2m and Fp on MICA2 and Tmote Sky nodes
MICA2 (7.38MHz) Tmote Sky (8.19MHz)
´T Tate Ate ´T Tate Ate
Timing 2.66s 7.43s 17.93s 1.71s 4.61s 11.82s
ROM 47.4KB 60.9KB 71.9KB 23.7KB 34.9KB 47.0KB
RAM 3.1KB 3.3KB 2.5KB 4.1KB 3.3KB 3.0KB
Current draw 7.86mA 7.88mA 7.88mA 3.45mA 3.68mA 3.68mA
Energy usage 62.73mJ 175.65mJ 423.87mJ 17.70mJ 50.89mJ 130.49mJ
The energy consumption of Micro-pairings was also calculated on all three platforms.
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An experimental setup was used for the MICA2 and the Tmote Sky motes to measure
the current drawn from the batteries (see Appendix A) during the example programs
execution. In the case of the Imote2 platform, the energy consumption values were taken
from the manufacturer data sheet [29]. As can be seen in Tables 5.12 and 5.13, the ´T
pairing was the most efcient in terms of energy consumption on all devices. Due to
faster computation time and the use of power management unit, the total energy usage
for ´T pairing on Imote2 was the lowest among all the platforms. According to the Imote2
data sheet [29], the core voltage on Imote2 is only 0.85V when clocked at 13MHz with
the radio transceiver turned off. The Tmote Sky node was also very efcient in terms of
energy consumption. The Imote2 was surprisingly the most energy efcient device even
though it was the most powerful of the test platforms. All calculations on Imote2 can
be signicantly accelerated with an increase of the clock speed to 104MHz. According to
the current draw values in [29], switching the clock speed to 104MHz decreases the total
energy consumption during the pairing calculation.
Table 5.13: Overall results for pairing implementation over F2m and Fp on Imote2 node
Imote2 (13MHz) Imote2 (104MHz)
´T Tate ´T Tate
Timing 0.46s 0.62s 0.06s 0.08s
ROM 29.55KB 44.40KB 29.55KB 44.40KB
RAM 4.12KB 3.75KB 4.12KB 3.75KB
Current draw 31mA* 31mA* 66mA* 66mA*
Energy usage 12.12mJ 16.34mJ 3.76mJ 5.02mJ
* - manufacturer data
Figure 5.1: Pairing timings comparison on MICA2 and Tmote Sky
The pairings implementations presented in this chapter are the fastest yet reported on
all three sensor network platforms. Figure 5.1 shows a comparison of execution time of
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different pairing implementations on low-end sensor nodes. The Tate pairing on MICA2
in Micro-pairings takes only 7.43 seconds to complete when clocked at 7.3828MHz. This
compares very favourably with the timing of TinyTate [96] (30.21s). The improvement in
pairing calculation is even more evident in the case of the ´T algorithm. On the MICA2
mote, the ´T pairing can be calculated in only 2.66s. This is around eleven times faster
than TinyTate. The timings for Tmote Sky are not compared with the related work as
there are no other pairing implementations available on that platform.
The energy consumption of different pairing algorithms is compared in Figure 5.2. As
can be seen the Micro-pairings implementation is the most efcient on both the MICA2
and the Tmote Sky. In the best case on MICA2, the ´T pairing uses 91% less energy than
the Tate pairing in [96]. The difference is pretty signicant, especially when the mote's
limited energy resources are taken into consideration. The Tmote Sky platform is more
efcient in terms of energy consumption thanMICA2, while calculating the same pairing
types.
On the MICA2 platform, the TinyTate implementation has the smallest memory foot-
print, but at the same time offers a limited security level with much smaller parameters
that are considered as insecure in today's security systems. On the Tmote sky node, the
´T pairing is the most efcient algorithm in terms of memory consumption. Neverthe-
less, the memory usage is considerable and takes 23.7KB of ROM, which is almost half of
the available memory on the Tmote Sky platform. RAM utilization is similar for all algo-
rithms in Micro-pairings implementation. A comparison of ROM and RAM occupation
for different pairing implementations is illustrated in Figures 5.3 and 5.4.
Figure 5.2: Pairing energy consumption comparison on MICA2 and Tmote Sky
All of the above results show that pairings can be implemented efciently in software
and that they can be calculated in a reasonable amount of time, even on small and con-
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Figure 5.3: Pairing ROM size comparison on MICA2 and Tmote Sky
Figure 5.4: Pairing RAM size comparison on MICA2 and Tmote Sky
strained devices. From the above performance comparisons, it is clear that the ´T pairing
over binary elds gives the best trade-off between speed, energy consumption and mem-
ory occupation. Pairings offers a new and interesting cryptographic primitive that can be
used to design many novel security protocols, andMicro-pairings facilitates the develop-
ment of such mechanisms.
5.4 Pairings implementations in hardware
This chapter is focused on software implementations of pairings for wireless sensor net-
works, but it is also possible to design a hardware unit for computing the pairing. A hard-
ware implementation of pairings for sensor nodes would be several orders of magnitude
quicker and would save a lot of program space, and consume less energy. This would be
especially benecial for very constrained devices with critical amounts of memory. The
main drawback of this approach is that a dedicated hardware accelerator would lift the
total cost of a mote and would complicate its design. This of course, goes against the
low-cost/small size philosophy which is a priority for sensor network devices.
A hardware accelerator for computing the pairing can be implemented on a Field Pro-
grammable Gate Array (FPGA) or can be designed as an Application Specic Integrated
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Circuit (ASIC). Most of the papers in the literature used the rst option, due to exibility
and smaller implementation cost. Shu et al [113] implemented the Tate pairing using the
´ and ´T approach. The second algorithm was faster when implemented on a FPGA, but
at a considerable cost in area of the design. In [103] Ronan et al implemented a dedicated
processor for the Tate pairing on a FPGA using the ´T algorithm. He used a pipelining
technique to improve the latency of the design. This architecture, however, was larger
and slower than the version presented in [113].
In [70] Keller et al designed an interesting hardware unit that could calculate, not only
the Tate pairing, but also the scalar pointmultiplication. The implementation presented in
[70] was based on the optimizedMiller algorithm (Algorithm 8). The authors managed to
achieve a good performance of the hardware accelerator, whilst maintaining a relatively
small area size. There were also a couple of attempts to implement pairings over elds
of characteristic three. Kerins et al [71] used the DuursmaLee algorithm to calculate the
Tate pairing over E(F397) on a FPGA. The authors in [54] also calculated the Tate pairing
in characteristic three, but instead of having a dedicated hardware solution they used a
general purpose processor to control the ALU co-processor. In both papers the authors
achieved results comparable with previous implementations over F2m .
All the above designs were implemented using FPGA's. The obvious constraint of
such an approach is that the hardware accelerator uses a lot more energy than an ASIC.
The above implementations were optimized for speed and area size rather than energy
efciency. Hence they are not directly applicable to low power environments like sen-
sor networks. From hardware accelerators targeted specically at WSNs, McCusker [86]
designed an ASIC for computing the ´ pairing. He focused on energy efciency of the
overall design and was able to calculate the ´ pairing in 1.75ms using 0.08mJ. This imple-
mentation, however, is the only one available that was designed with sensor networks
in mind. Hence the topic of pairings implementation in hardware for sensor netwroks
needs to be further investigated.
Currently there are no pairings hardware accelerators available for off-the-shelf sen-
sor nodes. Hence the developers can only relay on software based solutions. This chapter
presented an extensive study of Pairing-Based Cryptography implementations in soft-
ware and showed their practicality on different hardware platforms. Software implemen-
tations have many advantages, such as exibility, fast development time, and low cost.
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Deploying software-based solutions such as Micro-pairings demonstrates the validity of
Pairing-Based Cryptography in the WSN arena, and should motivate the incorporation
of hardware support for Pairing-Based Cryptography in future mote designs.
5.5 Summary
Bilinear pairing is a exible crypto primitive that can be used to build many interest-
ing security schemes in wireless sensor networks. Pairing-based cryptography is more
complex than methods based on integer factorization and the discrete logarithm. Never-
theless, Pairing-Based Cryptography has paved the way for a new wide range of crypto-
graphic protocols. It has also allowed many long-standing open problems to be solved in
an elegant way. Perhaps the most impressive among those applications is identity-based
encryption, which in turn has allowed complete identity-based cryptographic schemes.
In the literature, many pairing implementations for standard desktop computers are
reported. However, very little attention is focused on implementing those operations
on small embedded devices. Efcient computation of pairings is essential to the large
and ever growing area of pairing-based cryptosystems. Fast pairing implementations on
sensor nodes are necessary to enable different identity-based cryptography schemes in
sensor networks.
This chapter has investigated in detail the application of Pairing-Based Cryptogra-
phy to wireless sensor networks. It presents the mathematical concepts behind crypto-
graphic pairings and discusses various pairing types. It shows also efcient algorithms
for calculating bilinear pairings on different curves and over different nite elds. All this
research resulted in the development of Micro-pairings, which is an efcient implemen-
tation of pairings on a wide range of sensor nodes. Micro-pairings provides the fastest
available pairing implementations on popular sensor nodes. The software package can
also be easily ported to other embedded devices. Micro-pairings was tested on a wide
range of different WSN processors and it showed that pairings can be performed in a
very quick and efcient way, even on the most constrained devices. The results achieved
with Micro-pairings have shown that the ´T pairing over binary elds gives the best per-
formance on all hardware platforms. The ´T pairing is a Type 1 pairing and according to
the achieved results it has a lot better performance than any Type 3 pairing, on different
sensor nodes. Therefore Type 1 pairing is recommended for all low-end architectures. On
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the most constrained 8-bit MICA2 node, the ´T pairing took 2.66s using only 62.73mJ of
energy. This result is comparable with the calculation of the point multiplication opera-
tion on the same platform. The above result is signicant, especially as pairings are con-
sidered far more complex than Elliptic Curve Cryptography primitives. Micro-pairings
goes a step forward to show that Pairing-Based Cryptography can be now used as an
attractive alternative to Elliptic Curve Cryptography in many different security schemes
for wireless sensor networks.
The above study is not only relevant to sensor networks but also to different classes
of embedded systems where energy and computation power are limited. Examples of
those might be ad hoc and other distributed networks where security issues are still open
problems. ARM processors are also used in palmtop class devices and Micro-pairings
can be used to secure mobile systems that are build upon this platform. The efciency of
such security mechanisms would be much greater due to the improved capabilities both
in terms of available memory and processing power.
Software implementations of pairings have some advantages when compared with
hardware solutions. They are more exible and can be quickly implemented on existing
sensor nodes. Hence they allow easy evaluation of new Pairing-Based Cryptography pro-
tocols at lower cost. Micro-pairings provides all the necessary primitives to implement
such protocols on different hardware platforms and thus opens new ways for achieving
security in sensor networks. High performance of pairings over F2m elds makes binary
eld the recommended nite eld for software implementations of Elliptic Curve Cryp-
tography and Pairing-Based Cryptography.
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Identity-Based Security Protocols for
WSNs
I n Section 2.3.4 it was suggested that Identity-Based Cryptography can be used as asolution for the key distribution problem in sensor networks. Section 2.3.5 presents all
of the building blocks that are necessary to make Identity-Based Cryptography protocols
practical in a sensor network environment. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 describes in detail how to
efciently implement thesemodules on constrained sensor nodes. This chapter utilizes all
the information presented in previous chapters to build identity-based security protocols
for sensor networks.
While there is a whole family of security protocols that use identities (IBE, ID-based
signcryption, ID-based signatures, threshold cryptography schemes), the most relevant
ones to sensor networks are key agreement schemes and Identity-Based Encryption. These
schemes cannot be applied directly as a universal solution for the key distribution prob-
lem in sensor networks.Wireless sensor networks can have different networkmodels and
communication patterns, and hence the key distribution mechanism has to be tailored to
a specic network organization. Such an approach allows the designer to minimize the
resource utilization and achieve optimal performance of the network.
Sensor network models can be organized into three broad groups. Based on this divi-
sion, three new key distribution protocols for WSNs are proposed. The rst two investi-
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gate the application of non-interactive key exchange schemes in the at and hierarchical
network scenarios. The last key agrement scheme uses identity-based encryption to se-
cure communication within a heterogeneous sensor network. This chapter also includes
a comprehensive security analysis of all the proposed solutions, together with possible
security threats and defensive measures.
From the implementation point of view, the pairing calculation is the most expen-
sive operation of every Identity-Based Cryptography scheme both in terms of compu-
tational complexity and memory overhead. The implementation of a complete Identity-
Based Cryptography system on sensor devices is quite difcult and expensive in terms
of resources utilization. However, such systems are envisioned mainly as security boot-
strapping mechanisms in sensor networks. For link layer security, cheaper symmetric
key encryption schemes should be used.
6.1 Identity based key distribution
In the literature, there are papers that propose the use of identities to distribute keys in
sensor networks. Many of them [23], [34] are based on symmetric cryptosystems due to
Blundo et al. [17] and Blom [16]. These schemes do not provide perfect resilience, as after
a certain percentage of nodes have been captured, the whole network is compromised.
The authors in [33], [126], [94] envisaged the use of IBE based on pairings as a security
solution in sensor networks. All three papers proposed the Boneh and Franklin identity-
based encryption scheme [18] to distribute keys in the network.
In [126], the Identity-Based Encryption scheme was evaluated through a simulation
on a desktop class computer. The relevance of the results achieved to sensor networks is
not clear, as simulation details were not presented. Doyle et al in [33] showed the energy
consumption results for the Tate pairing calculation on an ARM7 processor. This plat-
form, however, is considerably more powerful than most of the devices that are currently
in use in WSNs. Finally Oliveira et al [94], [96] proposed the Identity-Based Encryption
scheme for sensor networks and presented the Tate pairing implementation gures for
the MICAz mote. Despite all this efforts, none of the above proposals have actually im-
plemented a complete identity-based encryption scheme in a sensor network. Hence, the
feasibility of such a security solution had not yet been proven . In addition, all of the au-
thors proposed the Boneh and Franklin Identity-Based Encryption scheme, which is not
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the most efcient identity-based protocol. Proper security mechanism for WSNs should
consider the network topology and the communication patterns between the nodes. The
Identity-Based Cryptography scheme should be designed for a particular model of a sen-
sor network.
6.1.1 Wireless sensor network models
Figure 6.1:Wireless sensor networks classication
Sensor networks can be organized in different ways. Figure 6.1 presents a broad classi-
cation of wireless sensor network models. In at sensor networks, all nodes play similar
roles and there is no hierarchy between them. All motes participate in sensing, data pro-
cessing and routing. The communication is performed on a peer-to-peer basis in a mesh
type of network (see Figure 6.2).
A at network presents a simple network organization where all the nodes have simi-
lar capabilities and operate using the same software and protocols. Themain communica-
tion pattern is from the sensors to the base station. In such a network topology the nodes
in the closest vicinity of the base station have the highest load and may run out of energy
a lot quicker than the rest of the nodes. In this case, the routing protocol should con-
trol the proper load balancing in the network. In at sensor networks each of the nodes
should be able to establish a secure connection with the majority of remaining nodes.
In hierarchical WSNs the network is typically organized into clusters, with ordinary
cluster members and specially designated cluster heads. While ordinary cluster members
are responsible for sensing, the cluster heads have additional tasks such as aggregating
and processing the data from nodes within their cluster. They are also responsible for
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Figure 6.2: Flat wireless sensor network
forwarding the sensor data to the base station. Hierarchical networks can be divided into
homogeneous and heterogeneous networks. In the former, all devices except the base
station are of the same type and have the same capabilities. Heterogeneous networks
include different kinds of devices where usually the cluster heads are more powerful
than other sensor nodes. In general, hierarchical networks can have more than two levels
of hierarchy. In this case, the cluster heads on one level are treated as ordinary cluster
members by the nodes that are one level up in the hierarchy.
Figure 6.3 illustrates a typical homogeneous sensor network. The whole network is
divided into three clusters each having its own cluster head. All the nodes have similar
capabilities and similar radio range. The nodes join the clusters based on the hop count
to the nearest cluster head. The cluster formation is not usually xed due to the limited
energy resources of ordinary nodes. After a certain amount of time (or processed packets)
new cluster heads must be elected from the remaining sensor nodes. The selection can be
made randomly (like in the LEACHprotocol [60]) or usingmore elaboratemethods. After
a new cluster head election the cluster formation process is repeated. In homogeneous
networks each sensor node must be able to establish a secret key with every other node
within the cluster. In addition cluster heads should have secure connectivity with each
other and the base station.
A Heterogenous Sensor Network (HSN) is a hierarchical WSN that is typically orga-
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Figure 6.3: Homogeneous sensor network
nized into clusters that consists of two types of nodes. More powerful devices (H-sensors)
usually take the role of cluster heads and low-end nodes (L-sensors) become ordinary
cluster members. L-sensors are mainly responsible for sensing, whereas H-sensors per-
form additional tasks such as data collection, information processing and reporting to
the base station. The role of a cluster head is xed in this kind of a network (as oppose to
cluster heads in LEACH [60] based sensor networks). The dominating trafc pattern in
heterogeneous sensor network is many-to-one, where L-sensors send data to their cluster
heads. Hence each L-sensor has to encrypt the data for its cluster head and cluster heads
must be able to securely deliver the information to the base station. Figure 6.4 presents
the cluster formation in a typical heterogeneous.
One of the biggest advantages of sensor networks is their versatility on many fronts.
They can have different number of devices, many conguration modes and various types
of sensors that make them suitable for a wide range of applications. This versatility, how-
ever, is also one of the main challenges in WSNs when it comes to network protocol de-
sign. Sensor networks may be organized in a variety of ways. The above classication
does not include all possible sensor network organizations. There are also other sensor
network models with different topologies. However, the three main groups described
earlier, demonstrate various communication patterns that might be used to optimize the
key distribution mechanisms in each case. A solution designed specically for a at net-
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Figure 6.4: Heterogeneous sensor network
work topology is unlikely to be the right choice in a clustered network scenario. Hence
an optimal solutions should be tailored to a specic network organization. The following
sections present three different key distribution protocols designed specically for the
afore-mentioned network models.
6.2 New approach to key distribution in at WSNs
Key distribution in sensor networks is challenging because the system has to be simple,
energy efcient and at the same time offer a high level of security. One simple approach
for key distribution in at sensor networks would be to issue just one shared bootstrap
crypto key to all nodes. From this initial state, the network could self-organize into groups
which, under cover of the shared key, might then go on to negotiate new group keys
for use in subsequent communication. This solution scales nicely to large networks, and
facilitates the addition of new nodes to the network. However, it does not provide any
kind of node-to-node authentication. Also it fails catastrophically to an active attacker,
who captures just one node during the early deployment stage, and with it the shared
master key. An alternative approach is to issue each node with a list of n ¡ 1 keys, one
for each of the other n¡1 nodes in an n-node network. This does provide authentication,
but it requires a lot of memory, and it is not at all trivial to add new nodes to an existing
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network without recalling existing nodes for a ret.
This section shows that the key distribution problem in at sensor networks can
be addressed by using an identity-based cryptography approach. Using the scheme de-
scribed here, any two nodes in the network can establish a shared symmetric key without
exchanging any messages. This scheme simplies key management in a network by re-
ducing the number of keys required , making the system scalable to large numbers of
nodes. The evaluation results prove that the software implementation of the scheme is
practical on popular sensor platforms and different CPU architectures. Comparison with
the state-of-the-art shows that identity-based key distribution is a superior security solu-
tion for sensor networks with better resistance against known attacks.
6.2.1 Protocol overview
The key agreement scheme for at networks is based on the simple key exchange pro-
cedure that was rst introduced by Sakai, Ohgishi and Kasahara in [106]. The protocol
proposed here is also based on secret key pre-distribution using the secure channel that
exists during the network pre-deployment phase.
6.2.1.1 Pre-deployment phase
The original network deployer takes the role of a trusted authority in the system. It needs
to load secret keys into each node's memory together with all the public parameters.
Initially it generates a master key s which has to be kept secret. It also assigns a unique
identity to each node that will participate in the network. For this purpose it can use
TinyOS or IP addresses (in the case of an IPv6 addressing scheme).
In the next step, the trusted authority calculates each node's private key. This opera-
tion can be performed by the use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography primitives. The publicly
available hash function H , is used to derive a hash value based on the node's identity
NX = H(IDX), where IDX is the identity of node X. TheNX value is then mapped to an
elliptic curve point via a mapping function. The point multiplication operation uses the
master key as a scalar (sNX ). The result of this operation is a node's private key. From
the description of security levels in elliptic curve systems (Section 2.2.1), it is known that
it is not feasible to derive the s value based on sNX , when the size of NX in bits is bigger
than 160. This operation would require the solution of an intractable discrete logarithm
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problem in an elliptic curve setting.
Each node is issued with a single secret key sNX , its identity IDX , hashing function
H , mapping function and a key derivation function that is based on a one-way hash
function. The key derivation function is required to derive the session key of a size that is
suitable for a particular symmetric cipher. All these parameters are preloaded into each
node's memory before the deployment phase.
6.2.1.2 Identity based key agreement
After the setup process, nodes are ready for deployment. During network operation two
nodes A and B that know each other's identities can exchange information in a secure
way without any prior interaction. Node A has a private key sA and node B a key sB.
Both sides can independently obtain the required public keys A and B by calculating
A = H(IDA) and B = H(IDB).
When node A wants to setup a pair-wise session key KA;B with node B, it calculates
the bilinear pairing function e^(sA;B). The Key Derivation Function (KDF) is used to
derive the session key from the calculated pairing value KA;B = KDF (e^(sA;B)). Now
A can use the key KA;B to encrypt the message and send it over the radio channel to B.
Node B receives the message and obtains the decryption key KB;A = KDF (e^(sB;A)) to
read the packet payload. Both A and B will end up with the same key since:
KA;B = KDF (e^(sA;B)) = KDF (e^(A;B)s)
= KDF (e^(A; sB)) = KDF (e^(sB;A)) = KB;A: (6.1)
This follows from the bilinearity and symmetry properties of the pairing function. It
is important to notice that this protocol can only be implemented using a Type 1 pairing,
as the symmetry property is necessary for the key agreement to work.
The above protocol allows two nodes to agree upon a common pair-wise key without
any prior interaction with each other. There is no extra bandwidth overhead associated
with the cryptography. The scheme presents a simple way to bootstrap the security in a
sensor network. However, the above protocol on its own is not sufcient to secure the
network against any given attack. Other security mechanisms (e.g. an intrusion detection
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scheme) might be required as well. The main purpose of this protocol is to provide a
secure and practical key agreement mechanism for at sensor networks that will be a
foundation for other network protocols built on top of it.
6.2.2 Implementation details
The key distribution is performed mainly at the beginning of network operation to estab-
lish session keys with neighbouring nodes, and thus the expensive pairing calculations
are very infrequent. It is also expected that the network will use an energy efcient rout-
ing protocol, which performs load-balancing in the network. In this case, the majority
of nodes will have to perform the key agreement only a few times, when establishing
common keys with the neighbouring nodes.
In elliptic curve systems it is not enough to rely only on large key sizes to provide a
high level of security. Other domain parameters such as the selected curve E and an ap-
propriate nite eld Fq are equally important. All of these parameters should be chosen
so that the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem is resistant to all known attacks.
For the Type 1 pairing over a eld of characteristic two (F2m), the security parameters
should be chosen as k ¢ m > 1024 [76]. These countermeasures would make any index
calculus attack [58] on the Bilinear Dife Hellman Problem infeasible for the time being.
According to the above security policy, a supersingular elliptic curve y2 + y = x3 + x
was chosen over the binary eld F2271 with the embedding degree k = 4. In this case, the
number of points on the curve is known to be 2271 + 2136 + 1 = 487805 ¢ r where r is a
large prime.
In the beginning, the setup process needs to be performed and all the necessary infor-
mation has to be pre-load onto the sensor nodes. The evaluation presented here does not
consider the operations performed by the trusted authority in the pre-deployment phase.
This is done off-line, and so is not time-critical, and it does not have any inuence on the
network performance.
The overall performance of the identity-based key distribution mechanism relies on
the efciency of the pairing calculation e^(P;Q). The ´T pairing [7] is one of the fastest
known pairings that can be evaluated very efciently. It uses a variant of Miller algorithm
to calculate the pairing. One of its advantages is that it only requires half the number
of iterations of the Miller loop compared with typical pairing algorithms. Hence it was
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chosen as the pairing function for the implementation of the key agreement protocol.
The ´T pairing evaluates as an element in the F24¢271 extension eld. The result of this
operation is a 1084-bit value that can be used to calculate the mutual session key. The
key derivation function derives the appropriate key by hashing the pairing result. In the
implementation presented here, a 128-bit session key was used in combination with the
AES block cipher. In general any kind of symmetric algorithm can be used and the key
derivation function should generate a key of an appropriate size for that cipher.
To evaluate the efciency of the scheme, there is a need to consider also the cost of
mapping node identities to elliptic curve points. One viablemethod is to hash the identity
to the x-coordinate, and then solve a quadratic equation to nd y. The following fast
algorithm to solve the quadratic equation y2 + y = c can be used for that purpose (based
on [58]).
Algorithm 12 Solve y2 + y = c (basic version)
INPUT: c =
Pm¡1
i=0 ciz
i 2 F2m where m is odd, trace Tr(c) = 0 and H(zi) is a half-trace
function
OUTPUT: A solution s of y2 + y = c
1: PrecomputeH(zi) for odd i, 1 · i · m¡ 2
2: sÃ 0
3: for iÃ (m¡ 1)=2 to 1 do
4: if c2i = 1 then do: cÃ c+ zi; sÃ s+ zi
5: end for
6: sÃ s+P(m¡1=2)i=1 c2i¡1H(z2i¡1)
7: return s
When the quadratic equation has no solution, the x value needs to be incremented
and the whole process described in Algorithm 12 needs to be repeated. Otherwise one
of the two solutions for y is selected and the elliptic curve point (x; y) is multiplied by a
large cofactor, to obtain a point of an appropriate order. This point multiplication is the
most expensive operation in the whole ID mapping scheme.
The non-deterministic nature of thismapping operation is a little unsatisfactory. How-
ever, the identities of the nodes are assigned by the network deployer. Hence the trusted
authority might only assign those identities for which the quadratic equation is known
to have a solution, at the negligible cost of adding approximately one bit to the overall
length of the node identities.
In order to check the performance of the key agreement scheme, the whole protocol
was implemented on typical sensor nodes. Three popular hardware platforms used in
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real-life deployments were chosen: the MICAz [30] and Imote2 [29] platforms developed
by Crossbow Technology, and the Tmote Sky node [92] developed byMoteiv corporation.
For the pairing implementation, the Micro-pairings package was used on all hardware
platforms. As the one-way hash function, the popular SHA-1 algorithm was chosen. The
code of the programs was integrated with the TinyOS operating system to measure the
timings for the main protocol operations.
6.2.3 Experimental results and analysis
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 present the evaluation results for all the basic operations that are per-
formed by a single node in the key exchange protocol. The results are summed up at
the bottom of the table to give the total values for the whole key agreement scheme. The
pairing calculation is the most expensive operation in terms of time consumption and
memory utilization on all three platforms. ID mapping also takes a considerable amount
of time to complete. Other operations include setup routines, hashing, and session key
derivation.
Table 6.1: ID-based key agreement evaluation on MICAz and Tmote Sky.
Operation MICAz (7.38MHz) Tmote Sky (8.19MHz)
Time ROM Energy Time ROM Energy
Pairing 2.66s 47.41KB 62.73mJ 1.71s 23.66KB 17.70mJ
ID mapping 1.55s 0.72KB 36.55mJ 1.07s 0.48KB 11.07mJ
Other 29ms 2.78KB 0.68mJ 19ms 1.81KB 0.20mJ
Total 4.27s 50.91KB 99.96mJ 2.80s 25.95KB 28.97mJ
Table 6.2: ID-based key agreement evaluation on the Imote2 node.
Operation Imote2 (13MHz)
Time ROM Energy
Pairing 0.46s 29.55KB 12.12mJ
ID mapping 0.19s 0.66KB 5.01mJ
Other 3.4ms 2.23KB 90¹J
Total 0.65s 32.44KB 17.22mJ
The fact that the implementation was set for a xed eld size (F2271) permits us to
greatly optimize the code. Software implementation was performed using C, nesC and
assembly language. Assembly language was used only to accelerate the most time crit-
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ical arithmetic routines (in particular binary polynomial multiplication). The whole key
agreement takes as little as 0.65s on the Imote2 and 4.27s in the worst case on the most
constrained MICAz mote. All of the results presented in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 assume a
7.38MHz clock rate on the MICAz, 8.192MHz on the Tmote Sky and 13MHz on the
Imote2. The timings for the key agreement protocol are acceptable because the key ex-
change is performed very rarely during the network operation.
Figure 6.5: Execution time comparison for different key agreement schemes.
Figure 6.5 shows how the Identity-Based Cryptography scheme performs against the
state-of-the-art. For comparison, the TinyPK scheme [120] and the TinyECC [80] library
were chosen. The rst method implements the Dife-Hellman key exchange (DH) on the
MICA2 platform (the MICAz mote has the same CPU). The second one uses a cong-
urable Elliptic Curve Cryptography library for sensor networks. This library implements
the Elliptic Curve Dife-Hellman key exchange protocol (ECDH) on a broad range of
sensor devices. In case of TinyPK, nwas a 512 bit prime, and x, y were 112-bit exponents
(see Figure 2.6 for an explanation). TinyECC had all the optimization switches enabled
and was congured for maximum speed and computational efciency. Figure 6.5 shows
that the traditional Dife-Hellman key exchange is the slowest method requiring, 22s,
even though its security level is a lot lower than for other solutions. This is due to the
fact that modular exponentiation is very expensive on 8-bit architectures, especially with
a large modulus.
The timings for the Identity-Based Cryptography scheme are comparable with the
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TinyECC implementation of the Elliptic Curve Dife-Hellman protocol. However the
performance of the TinyECC is actually worse due to the fact that it operates over a 160-
bit nite eld compared to the 271-bit required in the identity-based scheme. In addition
the Elliptic Curve Dife-Hellman key exchange in [80] is not authenticated, like the key
agreement scheme proposed here. It requires also an exchange of information before the
joint key can be established. The Identity-Based Cryptography scheme presented here
works in a non-interactive manner, which is especially benecial in large distributed net-
works.
One of the most important issues for sensor devices is efcient memory utilization.
Looking at the numbers in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 one can notice that the pairing calculation
takes a signicant amount of ROM on all platforms. This is mainly due to the large size of
the Elliptic Curve Cryptography library (more than 40KB on theMICAz, around 20KB on
the Tmote Sky and 25KB on the Imote2). The code needed to perform point multiplication
for IDmapping is also included in this library. Nevertheless further improvements to the
code size on all platforms are possible through manual removal of unnecessary library
functions.
Figure 6.6: Energy consumption comparison for different key agreement schemes.
The energy consumption of the Identity-Based Cryptography key agreement was also
evaluated. According to Table 6.1, the Tmote Sky node is far more efcient in terms of
energy consumption than the MICAz platform. The Imote2 uses even less energy thanks
to its low power operation mode (31mA at 13MHz). Assuming two new AA alkaline
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batteries with 2850mAh capacity, around 0.6 million key agreement operations can be
performed on the MICAz mote. Using the same energy, the Tmote Sky can calculate
more than 2 million shared keys.
Figure 6.6 presents the energy consumption of different key agreement schemes. The
TinyPK uses around 520mJ during the Dife-Hellman key exchange. The TinyECC and
the Identity-Based Cryptography scheme are more efcient and use ve times less en-
ergy. This result is quite reasonable, especially given that key exchange operations are
not very frequent in a static sensor network environment. The values in Figure 6.6 relate
only to CPU usage and do not include the communication overhead. The actual energy
consumption for the Dife-Hellman and Ellioptic Curve Dife-Hellman schemes would
be higher due to packet transmission and reception. The ID-based key agreement scheme
does not require any information exchange and can save energy on expensive radio com-
munication.
6.3 A novel key distribution technique for cluster-based WSNs
In a clustered sensor network scenario, each cluster head acts like a sink for data. All
nodes within the cluster send the sensor readings directly to their cluster head. It is envis-
aged that most nodes act as sources of information, most of the time, and that relatively
few would be sinks (cluster heads). The task of the cluster head is to aggregate the data
from the cluster and send it to the base station in an appropriate form. As mentioned
earlier, in a homogeneous sensor network, all nodes have similar capabilities and same
energy resources. Hence, the role of a data collator should be passed around, to equalize
the energy consumption of nodes in the network. Many routing algorithms for sensor
networks (e.g [60], [79]) use such clustering and data aggregation techniques.
One of the main problems in wireless sensor network is that the networks are often
deployed over wide areas, which in many cases are open to the public. This environment
poses a threat of physical node capture. Typical low-cost devices will not have secure
storage for cryptographic keys or tamperproof hardware. If a node is captured by an
attacker, its secrets can be extracted, and the node converted to meet the needs of its
new owner. A particularly insidious attack is for a subverted node to announce itself as
a data sink, hence collecting data from the network and passing it on to the adversary.
There is not much that can be done to prevent this. One solution to limit the problem
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might be to issue each node with two private keys: a source key and a sink key. A node
whose battery is running low and who is unlikely (due to its low battery or its physical
placement within the network) to be required to operate as a data sink, should then delete
its own sink key. Now the captured node can only operate as a source of data, and so is
likely to be of much less use to the adversary.
A security scheme that uses a pair of private keys can be designed with the help of
identity-based cryptography techniques. This approach leads to a key agreement proto-
col which is authenticated and does not require any interaction between sensor devices.
The following section presents a non-interactive identity-based key agreement scheme
designed specially for hierarchical sensor networks.
6.3.1 Protocol description
The identity-based key agreement protocol for clustered sensor networks should have
similar properties to the scheme proposed for at sensor networks (Section 6.2). It should
also have an additional property of using two private keys during the key exchange oper-
ation. The protocol proposed here is based on the scheme by Dupont and Enge [39]. This
scheme is equivalent to the non-interactive ID-based key exchange proposed by Sakai,
Ohgishi and Kasahara, but uses Type 3 pairings instead. However, on ordinary curves,
due to the loss of symmetry, the scheme is slightly more complicated. The application of
the scheme in sensor networks requires also secret key pre-distribution. For Type 3 pair-
ings, one parameter of the pairing may be a point on E(Fp). The best that can be done for
the other is that it should be a point on E0(Fpd), where d is a divisor of the embedding
degree k, and E0 is some twist of the original elliptic curve.
As in the previous protocol, the trusted authority assigns identities and secrets to each
node. This is performed off-line in a secure environment. The node identities are mapped
to points on the elliptic curve. The node represented by the identity IDA is hashed and
mapped to a point on E(Fp) of order r via Asr = H1(IDA), and to a point on E0(Fpd) via
Ask = H2(IDA). Here H1 and H2 are functions which hash arbitrary strings to points on
the elliptic curves E(Fp) and E0(Fpd) respectively. Node A is then issued with the pair of
secrets sAsr (its source key) and sAsk (its sink key). If a node B is issued with a similar
key pair (sBsr, sBsk), then both parties can calculate a mutual key as:
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KDF (e(sAsr; Bsk) ¢ e(Bsr; sAsk)) = KDF (e(sBsr; Ask) ¢ e(Asr; sBsk)) (6.2)
where nodeA calculates the left-hand-value, and node B calculates the right-hand-value.
They are clearly the same because of bilinearity. It is important to note that there are fast
ways to calculate products of pairings as required here.
As one can notice in equation 6.2, both nodes need to calculate a product of pair-
ings which is more expensive than a single pairing calculation. This calculation might
introduce a large computational overhead especially on the constrained 8 and 16-bit plat-
forms. The extra complication is due to the necessity to restore symmetry to the calcu-
lation and to maintain the non-interactive nature of the protocol. However, if the nodes
can agree that one will use its source key, and the other its sink key, then a mutual key
can be determined in two ways:
KDF (e(sAsr; Bsk)) = KDF (e(Asr; sBsk)) (6.3)
KDF (e(Bsr; sAsk)) = KDF (e(sBsr; Ask)) (6.4)
In the rst case, node A is an ordinary cluster member, whereas node B is the cluster
head. In the second case, both nodes play the opposite roles. An observation from equa-
tions 6.3 and 6.4 is that both sides must use different types of keys to calculate the pairing.
The computation of e(sAsr; Bsr) always equals to one, because both points are linearly
dependent. For the protocol to work, one of the nodes must use its source key and the
other its sink key.
The protocol described here is little bit more complicated than the scheme proposed
for at WSNs. However, it offers some additional protection against node compromise.
The captured node can only operate as a source of data and due to pairing properties
it cannot decrypt the packets that are addressed to other nodes. These features make
such a node far less useful for a possible attacker. The security of the above protocol
is higher in the case when most of the nodes are deployed with source keys, and only
small proportion of devices are sink-enabled. This, however, depends on a particular
application of the sensor network and the clustering scheme.
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6.3.2 Performance evaluation
As mentioned earlier, the key exchange protocol proposed in this section can be imple-
mented using a Type 3 pairing. For implementation purposes, the Tate pairing was cho-
sen over a y2 = x3 ¡ 3x+B MNT pairing-friendly curve with k = 4. For this pairing, the
rst parameter to the pairing can be a point on E(Fp), and the second parameter can be a
point on the quadratic twist E0(Fp2). The parameter p was chosen as a 160-bit prime and
the number of points on the curve was 34 ¢ r, where r denotes a large prime. More details
on the implementation of the Tate pairing together with values of parameters p, r and B
can be found in Section 5.3.3.
In order to map identities to curve points, the method described earlier can be used.
The identity string should be hashed to x and a quadratic equation should be solved
to nd y. Again, only identities that are known to have solutions can be chosen. In this
case the process is a little more time-consuming, requiring the calculation of a modular
square root. Furthermore, there is a requirement to hash identities to points of order r on
E(Fp), which requires a multiplication by the cofactor 34. For the second parameter to
the pairing, a multiplication by a larger cofactor would be necessary to map to a point of
order r on E0(Fp2). However, a certain property of the Tate pairing can be utilized here
to simplify the calculations. In the original Tate pairing, the second parameter need not
be of order r for bilinearity to hold, and so this potentially expensive operation can be
avoided [107]. This makes the cost of mapping identities to elliptic curve points similar
to the cost of the same operation in the protocol from Section 6.2. The above optimization
makes the Tate pairing more suitable in this protocol than the Ate pairing (which requires
the rst parameter on E0(Fp2) of order r).
The performance evaluation of the proposed key agreement scheme was performed
in exactly the same way as in case of the previous protocol. The same three hardware
platforms were used: MICAz, Tmote Sky and Imote2. Pairings were implemented using
Micro-pairings and functions H1 and H2 were based on the SHA-1 algorithm.
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 present the total results for the key agreement protocol in clustered-
base sensor networks. As in the previous protocol, the pairing calculation is the most
expensive operation on all the platforms. However, the use of a Type 3 pairing makes
the protocol this time more complex in terms of calculations. This is especially visible
on more constrained platforms such as the MICAz and the Tmote Sky where the total
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scheme duration is twice as long as in the previous case. At the same time, the energy
consumption is doubled as well. The protocol described here uses also more memory
than the scheme proposed earlier. The difference in performance is not that visible on the
Imote2 platform where both protocols have a similar running time.
Table 6.3: Evaluation of the key agreement in cluster-based WSNs.
Operation MICAz (7.38MHz) Tmote Sky (8.19MHz)
Time ROM Energy Time ROM Energy
Pairing 7.43s 60.9KB 175.65mJ 4.61s 34.9KB 50.89mJ
ID mapping 1.41s 0.85KB 33.34mJ 0.94s 0.54KB 10.38mJ
Other 41ms 2.91KB 0.97mJ 28ms 1.94KB 0.31mJ
Total 8.88s 64.67KB 209.96mJ 5.58s 37.38KB 61.58mJ
Table 6.4: Evaluation of the key agreement in cluster-based WSNs.
Operation Imote2 (13MHz)
Time ROM Energy
Pairing 0.62s 44.4KB 16.34mJ
ID mapping 0.15s 0.69KB 3.95mJ
Other 4.2ms 2.34KB 110¹J
Total 0.77s 47.43KB 20.29mJ
As one can notice, the key exchange protocol based on the Type 3 pairing is a little bit
more complicated than the simple scheme described earlier. It would seem that a Type 1
pairing protocol should be preferred over a Type 3 pairing scheme for the majority of
wireless sensor network applications. Type 1 pairings are also much faster to compute
and use less memory. Nevertheless, the Type 3 pairing protocol achieves higher security
especially in a cluster network scenario. The extra protection against node compromise
may be benecial for applications where security has the highest priority and resources
utilization is less important. Clearly the capture of a node with source-only capabilities
will result in less damage than the capture of a node which can masquerade as either a
legitimate data source or as a legitimate data sink.
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6.4 TinyIBE: identity based encryption for heterogeneous sensor
networks
Most of the work in the area of sensor network security has focused on at and homoge-
nous networks where all sensor nodes have the same capabilities in terms of memory
storage, CPU power, transceiver speed and energy supply. In such networks, all nodes
perform similar tasks such as sensing, routing and data processing. However, according
to research results, this design is not suitable for all kinds of applications. Theoretical cal-
culations and experimental results have shown that homogenous networks have lower
performance and scalability than heterogenous networks. They are also less energy ef-
cient and suffer from high communication and storage overheads [37]. Recently deployed
sensor networks are starting to follow a heterogenous design [52].
Many of the existing key distribution schemes for sensor networks are designed to
set up pairwise keys among nodes without considering the actual communication pat-
tern [43, 98]. In heterogeneous sensor networks L-sensors usually exchange information
with only a small number of their neighbours (see Figure 6.4) and they do not need to
maintain shared keys with all of them. Based on this observation, a new security boot-
strapping mechanism is proposed which takes advantage of H-sensors processing capa-
bilities. The protocol is called TinyIBE, uses identity-based encryption and requires only
a small number of keys in the network. The implementation results show that by using
efcient public key techniques, it is possible to simplify the key distribution process and
signicantly reduce the communication overhead. This allows the designer to lower the
energy consumption and prolong the lifetime of the sensor network.
The main task of this protocol is to securely distribute cryptographic keys among
cluster heads and L-sensors in the network. The scheme is a Public Key Cryptography
based algorithm and is much more computationally expensive than standard symmetric
key algorithms. However, it is only used as a bootstrapping mechanism to distribute
pair-wise keys after network deployment. During normal network operation, cheap link-
layer securitymechanisms can be used (like Tinysec [69]) to encrypt data with established
symmetric keys.
Before the actual security scheme can be designed, there is a need to specify certain
assumptions about the network organization. Themodel of the heterogeneous sensor net-
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work used here assumes that the network will consist of a large number of L-sensors and
only a small number of H-sensors. In this model, nodes are static and they do not move
after deployment. L-sensors are cheap devices that do not have tamper-proof hardware.
It is possible for an active attacker to compromise any L-sensor and extract all its secrets.
The role of a cluster head is xed and can only be performed by a H-sensor. Cluster heads
store valuable data and keying material, which makes them especially attractive for at-
tackers. The assumption that every H-sensor will be tamper-resistant is not realistic, as
this would be too expensive in most deployments. The best that can be hoped for is that
H-sensors will incorporate some sort of a cost effective memory protection mechanism
(as proposed in [59]). The model assumes also that the environment is insecure from the
beginning and the attacks are possible right after network deployment (as opposed to
[95]).
Another assumption is that each device in the network has a unique node ID. Dur-
ing the cluster formation phase, all H-sensors broadcast Hello messages to nearby L-
sensors. This message includes the ID of the H-sensor. Typically the transmission range
of the broadcast will be large enough so that most low-end nodes can receiveHello mes-
sages from several H-sensors. To select its primary cluster head each L-sensor measures
the strength of the signal received (through the received signal strength indicator) and
chooses the one with the best value. Other IDs of H-sensors are stored in the memory as
secondary cluster heads in case the primary one fails. The clustering structure formed at
the initial setup of the network does not change unless a cluster head becomes unavail-
able. If this happens all L-sensors try to join other clusters based on their cluster head
lists. The communication between an L-sensor and a H-sensor within a cluster can be
single or multi-hop depending on the distance.
Sensing reports from L-sensors are sent to corresponding cluster head at regular in-
tervals. Each H-sensor aggregates the data and sends only the result to the base station.
This can be done on request or periodically. The base station does not have to be con-
nected to the network at all times. It can be mobile and it is regarded as well-protected
from physical attacks. In the scheme described, the base station can establish a secure
connection with any node in the network using its master secret. It is also not possible
for an attacker to masquerade as a base station without the knowledge of the master key.
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6.4.1 TinyIBE overview
Heterogeneous sensor networks are asymmetric in terms of the trafc pattern and nodes
capabilities. A security protocol for heterogeneous sensor network should make good
use of high-end devices and save the resources of many constrained L-sensors. Previous
proposals for using Identity-Based Encryption in sensor networks [94, 126] suggested the
Boneh and Franklin scheme [18] for key distribution. However, this protocol is symmetric
in nature and requires expensive operations for both encryption and decryption.
The solution proposed here uses a simple variant of the Sakai and Kasahara Identity-
Based Encryption scheme [105]. This Identity-Based Encryption method is not as well-
known as that of Boneh and Franklin but it has its advantages that perfectly t the het-
erogenous sensor network setting. There is no pairing calculation required for encryption
and there is no need to hash identities to elliptic curve points. These potentially expen-
sive operations are avoided, which makes the whole scheme more affordable, especially
for low-end sensor nodes.
The TinyIBE scheme can be divided into two phases, each consisting of two stages. In
the pre-deployment phase, the trusted authority performs Setup and Extract operations.
This is done off-line in a secure environment:
Setup. The base station generates global system parameters that include its own mas-
ter secret s 2 Z¤r , a pairing-friendly supersingular elliptic curve E over Fq and
random points P 2 E(Fq) and Q 2 E(Fq) of order r, where Q = sP . It gen-
erates also g = e^(P; P ) and denes two hash functions H1 : f0; 1g¤ ! Z¤q and
H2 : Fq ! f0; 1gn, for some n. All nodes are pre-loaded with system parameters:
< E(Fq); Q; P; g; n;H1;H2 >.
Extract. The base station issues a unique identity IDX for each node. The identity of
every H-sensor is hashed to a value a = H1(IDH) and a corresponding private key
is generatedD = 1s+aP . Each H-sensor is also pre-loaded with a broadcast key pair
< BH ; EH > and identities of all the L-sensors in the network (IDL).
In the above notation sP is a point multiplication operation and e^(P; P ) is a Type 1
pairing. The second phase of TinyIBE scheme starts after network deployment and all
the operations are run by the nodes to encode and decode messages that are exchanged
between them. It consists of two main stages:
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Encrypt. Every L-sensor selects its primary cluster head, nds the value a = H1(IDH)
for a given H-sensor and generates random w 2 Z¤r and t 2 Z¤q . To encrypt the
session key t, the L-sensor creates the ciphertext C1; C2:
C1 = w(Q+ aP ) C2 = t©H2(gw) (6.5)
It includes also its identity in the message.
Decrypt. After receiving the encrypted message, every cluster head checks the identity
of the L-sensor. The decryption process can only start in the case of a positive ID
check. The H-sensor recovers the session key t by using its private key D:
t = H2(e^(D;C1))© C2 (6.6)
The session key is used with a symmetric cipher to encrypt the broadcast public
key BH .
The decryption process works because of the bilinearity property of the pairing:
e^(D;C1) = e^
µ
1
s+ a
P;w(Q+ aP )
¶
= e^ (P; sP + aP )
w
s+a
= e^ (P; P )w
= gw (6.7)
After the decryption step, every L-sensor can use its session key to securely commu-
nicate with a given cluster head. It can also authenticate broadcasts by using the Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). Secure broadcasts are important especially
in the case when remote network reprogramming is needed.
Figure 6.7 presents all of the TinyIBE operations that are performed after network de-
ployment. The need for identity exchange between nodes cannot be considered an over-
head incurred by the key distribution protocol. The majority of existing sensor network
routing algorithms already require that nodes know each other's IDs. It is also assumed
that H-sensors are equipped with a lot more storage space than L-sensors. This allows
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them to store all the L-sensor identities (which could be simple serial numbers) without
introducing large overhead. Additionally, ID sizes are negligible when compared to pub-
lic key and certicate sizes. It is more convenient to maintain a list of eligible L-sensor
identities rather than storing all their public keys.
Figure 6.7: Key distribution during the on-line phase of TinyIBE.
TinyIBE provides authenticated key distribution without using certicates. The mes-
sage encrypted for a specic cluster head can only be decryptedwith a correct private key
D which is in the possession of a single H-sensor and the base station. Every H-sensor
authenticates itself to any L-sensor simply by decrypting the message and sending back
data encrypted with the session key. This prevents L-sensors from sending sensor read-
ings to fake cluster heads or base stations. Even if an adversary steals an identity of a
node or takes fake identities, it still cannot act as a cluster head or a base station without
obtaining the proper private keyD or the master secret s. Those values are well-protected
and the protocol guarantees that the master secret is not revealed, even if an attacker sub-
verts all the nodes in the network1.
It is also important to prevent fake L-sensors from taking part in the network. A H-
sensor can only setup a shared key after checking the L-sensor's identity. If the ID is not
1it is protected by a hard discrete logarithm problem in the elliptic curve setting.
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on the list the cluster head can contact the base station to clarify if this ID is valid. In the
case where two L-sensor claim the same ID, the H-sensor informs the base station of a
possible adversary in the network. The communication between the base station and H-
sensors is secured using the Encrypt/Decrypt mechanism described earlier. Both parties
use ID-based encryption, so the communication is authenticated in both directions. The
base station can also perform periodic checks on the lists of nodes connected to different
H-sensors. In this way, the base station can detect intruders that claim the same IDs in
various parts of the network.
New node addition is easy using TinyIBE and does not require any new keying ma-
terial for existing nodes. The base station performs the Setup and Extract operations and
deploys a node with a new ID. The H-sensor will contact the base station to validate the
new ID during the session key establishment phase. Additionally any external party can
deploy its own L-sensors and add them to an existing sensor network. They only have
to agree on the identities with the base station using a secure channel. When an L-sensor
becomes an orphan, it can quickly join another cluster by encrypting amessage for its sec-
ondary cluster head. This is done according to the scheme described above. In the case
of node compromise the base station can revoke keys by simply removing the ID and the
corresponding session key from the list that is held by every cluster head. This prevents
an L-sensor from establishing a secure connection with any H-sensor of its choice.
TinyIBE is designed to work with heterogeneous sensor networks and uses more
powerful sensor nodes to perform complex cryptographic operations. Each L-sensor per-
forms less expensive point multiplications and is only required to store two keys. The ex-
tra bandwidth overhead associated with cryptography is limited to only one encrypted
message that the L-sensor sends to its cluster head. Software implementation results
show that TinyIBE is feasible on constrained sensor nodes without using any crypto hard-
ware accelerator. In addition, TinyIBE is the rst practical implementation of a complete
Identity-Based Encryption scheme on sensor devices.
6.4.2 Implementation of TinyIBE
TinyIBE is based on the mathematical theory of elliptic curves which involves operations
that are computationally intensive. Two of the most expensive operations in the scheme
are the point multiplication and pairing calculation. The implementation of the whole
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scheme is quite difcult and requires cryptographic primitives used in Elliptic Curve
Cryptography and Pairing-Based Cryptography.
In order to check the feasibility and performance of TinyIBE, the scheme was imple-
mented on three commonly used sensor devices. The Imote2 platform was used a an H-
sensor and L-sensors were deployed on the MICAz and the Tmote Sky nodes. All three
platforms use the same CC2420 radio transceiver which allows them to communicate
within the same frequency band.
In some sensor network scenarios, a 64-bit security level has been used [98] to reduce
the security overhead. However, sensor networks should use a minimum 80-bit security
level (equivalent to 1024-bit RSA) as it is the current standard in information security. An
80-bit symmetric cipher provides equivalent security to a 160-bit elliptic curve system. In
order to achieve a similar security level for pairing-based cryptography there is a need to
work with 1024-bit values. This fact makes the pairing computation the most expensive
operation in TinyIBE. The pairing calculation in TinyIBE is performed only by the more
powerful H-sensors during the decryption process. This allows us to save on code space
and execution time on low-end devices.
The scheme can be implemented using a Type 1 pairing. Results presented in Chap-
ter 5 have shown that the ´T algorithm [7] can be efciently implemented on embedded
sensor devices. Hence this pairing type was chosen for the TinyIBE scheme. The ´T pair-
ing was evaluated over a binary eld F2m , where m denes the length of the binary
polynomial that represents eld elements. In accordance with the 80-bit security level, a
supersingular elliptic curve y2+y = x3+xwas chosen over the binary eld F2271 with the
embedding degree k = 4. The details of the pairing implementation can be found in Sec-
tion 5.3.2. In order to make the TinyIBE scheme practical, the implementation was based
on NanoECC and Micro-pairings. A detailed description of both software packages is
presented in Sections 4.3 and 5.3 respectively. TinyIBE was integrated with TinyOS v1.15
and evaluated on three different sensor node platforms.
6.4.3 Experimental results
In the rst phase of the TinyIBE scheme, the trusted authority pre-loads all the necessary
information on to sensor nodes. This is performed off-line before network deployment.
The Setup and Extract steps are not time critical and they do not have any inuence on
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the network performance. In what follows, the focus is only on the operations that are
carried out by the sensor nodes during the session key establishment phase.
The Encrypt step involves hashing and calculation of two point multiplications. In
TinyIBE, the popular SHA-1 function was used, but in general any other secure hash
function can be adopted for this purpose. The calculation of C1 is the most expensive
step during the encryption process. A H-sensor public key can be regarded as the value
(Q + aP ) which is xed for a given cluster head. If it is assumed that the encryption
step will be performed multiple times for the same H-sensor, this value can be cached
to save one point multiplication during subsequent encryptions. However, in most cases
the encryption step will be performed only once for a given cluster head. The calculation
of aP is a xed point multiplication with a 160-bit scalar and can be accelerated using
the precomputation methods described in Section 4.1.2.2. To compute C2, the g value
exponentiation needs to be performed, but this operation is negligible when compared
with the C1 calculation.
The decryption step is pretty straightforward and requires one ´T pairing calcula-
tion and one hashing to retrieve the session key. The pairing takes as the rst parameter
the H-sensor's private key, which is a constant value. This xed parameter can be ex-
ploited for precomputation, which accelerates the pairing computation at the expense of
some storage overhead. In the TinyIBE implementation, the pairing calculation was per-
formed only on more powerful H-sensors, hence additional acceleration was not neces-
sary. However, the precomputation option should be considered in the case where more
constrained devices are used as H-sensors. The performance evaluation presented below
excludes the ID check operation performed by every H-sensor before the decryption step.
Table 6.5: TinyIBE evaluation results
Platform Encryption
Time ROM RAM Energy
MicaZ (7.38MHz) 3.93s 39.6KB 2.9KB 92.67mJ
Tmote (8.19MHz) 2.62s 30.3KB 3.2KB 27.12mJ
Platform Decryption
Time ROM RAM Energy
Imote2 (13MHz) 462ms 32.87KB 4.12KB 12.12mJ
Imote2 (104MHz) 57.7ms 32.87KB 4.12KB 3.76mJ
Table 6.5 presents the evaluation results for the TinyIBE implementation. All themem-
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ory and timing results were obtained using cycle accurate simulators. The AVR Studio
was used for the Atmega128L processor (MICAz) and the IAR Embedded Workbench
was used for both the MSP430 (Tmote) and the Xscale (Imote2) platforms. The energy
consumption was measured experimentally for the MICAz and the Tmote Sky nodes.
Data sheet gures were used in the case of the Imote2 node. As can be seen in Table 6.5,
the Tmote Sky node is almost four times more efcient in terms of energy consumption
than theMICAz platform. The Imote2 also has low energy consumption, especially when
its CPU frequency is set to 104MHz.
The encryption times for L-sensors are acceptable, given that these operations are
performed very rarely, and mainly at the beginning of the network operation. After the
session key establishment, the nodes will use cheap symmetric key encryption methods.
The Imote2 platform handles the decryption process well, and its 32-bit ARM processor
facilitates the calculation of complex cryptographic operations. The best performance can
be achieved when the maximum frequency is set (416MHz). At this speed the Imote2
can perform around 70 decryption operations per second. So far, TinyIBE is the fastest
Identity-Based Encryption scheme for sensor networks.
The memory footprint on L-sensors is considerable and it is mainly due to the large
size of the Elliptic Curve Cryptography library. However, this also includes all the nec-
essary library code needed to perform the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
during the secure broadcast verication. RAM utilization may seem high for low-end de-
vices, but the memory is reserved only for the duration of cryptographic operations. The
values shown in Table 6.5 present the peak numbers for stack usage during the program
execution.
6.4.4 Performance analysis
Existing security mechanism for WSNs are mainly based on key-predistribution mecha-
nisms. Most of the key pre-distribution schemes were designed for homogenous sensor
networks (e.g. [43]), and once applied in heterogeneous sensor networks they suffer from
high communication and storage overhead. Du et al. [36] tried to address these issues
by proposing an asymmetric key pre-distribution scheme that uses the capabilities of H-
sensors. The authors in [95] and [63] also tried to adopt key pre-distribution schemes to
t heterogenous network design. However, all these solutions are based on symmetric
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key techniques and they do not provide a perfect trade-off between resilience and stor-
age. Compared with symmetric key cryptography, Public Key Cryptography provides a
more exible and simple interface, which reduces the number of necessary keys in the
network.
One of the biggest advantages of TinyIBE when compared with the state-of-the-art
is the signicant storage saving in terms of cryptographic keys. In the following calcu-
lations, the number of H-sensors and L-sensors in a heterogeneous sensor network is
denoted asM and N , respectively. In the case of a key pre-distribution scheme proposed
by Eschenauer and Gligor (E-G [43]) the total number of pre-loaded keys in the network
is equal to:m(M +N), where each sensor is pre-loaded withm keys. The value ofm de-
pends on the key pool size (P ) and the probability of sharing at least one key between two
nodes (p0). Du et al. proposed asymmetric pre-distribution (A-P [36]) where H-sensors are
pre-loaded with more keys (x) than L-sensors (y). The number of pre-loaded keys can be
calculated as xM + yN where xy = m2. The Elliptic Curve Cryptography scheme pro-
posed in [35] decreases the number of necessary keys to M(N + 3) + 2N . The TinyIBE
scheme proposed here assumes that eachH-sensor is pre-loadedwith only three keys and
the total number of pre-loaded keys in the network (3M ) is independent of the number
of L-sensors. This feature allows TinyIBE to scale gracefully with the number of nodes in
the network.
Figure 6.8: Pre-loaded key storage space.
Figure 6.8 presents the comparison between TinyIBE and different security solutions
proposed for HSNs. The parameters were set as: M = 30, m = 100, P = 5000, p0 =
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0:87, x = 500, y = 20 and the total number of pre-loaded keys for each scheme was
calculated. As can be seen in Figure 6.8, TinyIBE requires much less storage space for
the pre-loaded keys (for a constant number of 90 keys) than other solutions. The storage
savings of TinyIBE increase drastically with the number of L-sensors in the network. The
IBE scheme proposed here uses the smallest key space among all existing key distribution
protocols for heterogeneous sensor networks.
Figure 6.9: Communication overhead.
TinyIBE also introduces signicant savings in communication overhead. Figure 6.9
shows howmuch data needs to be exchanged between an H-sensor and a given L-sensor
in each scheme, to establish a common session key. This comparison does not include
the packet header or any additional overhead incurred by packet fragmentation. In the
Eschenauer-Gligor (E-G) scheme each sensor broadcasts the list of identiers of keys on
their key ring. When the key pool P = 10000, m needs to be larger than 150 to achieve a
high key sharing probability of 0.9 [43]. Each key identier requires at least 14 bits and
the resulting message will have a size of 263 bytes. The A-P scheme [36] uses a similar
technique in the key agreement phase. To achieve the same key sharing probability as for
the E-G scheme, the parameters need to be set as x = 450, y = 50, P = 10000. Every L-
sensor sends a key list message to its H-sensor which includes the L-sensor's ID, the list
of key IDs and the node's location. This results in a communication overhead of 94 bytes
(assuming 2 bytes for ID and 4 bytes for location data). The TinyIBE scheme requires an
exchange of only one message < IDL; C1; C2 > to establish a shared session key. The C1
value is a point on E(F2271) which can be compressed to 34 bytes and C2 has the size of
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the session key (128-bits). The resulting message has 52 bytes. According to Figure 6.9,
TinyIBE is the most efcient scheme in terms of data exchange. The communication over-
head in TinyIBE is independent of the network size and xed for each node pair. In case
of the key pre-distribution schemes ([43], [36]), the overhead increases with the number
of pre-loaded keys and the key pool size. The results of the Elliptic Curve Cryptography
scheme proposed in [35] cannot be compared with TinyIBE as the paper does not specify
the public key encryption method used for session key distribution.
6.5 Security analysis of Identity-Based Cryptography protocols
Like any wireless networks WSNs are vulnerable to different kinds of attacks including
jamming, eavesdropping and spoong. There are also additional attacks that are exclu-
sive to sensor networks. Deployments in public areas introduce a risk of a physical attack
and limited battery power opens the door for a whole range of DoS (Denial-of-Service)
attacks, resulting in a node's energy depletion. Sensor networks that use node identities
are also prone to replication and Sybil [93] attacks. In the rst type of attack the adversary
adds a node to the network by replicating the ID of an existing node, or by generating a
fake ID. The second attack relies on presenting multiple IDs by a single node, in order to
intercept data from the network.
Perhaps the biggest problem in sensor networks is the node capture attack. Sensors
are usually very cheap and do not have any protection against tampering. Recent results
show that standard sensor nodes, such as the MICA2, can be compromised in less than
one minute [59]. In the case when an adversary manages to compromise a sensor node,
it gains access to valuable information and can stage a number of different insider at-
tacks, targeting nodes within the cluster and across the network. Insider attacks are a lot
harder to prevent and detect, because they are performed by nodes that are regarded as
legitimate members of the network. There is not much that can be done to prevent node
compromise attacks. Therefore, the best that can be hoped for is that the network will be
immune to passive attacks, and that it can survive in some sense the loss and capture of
a certain percentage of its nodes.
The performance of the proposed Identity-Based Cryptography schemes have been
evaluated in the previous sections. However, the resistance of these security schemes
against different types of attacks have not been discussed in detail. This section presents
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a security analysis of Identity-Based Cryptography protocols inwireless sensor networks.
It describes also possible attacks on sensor networks and recommended defensive mea-
sures.
6.5.1 Possible attacks
Wireless sensor networks are susceptible to more attacks than ordinary networks. A
whole range of attacks from passive eavesdropping and active injection of bogus mes-
sages, to node physical capture and subversion is possible. Especially dangerous are var-
ious denial-of-service attacks [124]. Potential threats include attempts to disrupt, subvert
or destroy a network, but in many cases a simple denial-of-service attack would be suf-
cient for the adversary to succeed. A denial-of-service attack is any event that diminishes
or eliminates a network's capacity to perform its expected functions. Hardware and soft-
ware failures, resource exhaustion, environmental conditions or a mix of these factors,
can cause a denial-of-service attack. Such an attack results in a loss of availability and
degrades the efciency and functionality of the whole network. It is extremely hard to
defend against these types of attacks. A standard attack is to jam wireless transmission
between the nodes by sending a strong radio signal, that interferes with the network
operational frequency. Another type of denial-of-service attack might be performed by
simply taking out a node's batteries. Constant ooding of a network with packets is also
a big threat, as it leads to a quick depletion of nodes energy.
Most of the sensor networks are particulary vulnerable to several key types of attacks.
Attacks can be performed in a variety of ways and are not limited to simple denial-of-
service attacks. They encompass a variety of techniques that pose a serious threat against
sensor devices. The main types of attacks include:
Monitoring and eavesdropping. This is the easiest attack on sensor networks. It may
compromise the privacy of information that is exchanged in the network.
Trafc analysis. This attack may lead to identifying certain entities in the network, with-
out even understanding the contents of the packets. In this way valuable informa-
tion is gained, that may be used to perform a denial-of-service attack.
Replication attack. An attacker adds a node to the network by replicating the ID of an
existing node. The adversary gains unauthorized access to the network. Certain
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packets can be easily misrouted because of replicated identities.
The Sybil attack. Single node presents multiple identities to other nodes in the network.
This reduces the effectiveness of fault-tolerant schemes, such as distributed storage,
multi-path routing and topology maintenance.
Routing attacks. By spoong, altering or replaying routing information, adversariesmay
be able to create routing loops, attract or repel network trafc, generate fake routing
messages, and degrade the network performance.
Selective forwarding. Compromised node may refuse to forward particular packets or
even completely limit its role as a router. This may lead to partitioning in the net-
work.
Denial of service. It is a standard attack that limits the availability of a node in a sen-
sor network. This could be achieved in many different ways like: jamming, energy
depletion attacks or network ooding with bogus messages.
Node capture. It is a serious threat to sensor network security. Adversaries can tamper
with the devices, extract cryptographic keys and subvert the nodes.
Sinkhole attack. This type of attack lures nearly all trafc from a particular area of the
network to the compromised node. An adversary may spoof or replay an adver-
tisement for an extremely high quality route to the base station, in order to perform
this attack.
Wormhole attack. It is a more sophisticated attack, where two devices conspire with
each other, to provide a low latency route in the network (wormhole). Most of the
communication between the nodes goes through this wormhole, as it appears to be
a short and efcient path in the network. The adversary can exploit this trafc to
perform other types of attack.
6.5.2 Defensive measures
Security in sensor networks is a large and complex topic due to the many possible threats
in these networks. Many security issues concerning: key establishment, routing, intru-
sion detection, broadcasting, trust management and data aggregation, must be solved to
provide a complete security system.
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Well planned denial-of-service attacks on sensor networks might be very hard to de-
fend. Jamming the network with a strong signal is one of the simple attacks, that may
disable the whole network without any difculties. Improved radio hardware includ-
ing spread spectrum capability with low probability of detection and interception, may
someday help resolve this problem. Unfortunately, the currently proposed spread spec-
trum capability dened in IEEE 802.15.4, is designed to protect against only unintentional
interference, rather than denial of service attacks.
The research area of wireless sensor network security is still in its early stages. A clear
line of defence is not yet available. The best that can be achieved at the moment, is to
use a multi-fence security mechanism that should be embedded into every component of
the network. Obviously, a single solution against all security threats in sensor networks
does not exist. Instead, a set of solutions can be proposed, to provide the functionality
that is needed for a given application. Possible security threats and related defensive
measures are summarized in Table 6.6. As can be seen, most of the security solutions rely
on a proper key distribution technique that is based on Public Key Cryptography. The
Identity-Based Cryptography protocols, described in this chapter, can provide a reliable
framework for all the security services built on top of them.
Table 6.6: Security threats in WSNs and possible defensive measures
Security threat Countermeasure
Unauthorized access Public key cryptography, random key distribution
Eavesdropping Link or network layer encryption (symmetric algorithms),
access control
Denial of service Intrusion detection, improved radio hardware,
node redundancy
Routing attacks Secure routing, message authentication codes (MACs),
digital signatures
Node capture Tamper resistant hardware, robust PKC schemes,
node revocation
Intrusion Intrusion detection, secure group communication,
nodes authentication
6.5.3 Non-interactive key agreement security evaluation
The non-interactive identity-based key distribution schemes proposed in this thesis pre-
vent intruders from taking part in the network, injectingmessages into the system, aswell
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as eavesdropping on communication between legitimate nodes. They employ asymmet-
ric cryptography primitives, whichmakes the effect of a node being compromised strictly
local. Subverting one node does not reveal anything about communication between other
sensor devices. This allows the network to continue to operate even with a small percent-
age of compromised nodes. The key distribution schemes proposed here, limit the effect
of a node compromise, but cannot fully protect against this attack. Additional protection
can be provided by using an intrusion detection mechanism, which spots misbehaving
nodes with genuine identities. Many of the possible attacks (sinkhole attack, selective
forwarding, wormhole attack) can be staged only after one of the nodes in the network
is subverted. Therefore it is important to apply mechanisms, which detect malicious be-
haviour of sensor nodes.
One of the problems in every ID-based security scheme is proper management of
node identities. The assignment and control over nodes IDs must be performed only
by the trusted authority, to ensure that each identity is unique in the network. Such an
approach allows the network to achieve high resistance against the Sybil attack and the
node ID replication attack. In the case when an attacker steals an identity of a node, or
takes fake identities it still cannot establish a shared key, because he does not have the
master key s and is not issued with a private key sNX , needed for decryption. The ID-
based key agreement schemes also guarantee, that the master secret s, is not revealed
even if all the nodes in the network are subverted (only the trusted authority holds the
master key). Network access control is also provided, as only the trusted authority issues
identities and pre-loads sensors with valid private keys. An active attacker can encrypt
messages to given identities, but cannot decrypt any message without a proper private
key.
Another problem, that should be also considered, is the whole range of denial-of-
service attacks that try to deplete the energy of sensor nodes. The Identity-Based Cryp-
tography protocols proposed here, perform public key operations, which are computa-
tionally intensive. Establishing a private key between two nodes requires the calculation
of a pairing, which consumes precious energy. Constant requests for a key exchange,
from a malicious mote, would quickly deplete node's energy resources. This can be pre-
vented with a simple mechanisms that limits the number of key establishment trials with
a certain node. Every request above the limit, which comes from the same source, should
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be simply discarded.
6.5.4 TinyIBE security analysis
The security requirements for heterogeneous sensor networks are similar to the require-
ments in at networks. TinyIBE provides authenticated key agreement between an L-
sensor and a H-sensor. This operation requires an exchange of only one message between
the nodes, and does not require digital certicates. Dangerous attacks, such as the Sybil
attack and node ID replication, can be easily prevented. Even in the case when an adver-
sary steals an identity of a node, or takes fake identities, it still cannot masquerade as a
cluster head or a base station without the knowledge of the proper private key D or the
master secret s. Those values are well-protected by H-sensors and the base station. Tiny-
IBE also guarantees that the master secret cannot be calculated based on the private keys
of H-sensors. In addition, the ID replication attack gives a chance to spot the intruder that
uses the same ID as a legitimate node.
Careful management of identities in the network is especially important in the case
of the TinyIBE scheme. Proper ID checks prevent fake L-sensors from taking part in the
network. A H-sensor can only setup a shared key after checking the L-sensor's identity.
The IDs of L-sensors should be included on the list maintained by every H-sensor. If the
ID is not on the list, then the L-sensor is treated like an intruder and the H-sensor (if
possible) should clarify with the base station, if the ID is valid. The base station itself can
periodically check the lists of node IDs, to update them, and to detect intruders, which
use the same IDs in different parts of the network.
Similar to the two previous schemes, TinyIBE applies asymmetric cryptography prim-
itives, which minimizes the effect of node compromise. Subverting one L-sensor does not
reveal the session keys used by other nodes in the network. The resilience of TinyIBE
against node capture can be measured by calculating the compromising probability. This
parameter checks the effect of an L-sensor compromise on the rest of the network. The
compromising probability can be dened as the probability that an attacker can decrypt
the communication between any two nodes, after capturing c L-sensors.
Paper [35] presents the formula to calculate the probability that two sensors have
exactly j common keys in the Eschenauer and Gligor scheme (E-G) [43]:
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where P is the key pool size and m is the number of pre-loaded keys in each node. The
compromising probability for the E-G scheme can be calculated as:
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Similar formulas can be found in [36] to compute the same probability in the asymmetric
pre-distribution scheme (A-P).
Figure 6.10: The compromising probability of different key distribution schemes.
Figure 6.10 compares the compromising probability for different key distribution schemes
in heterogeneous sensor networks. The following parameters were used: P = 5000,
x = 125, y = 20 (A-P scheme) and two different values of m for the E-G scheme. The
Elliptic Curve Cryptography-based protocol [35] and the TinyIBE scheme employ asym-
metric cryptography primitives. After the session key distribution phase, each pair of
nodes has a different shared key. Hence, compromising c L-sensors does not affect the
security of communication among other pairs of nodes. The compromising probability in
both schemes is always equal to zero, for all c values. For the key predistribution schemes
the compromising probability increases signicantly with the number of pre-loaded keys
(m or y). Therefore, the resilience to node compromise attack is much higher in public key
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protocols. In addition, TinyIBE can easily revoke keys used by compromised L-sensors.
The base station needs to simply remove the ID and the corresponding session key from
the list that is held by every cluster head. This prevents an L-sensor from establishing a
secure connection with any H-sensor of its choice.
6.6 Summary
The problem of distributing symmetric keys within a sensor network is one of the funda-
mental security issues in WSNs. Existing key distribution mechanisms have many aws
and the level of security provided is not satisfactory for many applications. Hence, there
is a need to develop new security solutions that would offer high security levels and
simplify key management in the network. This chapter shows that such solutions can be
developed with the use of bilinear pairings and identity-based cryptography schemes.
Wireless sensor networks can be divided into three broad groups based on nodes
organization: at, cluster-based and heterogeneous. Each of these groups have specic
features and communication patterns that need to be considered when developing key
distribution schemes. Optimal security solution should be tailored to a specic network
organization.
This chapter proposes three different ID-based key agreement protocols which were
developed for specic sensor network models. For a clustered network scenario a novel
variant of a key exchange protocol, which is based on a Type 3 pairing, has been pro-
posed. This protocol uses sink and source keys, which limit the effect of node compro-
mise and increase the level of security for more demanding sensor network applications.
However, the implementation results of this protocol have shown, that its performance is
lower than other Identity-Based Cryptography schemes on sensor devices. This protocol
uses a Type 3 pairing, which is much slower than the ´T pairing over binary elds.
The second scheme investigated the application of a simple non-interactive key ex-
change protocol in at sensor networks. This scheme uses a Type 1 pairing and allows
any two nodes in the network to agree upon a shared secret, in a secure manner. The eval-
uation results have shown that this key agreement is feasible and practical on different
sensor platforms, and can be evaluated in around 4.3s on a tiny 8-bit sensor device. The
security analysis proves that appropriately designed ID-based scheme might be a perfect
solution for the key distribution problem in sensor networks. This protocol is preferred
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over the previous scheme and is especially recommended for use in different sensor net-
work scenarios, due to its performance and simplicity.
The last security protocol proposed in this chapter utilizes identity-based encryption
to distribute keys in a heterogeneous sensor network. TinyIBE exploits the enhanced
capabilities of high-end cluster heads to secure the communication between different
classes of sensor devices. The protocol was designed specially for heterogeneous sen-
sor networks to provide a new and simplied way for key distribution in the network. A
common misconception is that identity-based encryption is not a suitable security tech-
nique for sensor networks. The argument is that Identity-Based Encryption suffers from
identity theft and replication problems, and that it is too heavyweight for sensor devices.
The results presented in this chapter prove otherwise. The TinyIBE scheme is protected
against fake cluster heads and is feasible to implement on constrained sensor nodes. The
encryption procedure takes less than four seconds on an 8-bit MICAz platform. Identity
theft and replication issues can be addressed by simple ID check procedures. A com-
parison with the state of the art, shows that the TinyIBE protocol introduces signicant
savings in key storage space and communication overhead, compared to existing solu-
tions for heterogeneous sensor networks. Additionally it provides a higher level of se-
curity and stronger resilience against node capture attack, than any key pre-distribution
technique.
The results presented in this chapter prove for the rst time that key distribution
schemes based on Identity-Based Cryptography are practical inwireless sensor networks.
They can be applied in real-life applications on standard sensor nodes, without any
specialized hardware accelerators. Features such as non-interactive key agreement and
certicate-less node authentication, makes the proposed schemes superior security so-
lutions in a sensor network environment. The application of ID-based cryptosystems to
sensor networks has a very promising future. This direction is especially interesting, as
more powerful nodes are being developed that allow more complex security protocols.
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Conclusions
W ireless technology is evolving very rapidly nowadays. Large distributed net-works comprising of many cheap and tiny sensing devices have become a re-
ality. In the near future it is likely that these wireless sensor networks will be deployed
all over the world on a large scale. It is predicted that these pervasive systems will be
integrated with the environment to form a bridge between the digital and the physical
world.
This revolution in technology brings of course many open questions concerning pri-
vacy and data condentiality. In many cases, sensor networks will handle sensitive and
important data in open areas that anyone can access. The wireless nature of communica-
tion between the nodes makes it easier to eavesdrop, intercept and inject bogus informa-
tion into the network. The security problem in this environment is especially important
because wireless senors will gather information not only about the environment but also
about people.
The range of sensor network applications spans environmental monitoring and home
automation to more complex ones like trafc control and health care. These applications
require various security levels and services. Simple applications like habitat monitoring
need only basic security assurances that can be fullled by using symmetric key algo-
rithms. More advanced sensor network applications require more complex methods for
applying security. Sensing, monitoring and actuating systems are expected to play a key
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role in reducing buildings overall energy consumption. Sensor networks can provide
intelligent control based on precise real-time measurements to reduce the energy con-
sumption and greenhouse gas emissions of commercial buildings. This can make a major
impact on the issues of climate change and energy use in buildings. Leveraging wireless
sensor systems to monitor critical infrastructure brings many novel research challenges
especially in the eld of security.
Despite many efforts, security in wireless sensor networks still remains an active re-
search eld. The devices used in sensor network have limited capabilities in terms of
processing power, available storage and energy. It is difcult to design a security solu-
tion which has minimal resources utilization and at the same time offers high level of
security. Most of the security schemes proposed for wireless sensor networks are based
on simple symmetric key cryptography mechanisms. This approach minimizes resource
utilization, but does not solve the problem of dynamic key distribution in the network.
In xed networks, the problem of key distribution is usually solved through Public
Key Cryptography methods. Published results showed that traditional Public Key Cryp-
tography solutions (e.g. RSA) are not suitable for constrained devices and thus new se-
curity methods are required. These new key distribution methods should offer the same
security services as standard public key algorithms, but at a lower cost that is acceptable
for sensor devices.
This thesis proposes new mechanisms for key distribution in sensor networks. It
showes that Public Key Cryptography can be applied in sensor networks through the
use of bilinear pairings and identity-based cryptography schemes. This new approach
to wireless sensor network security is promising because sensor networks seem to be a
perfect setting for applying Identity-Based Cryptography. One of the main advantages
of the proposed methods is that they can provide simple key distribution in the net-
work without the use of expensive certicates. They also introduce signicant savings
on radio transmission and the storage of cryptographic keys when compared with other
solutions. In order to check the feasibility of the proposed schemes, all key distribution
protocols were implemented on standard sensor nodes. The evaluation results show that
the protocols have short execution time and low energy consumption which makes them
suitable even for tiny 8-bit devices. These results prove also for the rst time that the
use of Identity-Based Cryptography schemes is a practical way of providing Public Key
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Cryptography in sensor networks.
7.1 Research objectives achieved
The application of identity-based cryptography protocols in sensor networks is a dif-
cult task that requires execution of cryptographic primitives used in Elliptic Curve Cryp-
tography and Pairing-Based Cryptography. The computational complexity of Identity-
Based Cryptography schemes is signicant, and implementations on standard sensor
nodes need to be highly optimized to be practical. Identity-Based Cryptography schemes
require many modules and each of them needs to be implemented efciently in order
to achieve the maximum performance of the protocols. The ID-based key distribution
schemes also need to be designed for particular network organization. A solution de-
signed for a heterogeneous sensor network might have low performance when applied
in a at network scenario.
This thesis presents a detailed description on how to provide practical key distribu-
tion mechanisms for sensor network. It also proposes three new key distribution pro-
tocols tailored for different sensor network organizations and various communication
patterns. New contributions to the state-of-the-art are added on many levels of develop-
ment.
On the lowest level, nite eld arithmetic operations on constrained CPU's are de-
scribed in detail. In particular, new methods for performing multiprecision multiplica-
tion are presented. In the case of the prime nite eld, an improved hybrid method is
proposed, which accelerates the calculations by using extra registers of a given proces-
sor. The general applicability of the idea has been demonstrated on three different 8, 16
and 32-bit architectures. In all of these cases, signicant performance improvements have
been achieved. For the binary eld case a new hierarchical method for polynomial mul-
tiplication is proposed. This new technique is optimized for elds of large characteristic
and achieves a signicant improvement in execution time when compared with previous
methods.
The thesis also studied the implementation of basic Elliptic Curve Cryptography
primitives on different sensor platforms. This research resulted in the development of
the NanoECC library. The library has the best performance among existing Elliptic Curve
Cryptography implementations on different sensor devices and can be easily integrated
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into sensor network applications. The high speed of the library was achieved through
efcient implementation of point multiplication algorithms and arithmetic routines op-
timization in assembly language. The energy consumption of basic Elliptic Curve Cryp-
tography primitives was also measured. The achieved results prove that Elliptic Curve
Cryptography is not only feasible on sensor devices, but is also attractive for constrained
sensor nodes such as the MICA2 and the Tmote Sky. NanoECC also showed for the rst
time that Elliptic Curve Cryptography over binary elds can be implemented as ef-
ciently as over prime elds.
Another contribution of this thesis is the rst in-depth study on the application of
pairing-based cryptography to wireless sensor networks. The research on bilinear pair-
ing implementations on sensor nodes resulted in the development of the Micro-pairings
package. Micro-pairings provides the fastest currently available pairing implementations
on popular sensor nodes. The results achievedwithMicro-pairings show that the ´T pair-
ing over binary elds gives the best performance on the tested hardware platforms. On
the most constrained 8-bit sensor nodes, the pairing can be calculated in only 2.66s  a
time comparable with the point multiplication operation. The signicance of the above
result is that pairings were long considered as too heavyweight for small embedded de-
vices. Efcient implementation of pairings opens the door for a whole new range of se-
curity protocols in sensor networks. With the use of Micro-pairings, these new security
schemes can now be easily implemented and evaluated in a sensor network environment.
One of the main research objectives of this thesis was to design identity-based secu-
rity protocols for sensor networks. This goal was achieved by proposing three different
key distribution schemes that were designed for specic wireless sensor network mod-
els. The rst protocol was developed with at sensor networks in mind to solve the key
distribution problem among homogeneous sensor nodes. The main advantages of this
scheme is simplicity and the non-interactive feature of the key agreement process. This
allows the network to save on the energy required for radio communication and makes
the whole system highly scalable. The evaluation results showed that the proposed key
agreement protocol is feasible and practical on different sensor platforms. Proper man-
agement of node identities in the system also guarantees that the scheme is resistant to
many possible attacks.
The second scheme proposed here investigates the application of a non-interactive
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key exchange protocol in a clustered network scenario. This novel variant of a key agree-
ment scheme uses a Type 3 pairing and assigns a source and a sink key to each node in
the network. The captured node can only operate as a source of data and cannot decrypt
the packets that are addressed to other nodes. This make such a device far less useful
for a possible attacker and limits the effect of a node compromise. This feature might be
important especially in high security wireless sensor networks which deal with critical
data.
The last security protocol proposed in this thesis implements identity-based encryp-
tion to distribute keys in a heterogeneous sensor network. The scheme is called TinyIBE
and takes advantage of the enhanced processing capabilities of the cluster head nodes.
The proposed Identity-Based Encryption method provides authenticated key exchange
between the nodes and ts perfectly in the heterogenous sensor network setting. Tiny-
IBE is an efcient security bootstrapping mechanism that achieves signicant savings in
communication overhead and key storage space, when compared with the state-of-the-
art. Implementation results showed that TinyIBE is a preferable security scheme for het-
erogeneous sensor networks which provides affordable Public Key Cryptography and
achieves stronger resilience against node capture attack than any key pre-distribution
technique.
This thesis proves for the rst time that Identity-Based Cryptography protocols can
be applied to wireless sensor networks not only in theory, but also in practice. All the
implementations can be made entirely in software without the use of any specialized
hardware accelerators for cryptographic operations. The key distribution protocols pre-
sented in this thesis can be implemented efciently even on the most constrained 8-bit
platforms. This means that the technology is viable and can be used to secure real-life
WSN applications.
7.2 Future work
Providing security is undoubtedly one of the biggest challenges in the eld of wire-
less sensor networks. This thesis presents novel methods for symmetric key distribution
within sensor networks. Nevertheless, some interesting research problems in the area of
sensor network security still require further investigation. Many security issues have not
yet been fully addressed. Some of these include secure reprogramming of motes on-the-
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y and secure node localization. The key distribution schemes proposed in this thesis
can be enhanced to offer the above functionality. It would be interesting to evaluate the
performance of a combined solution in a real sensor network scenario.
The results presented in this thesis were obtained using a range of sensor devices in
order to test the feasibility of the proposed solutions on different hardware platforms.
However, it would be interesting to evaluate the proposed methods on large scale sensor
networks and already deployed networks. One possible solution would be to deploy
the code on different sensor net testbeds. This approach would check the performance
and robustness of the solutions developed, but does not provide all the results (e.g. data
regarding energy efciency).
This thesis presents implementation results for different cryptographic primitives
used in Elliptic Curve Cryptography and Pairing-Based Cryptography. These areas of
cryptography are still evolving and new advances in the state-of-the art are being made.
Recently discovered Edward curves [11] and new pairing algorithms (e.g. R-Ate pairing
[75]) providemore efcient ways to calculate the basic cryptographic primitives. It would
be benecial to include these new methods in future versions of NanoECC and Micro-
pairings. Further code optimization in terms of execution time andmemory usage would
also be advantageous.
Another opportunity for future research would be to investigate different ways to
provide end-to-end authentication of sensor data over the Internet. In many cases, the
condentiality of simple sensor readings is not as important as the authenticity of the
data. Many applications need an assurance that the origin of the sensor readings is gen-
uine and that the data is not fabricated. A solution to this problem would require new
energy efcient methods for data authentication, especially on the sensor network side.
7.3 Concluding remarks
Recent advances in wireless sensor network technology have opened the door for an ar-
ray of new and innovative applications. As the applications mature the need for reliable
security systems grows signicantly and justies the use of Public Key Cryptography
techniques to secure communication in sensor networks. Practical Public Key Cryptog-
raphy schemes in sensor networks can be applied by using identity based cryptography
techniques. This thesis proposes different ID-based key distribution protocols and shows
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for the rst time that they can be efciently implemented on popular sensor network
devices. Deploying software-based solutions such as those described in this thesis will
demonstrate the feasibility of complete public key schemes in sensor networks, and may
motivate the incorporation of hardware support for Public Key Cryptography in future
mote designs.
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APPENDIX A
Energy consumption measurements
E nergy consumption is one of the most important parameters in wireless sensor net-works. Almost all of the nodes available on the market today use batteries as the
main energy source. Current batteries offer very limited capacity especially for sensor
nodes, which are expected to operate for a few years. That is why sensor networks re-
quire low duty cycling and energy efcient protocols to prolong the network lifetime.
The energy efciency requirement applies also to security protocols in wireless sen-
sor networks. The energy consumption is especially important in the case of asymmet-
ric cryptography, which is far more complex in terms of computation than symmet-
ric key solutions. The security protocols proposed in this thesis are based on identity
based cryptography, which requires complex arithmetic operations. The key to energy
efcient Identity-Based Cryptography operations lies in fast execution of basic crypto-
graphic primitives. During this research much time and effort was spent on accelerating
nite eld arithmetic, point multiplication operations and bilinear pairings. In each case
precise energy measurements were taken to evaluate the energy consumption of sensor
nodes. This appendix describes how these energy measurements were performed.
The energy consumption of a sensor node can be measured using different methods.
It can be proled internally in software or externally by measuring devices. For exper-
iments described in this thesis the second method was chosen. To measure the average
power consumption of a sensor node a special measuring circuit was built (Figure A.1).
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Figure A.1: Experimental setup for measuring energy consumption on senor nodes
The experiments were performed on the MICA2 and the Tmote Sky platforms. The
nodes were powered from a regulated power supply, which was set to 3V (the voltage of
two standard AA batteries). Both devices had to be slightly modied for the experiments.
A precise 1­ resistor was soldered between themain PCB of the node and its battery pack.
The current drawn from the batteries (3V power source in this case) was measured based
on the voltage level (Um) on the resistor R. The voltage samples of Um were measured
using a PC with a data acquisition card. The same measurements on both devices were
taken using a National Instruments NI 5112 digitizer card. All experiments were carried
out using a LabVIEW application, which was developed for this purpose. The program
was storing samples and calculating the average voltage level from all the samples within
the Elliptic Curve Cryptography program execution period. A typical graph of Um values
on the Tmote Sky node is presented in Figure A.2. The apparent negative samples of
voltage are the result of a displaying error in the graphical software, when plotting large
number of collected samples (10MHz sampling rate). The interval with a higher average
level of voltage, indicates the time when cryptographic operations were calculated.
The total energy consumption of a node can be calculated based on the following
formula:
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Figure A.2: Voltage samples measured on the Tmote Sky node
E = Us ¢ Im ¢ t (A.1)
where Us is the voltage on the sensor node, Im is the current running through resistance
R and t is the code running time. The average value of current Im over time t can be
obtained as:
Im =
Um
R
(A.2)
With the approximation that Us = 3V the total energy consumption of a node can be
represented as:
E ¼ 3 ¢ Um
R
¢ t (A.3)
where R = 1­. In reality the value of Us is lower than 3V due to the additional resistance
R and is equal to Us = 3 ¡ Um. The current Im running through the node can be at a
maximum 20mA (according to the motes data sheets), hence the measured value of Um
is never bigger than 20mV (using R = 1­). This gives a maximal relative error of 0.67%
for Us. For example if the energy consumption was measured as 50mJ using equation A.3
than the relative error is only 0.33mJ. This makes equation A.3 a good approximation of
the node's energy consumption, which can be used in practice.
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